Innovations in Asia: Selected case studies by Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Singapore Management University
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Institute of Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
12-2017 
Innovations in Asia: Selected case studies 
Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Singapore Management University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/iie_research 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations 
Commons 
Citation 
Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Singapore Management University. Innovations in Asia: 
Selected case studies. (2017). Research Collection Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/iie_research/4 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
INNOVATIONS 
IN ASIA
― SELECTE
D CASE STU
DIES
Ordering Information
The SMU Case Collection is available through the Case Centre website: http://www.thecasecentre.org
The collection can be directly accessed on the Case Centre website at: http://www.thecasecentre.org/educators/ordering/whatsavailable/collections/
SingaporeManagementUniversity
Cases are freely available to SMU faculty on Ink:http://ink.libary.smu.edu.sg/cases_coll_all/InK supports the following browsers using Java SE7 or later: Internet 
Explorer (Windows), Chrome(Windows) and Firefox (Windows and Mac OSX).
The collection will also be available through the CMP’s new publishing platform, Asia Learning Exchange, which is expected to launch in early 2015. For 
updates on the Asia Learning Exchange, new case studies and further information on the SMU case writing initiative, please visit: http://casewriting.smu.edu.sg 
Contact the Centre for Management Practice directly at: cwp@smu.edu.sg
Preface
Asian Innovation Case Studies 
This book is a compilation of seven case studies written 
by faculty and staff of Singapore Management University 
(SMU) and has been edited in conjunction with the 
inaugural Asia Pacific Innovation Forum organised by 
the International Society for Professional Innovation 
Management (ISPIM) and hosted by SMU in December 
2014. These cases have been carefully selected to illustrate 
the various challenges inherent in creating entrepreneurial 
and business innovations.
 
The first five cases are related to start-ups by experienced 
professionals and students.
  
Jayashree is an excellent case that shows how an individual 
with very little education was able to design and implement 
a solution – based on his own observations – for meeting 
market needs at the bottom-of-the–pyramid. It is also a 
case that can be used to discuss the challenges faced in 
the product development and manufacturing stages.
 
Innova Technology was included to discuss how a company 
decided the best market to enter out of several go to market 
alternatives. It also examines the necessary due diligence 
required in product development.
 
Quantine is a good example of how some successful 
entrepreneurs must pivot their offerings based on market 
feedback and opportunities. Quantine chose to stay within 
its initial industry of interest.
 
Rainmaker Labs follows the story of an industry practitioner 
turned entrepreneur in his endeavor to create an interesting 
product that he hopes will revolutionise the retail world. 
Jungle Beer is an interesting case that introduces the 
challenges faced by a start-up offering a differentiated 
product in an existing product line, and the accompanying 
challenges in scaling up the company.
 
The last two cases are innovations by established players. 
The Gillette case explores marketing innovation in 
consumer goods and elaborates how Proctor and Gamble 
managed to increase their market share in India despite 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles to consumer adoption. 
Encompass further adds to the discussion of scaling up an 
existing business.
 
I would like to thank Professor Arnoud de Meyer, the 
President of SMU, for contributing his Encompass case, 
and also Professor Srinivas Reddy and Professor Kapil Tuli 
for contributing Gillette and Jungle Beer respectively. I 
would also like to thank the SMU Case Writing Initiative at 
the Centre for Management Practice for their unwavering 
support to faculty interested in developing cases based on 
an Asian context for classroom discussions.
Professor Arcot Desai Narasimhalu
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Abstract
Arunachalam Muruganantham is a social entrepreneur 
dedicated to solving India’s menstrual health problems. 
He developed an unprecedented product as a solution: a 
low-cost, locally produced sanitary pad. In a paragon effort 
of frugal innovation, he reverse-engineered the industrial 
processes used to make sanitary pads. The result was a 
small-scale, low-cost machine that could manufacture 
quality pads sold at a retail price that is 20 percent lower 
than the cheapest mass-produced brand. However, no one 
bought his pads until his wife began to sell them. After 
which, the two were unable to keep up with demand. This 
triggered his realisation concerning the importance of 
including women as stakeholders in the operation. His next 
step was to figure out a way to increase the availability and 
access of the pads. He needed an innovative, bottom-of-
the-pyramid solution and wanted to create a positive social 
impact along the entire value chain.
Arcot Desai Narasimhalu, 
Singapore Management University
Christopher Dula, 
Singapore Management University
Publication Type
Case
Year Completed
11-2012
Discipline
Entrepreneurial and Small Business 
Operations | Marketing | Operations and 
Supply Chain Management | Technology 
and Innovation
Data Source
Field Research
Industry
Feminine Hygiene
Geographic Coverage
India
Temporal Coverage
1998-2012
Education Level
Executive Education; Postgraduate; 
Undergraduate
Case ID
SMU-12-0046
Keyword(s)
JAYAASHREE INDUSTRIES
REVOLUTIONISING SANITARY PAD USAGE IN INDIA
1Social enterprise, social entrepreneur, social entrepreneurship, development, gender development, women, menstrual health, menstrual hygiene, hygiene, feminine hygiene, bottom of the pyramid, innovation, frugal innovation, women’s groups, distribution, sales, scale-up, reverse engineering
This case was written by Professor Arcot Desai Narasimhalu and Christopher 
Dula at the Singapore Management University. The case was prepared solely 
to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate 
either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors 
may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to 
protect confidentiality. 
Copyright © 2012, Singapore Managment University
Version: 2012-11-15 
Muruganantham was a newly married man in 1998. One day 
he noticed his wife slinking about while holding something 
hidden behind her. Confronting her, he gestured behind his 
back and asked what she was holding, to which she replied, 
“None of your business”.
He pressed her and was shocked to discover that she was 
concealing an old dirty rag she used to manage her menstrual 
period. He begged, “You’re an educated woman, why aren’t 
you using sanitary pads?”1 Hesitantly she answered,
So it was a matter of cost. Muruganantham was appalled. 
He never thought about menstrual health or considered it 
an issue. As he would later come to realise, India faced 
serious, multifaceted problems due to poor menstrual 
hygiene. It was a hidden problem, and Shanti, his wife, 
was not alone.
The more he thought about it, he came around to believe 
that the problem persisted due to a lack of women’s 
empowerment and affordable access to sanitary pads. In 
his view, a solution could be achieved by manufacturing 
low-cost sanitary pads locally. From that point, he vowed to 
help India achieve a sanitary pad use rate of 100 percent. 
It was barely above ten percent at the time.
For seven years he worked tirelessly to develop a sanitary 
pad of comparable quality to those made by multinational 
consumer goods manufacturers. He endured numerous 
hardships through his quest including estrangement from 
his wife, but eventually succeeded in reverse engineering 
both the pad and the machine that was used to make it. In 
2005 he had a working prototype. A little over a year later, 
he founded Jayaashree Industries to begin producing and 
selling the low-cost sanitary pads.
I know about san
itary pads, 
but if myself and 
my sisters 
started using that,
 we’d have 
to cut the family m
ilk budget.
1   Stephanie Nolen, “The Absorbing Tale of One Man’s Quest for Better Feminine Hygiene.” The Globe and Mail, October 4, 2012, retrieved from: http://globe2go.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx. Accessed December 2012. 
2  G. C. Shekhar, “Inventor Prize for School Dropout – Honour for Sparking Hygiene Revolution”, The Telegraph, November 25, 2012, retrieved from: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1091125/jsp/nation/story_11783178.jsp. Accessed December 2012.
3  “A Tide of Change in India – 3,000 days of pain and shame is out in the open”, Water Supply and Sanitation Council, September 12, 2012, retrieved from: http://www.wsscc.org/resources/resource-news-archive/tide-change-india-3000-days-pain-and-shame- out-open. Accessed December 2012.
4  Kounteya Sinha, “70% Can’t Afford Sanitary Napkins, Reveals Study”, The Times of India, January 23, 2011, retrieved from: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-01-23/india/28363510_1_women-resort-napkins-menstruating. Accessed December 2012.  
5  “A Tide of Change in India – 3,000 days of pain and shame is out in the open”, Water Supply and Sanitation Council, September 12, 2012, retrieved from http://www.wsscc.org/resources/resource-news-archive/tide-change-india-3000-days-pain-and-shame-out- open. Accessed December 2012.  
However, by late 2006, Muruganantham had become 
discouraged by his pile of unsold pads. He had not sold 
one.2 At this point, Shanti reconciled with him, and decided 
to try and sell the pads herself. She succeeded. By 2007 
the couple could not keep up with demand. It was then that 
Muruganantham understood the importance of involving 
women in the operation.
However, the couple could only produce a thousand pads per 
day with their machine. If Muruganatham wanted to realise 
his dream of India reaching a 100 percent sanitary pad use 
rate, he would need to expand the scope of Jayaashree’s 
operations. He needed a way for more of his pads to reach 
many more women.
2
Menstrual health in India
Menstrual health continued to be an issue for India 15 
years after Muruganantham first became aware of the 
matter. In 2012 there were 355 million women in India of 
menstruation age.3 Only 12 percent of these women had 
access to sanitary pads.4 As an alternative, most women 
in India used unhygienic old rags, dried plant matter, 
newspapers, or ash. Others simply wore the same clothes 
and isolated themselves from others.
Further, menstrual health education was not available 
to 200 million of India’s women.5 These women were 
simply unaware of the full risks of unhygienic practices. 
The disparity was clear; women who did not use sanitary 
pads had 70 percent more reproductive and urinary tract 
infections than users.6 This contributed to India’s high 
maternal mortality rate of 212 per 100,000 live births, or 
one pregnancy-related maternal death every ten minutes.7
Thirty one percent of Indian women also self-reported 
decreased levels of productivity.8 On average, these 
women experienced a loss of 2.2 days per month during 
their menstrual period.9 Of greater concern was the strong 
correlation between school dropout rates for girls and 
the onset of puberty.10 In 2012, this dropout rate was 
23 percent for pubescent girls; managing menstruation 
was hypothesised to be a causal factor.11 The health and 
economic consequences of low sanitary pad use were 
serious and significant. Several identifiable reasons 
behind low rates of use were to blame: accessibility, 
cost, and awareness.
Accessibility and cost
India already had a low rate of sanitary pad use, especially 
when compared to the 96 percent use rates witnessed in 
developed countries.12 However, pad use rates in India 
were not evenly distributed. Metropolitan areas, with their 
more developed markets and higher incomes, skewed the 
numbers on sanitary pad use. The situation was much worse 
in rural areas.
When looking at per capita, it is a mix of both urban and 
rural... but if you remove the metros like Mumbai or Delhi... 
it is two percent.
Cost was a limiting factor for market availability, and 
rural areas were typically much poorer than their urban 
counterparts. Sanitary pads were just not available for 
sale in many rural areas. In this sense, women in villages 
often did not have access to sanitary pads, even if their 
incomes permitted. Regardless, per capita use in urban 
areas was still low, with two out of ten urban women using 
eight sanitary napkins per month on average.13 The more 
challenging problem, however, was convincing others to 
acknowledge the issue and address it.
Awareness
Social mores surrounding menstruation were symptomatic 
of gender inequality in India; it prevented menstrual hygiene 
from being recognised as a problem. Muruganantham would 
experience first hand the popular belief that menstruation 
was impure and polluting – even to discuss the matter was 
considered taboo. These views were particularly severe in 
more traditional and conservative areas like villages. Women 
in these places were sometimes barred from participating in 
social activities and segregated from their families during 
their menstrual periods.14
These factors were very real impediments to India’s socio-
economic development, but in 1998, Muruganantham was 
still unaware of how large the problem truly was.
6  Nisha Kumar Kulkarni, “Promoting Feminine Hygiene in India,” Searchlight South Asia, June 21, 2011, retrieved from: http://urbanpoverty.intellecap.com/?p=62. Accessed December 2012. 
7  Aarti Dhar, “U.N.: India likely to miss MDG on maternal health”, The Hindu, July 2, 2012, retrieved from: http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/health/policy-and-issues/un-india-likely-to-miss-mdg-on-maternal-health/article3595095.ece. Accessed December 2012. 
8  Nisha Kumar Kulkarni, “Promoting Feminine Hygiene in India,” Searchlight South Asia, June 21, 2011, retrieved from: http://urbanpoverty.intellecap.com/?p=62. Accessed December 2012. 
9  Ibid. 10 Varina Tjon A. Ten, “Menstrual Hygiene: A Neglected Condition for the Achievement of Several Millennium Development Goals”, Europe External Policy Advisors, October 10, 2011, retrieved from: http://www.wsscc.org/sites/default/files/publications/tjon-a-ten-menstrual_hygiene-2007.pdf.
   Accessed December 2012. 11 “A Tide of Change in India – 3,000 days of pain and shame is out in the open”, Water Supply and Sanitation Council, September 12, 2012, retrieved from http://www.wsscc.org/resources/resource-news-archive/tide-change-india-3000-days-pain-and-shame-out- open.
   Accessed December 2012. 
12 Nisha Kumar Kulkarni, “Promoting Feminine Hygiene in India,” Searchlight South Asia, June 21, 2011, retrieved from: http://urbanpoverty.intellecap.com/?p=62. Accessed December 2012. 3
Satisfying unmet needs 
through innovation
Troubleshooting 
Muruganantham was troubled by what he saw with his wife. 
It was wrong that she suffered because his family could not 
afford her basic hygiene. He was curious about this issue, 
and sought to discover why sanitary pads were so relatively 
expensive. He went to the store and purchased one. He 
recalled, 
That fellow [the shopkeeper] looks left and right and spread a newspaper 
– rolls it [the sanitary pads] into the newspaper – and gives it to me like a 
banned item or something like that.
He returned home to investigate the contraband in private.
I thought to myself, "this white substance made of cotton… my god, 
that guy is just using a penny value of raw material…they are selling for 
pounds… dollars! Why not make a local sanitary pad for my wife?"
Muruganantham sensed an opportunity. If he could discover 
a low-cost method to produce a clean and effective sanitary 
pad, he would be able to improve the lives of women 
throughout India.
The commercial pads were ostensibly simple in construction; 
little more than cotton. He began experimenting by making 
his own sanitary pad replicas. However these pads were 
untested – he needed volunteers. “But who in India 
would volunteer to test his homemade sanitary pads…who 
anywhere!?” he thought.
The only available victim is my wife, so I made a sanitary pad and handed 
it to her. One day she said, openly, “I’m not going to support this research.” 
Then the other victims are my younger sisters. But even sisters, wives, 
they’re not ready to support [this] research.
As he came to recognise, menstrual health was a sensitive 
subject in India, and his family was unwilling to discuss it. 
His experimentation process needed to be more clinical. 
He had an idea. Muruganantham recruited female medical 
students to volunteer for prototype testing. He gave them 
questionnaires to provide performance data on his pads 
because they would refuse to speak with him directly. 
Unfortunately this method did not yield any useful feedback. 
He needed better data. Muruganantham began testing the 
prototypes on himself.
I wore a sanitary pad. I filled animal blood in a football bladder. I tied it up 
here [pointing to around his waist]. There is a tube going into my panties, 
while I’m walking, while I’m cycling; I made a press and doses of blood 
will go there. Muruganantham laughed, “I am the first man in the world to 
wear a sanitary pad!”
Simulated menstruation gave him a critical understanding of 
his pad’s shortcomings, and in the process, he empathised 
more with women. However, this unconventional method 
was rousing suspicion in the community. Some even 
believed he was practicing black magic.15
Perseverance
His wife, Shanti, suspected Muruganantham was having 
affairs with the medical students. She left to visit her 
parents, and a short time later, he received a divorce notice 
in the mail. He was devastated and shortly thereafter moved 
in with his mother. There he continued his research 
where he had another idea on how to improve his 
research methodology.
He needed a better way than questionnaires to evaluate his 
pad’s performance. Muruganantham subsequently colour 
coded the prototype pads to correspond with each tester. 
He then convinced the testers to drop off the used pads in 
a bin near his residence where he would discreetly collect 
them. He then devoted one room of his mother’s house as 
a research laboratory.
13  Mohammed Ekramul Haque, “Happy Period: a bright future for the feminine hygiene product market in India is reason enough to invest in P&G”, Bloomberg, November 28, 2008, Outlook Profit, retrieved from: http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=ljIEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PT27&lpg=PT27&dq=Happy+
     Period:+a+bright+future+for+the+feminine+hygiene&source=bl&ots=6Ax5VRwvxV&sig=5rjkh6m2YvOnsFrtl-8jhUXatY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=nFUbUYHtFceOrgewqIHgCQ&ved=0CDwQ6AEwAg. Accessed December 2012. 
14  Yousra Yusuf, “Celebrate Solutions: Addressing Taboos to Improve Women’s Lives”, Women Deliver, October 1, 2012, retrieved from: http://www.womendeliver.org/updates/entry/celebrate-solutions-addressing-taboos-to-improve-womens-lives.
     Accessed December 2012. 4
Specifically, it was cellulose derived from the wood fibres 
of pinewood. He learned that the production of commercial 
sanitary pads required a defibration process that used 
machines often worth over a million dollars to separate 
usable cellulose from the fibres into what was called fluffy 
pulp. This was a large capital investment typically made 
by multinational companies like Johnson & Johnson and 
Proctor & Gamble. A locally produced, low-cost sanitary pad 
would need an entirely different production model.
Muruganantham’s machine
Muruganathan spent the next two and half years developing 
a machine that could make low-cost sanitary pads 
comparable to the ones produced by multinational personal 
care companies.19 It was a long process of trial and error, 
or, according to Muruganantham, what corporations called 
‘R&D’. The only difference was that Muruganantham worked 
independently and on his own budget.
During that time, he came to understand how commercial 
pads were manufactured, and he worked to innovate 
a simpler process. Piece by piece his machine came 
together. First he developed a defibration unit that could 
mechanically separate moldable pulp from wood fibres. He 
next built a core forming machine to mold the pulp into an 
absorbent pad, and then another machine to seal the pad 
using non-woven fabric. The last add-on was a ultraviolet 
This set up did not last long. Muruganantham’s mother 
walked into his laboratory and saw multiple used sanitary 
pads splayed out over a table. She was so upset that she 
wept and asked her son to leave home. The small town 
where he lived also ostracised him because of his research. 
The community agreed that Muruganantham was no longer 
welcome. After facing much public ridicule, he had to leave.
A breakthrough
Muruganantham relocated to the neighboring city of 
Coimbatore. It was the second largest city in the southern 
state of Tamil Nadu, and was home to 1.5 million people.16 
He fell on hard times, and eventually found work as a 
machine operator, living in cramped quarters. Nonetheless 
he continued his research and development into producing 
a low-cost sanitary pad.
The cotton pads that Muruganantham had been developing 
were unable to absorb fluids and maintain their shape. 
Apparently, there was something more to commercial 
sanitary pads despite their resemblance to cotton. He 
experimented with other materials but never had any 
success.17 After years of experimentation, he eventually 
removed the absorbent material inside a commercial pad 
and tested it in a lab – it was cellulose.18
unit to sterilise the pads (refer to Exhibit 1 for a diagram of 
the manufacturing process). By 2005 Muruganantham had 
completed the final design and assembled a fully operational 
machine that cost less than US$1,400 to build.20
Muruganantham was able to keep his costs low by 
developing what he called “a virtual factory”. He lacked 
the resources to invest in the machinery necessary to build 
the component parts for the machine himself. Instead, he 
relied on a novel alternative. The machinery used in various 
metal fabrication shops across Coimbatore were not always 
in use; there was idle time.
Muruganantham spent months contacting all of the 
fabrication shops in town to create a catalog of contact 
information, schedules and capabilities. He was amazed 
how much excess capacity existed. When these fabrication 
shops had idle manpower and machine time he would 
contract them to produce specialised component parts of 
his sanitary pad making. Otherwise he ordered off-the-shelf 
components. In this manner he only needed a small space 
to assemble all 113 parts of his machine.
Satisfying unmet needs
He then patented his design and delivered the specifications 
to the Indian Institute of Technology in Chennai where he 
requested it to be evaluated. 
15  Lakshmi Sandhana, “India’s Women Given Low-Cost Route to Sanitary Protection”, The Guardian, The Observer, January 22, 2012, retrieved from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2012/jan/22/sanitary-towels-india-cheap-manufacture. Accessed December 2012. 16 Coimbatore, 
    “General Information on Coimbatore”, retrieved from http://www.coimbatore.com/general.htm. Accessed December 2012
16   Coimbatore, “General Information on Coimbatore”, retrieved from http://www.coimbatore.com/general.htm. Accessed December 2012
17  Lakshmi Sandhana, “India’s Women Given Low-Cost Route to Sanitary Protection”, The Guardian, The Observer, January 22, 2012, retrieved from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2012/jan/22/sanitary-towels-india-cheap-manufacture. Accessed December 2012.  18 Ibid.  19 Ibid. 5
The institute was so impressed with Muruganantham’s 
design that they registered it on his behalf in the competition 
for Best Innovation for the Betterment of Society, which he 
then won in 2006.21 That same year he founded Jayaashree 
Industries (refer to Exhibit 2 for capital and startup costs). 
Recognition for his work began to draw attention, including 
Shanti’s. He and his wife reunited.
Profit was never Muruganantham’s motivation. He wanted 
to sell his sanitary pads at near cost (refer to Exhibit 3 
for a typical monthly income statement). He believed that 
success would be based on creating positive social impact 
along the entire value chain rather than maximising profit 
for personal gain. Jayaashree would be a social enterprise.
In late 2006 Muruganantham and his wife ran operations 
at Jayaashree producing and selling low-cost sanitary pads 
(refer to Exhibit 4 for monthly input and operating costs). 
Two people using his machine could make 1,000 pads a 
day that were 20 percent cheaper than the lowest-cost 
mass-market commercial pads sold in India. His retail 
price for a packet of eight of his machine-made pads was 
US$0.29 as compared with US$0.36 to US$1.28 for 
mass-market commercial pads of the same per quantity 
packet (refer to Exhibit 5 for the pricing model). They were 
also equivalently effective at comfortably and hygienically 
managing a period. This was a significant difference that 
improved the affordability of sanitary pads for the price-
sensitive rural poor.
The next step
It was 2007, nearly ten years since Muruganantham first 
conceived of making a low-cost locally produced sanitary 
pad. Just a few months ago he worried that his venture 
would fail. After all, he could not sell a single pad. However, 
once his wife began selling the pads, the couple was unable 
to keep up with demand. This was a crucial insight.
Muruganantham finally understood the importance that 
women played as key stakeholders. If Jayaashree was to 
succeed, women would have to be involved at every level of 
the value chain. Overcoming the underlying issues behind 
menstrual health would have to be on their terms.
One critical challenge remained: Jayaashee Industries was 
unable to meet the demand for its pads. A 1,000 pad per 
day production rate was a long way from enabling India to 
achieve a 100 percent sanitary pad use rate. Hundreds 
of millions of women across the entire sub-continent still 
needed to adopt sanitary pads. His pads needed to reach a 
lot more women. What could he do?
EXHIBIT 1: 
SANITARY NAPKIN MAKING MACHINE 
– MANUFACTURING PROCESS
Defibration machine breaks down wood pulp into fibres
Wood pulp fibres are measured on a scale
The measured amounts of wood pulp fill a core mould
The moulded pulp is pressed using a core-forming machine
Pressed cores are wrapped into non-woven fabric
Wrapped cores are machine scaled
Finished sanitary napkins are packaged
Source: Jayashree Industries, retrieved from: http://newinventions.in/. Accessed December 2012.
20  Shobha Warrier, “How a Highschool Dropout Empowers Rural Women”, Rediff Business. August 10, 2010, retrieved from: http://www.rediff.com/business/slide-show/slide-show-1-how-a-school-dropout-empowers-rural-women/20100810.htm. Accessed December 2012.
21  “Arunachalam Muruganantham – CEO, Jayaashree Industries,” The Nand & Jeet Khemka Foundation, http://khemkafoundation.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=167:arunachalam-muruganantham&Itemid=287.
     Accessed December 2012. 6
EXHIBIT 2: 
CAPITAL AND STARTUP COSTS
EXHIBIT 3: 
TYPICAL INCOME STATEMENT
 
 
Capital Costs Typical Startup Costs
Description                 Units               Total Cost (US$) Description                                         Total Cost (US$) Description                                               US$
Defibration machine                         1            370 Advance for working place*                             90 Monthly revenue
- Monthly napkin production * Wholesale price           1038.80
Weighing scale                    1           55 Installation and training fees**                          70
Monthly costs
- Raw material input costs           (668.25)
- Central sales tax on inputs (12.5 percent)          (83.53)
Core moulds                    5         55 Running capital for two months                                  1569
Monthly Expenses
- Rent             13.55
- Electric utilities            9.00
- General admin.            18.08
Core forming machine                      1           105 Registration for Small Scale Industries (SSI) 
Ultra-violet treatment unit              1           190
Soft-touch sealing machine    515
Work table                                       2      36
Plastic buckets and trays                 5              10
Central sales tax (12.5 percent)    167
 Total costs plus tax         1,503
  Total costs                1,856
  Total costs              119.83
* The equipment and workspace requires an area at least 16’ x 16’ or 12’ x 10’. 
   Entrance must be at least 30’’ wide.
** One free day of training is provided. Installation fees are determined by travel costs from 
     Coimbatore to destination along with food and accommodation expenses.
Note: Costs converted into US dollars from Indian rupees at rate 1 INR : 0.0181 US$
Source: Jayashree Industries, retrieved from: http://newinventions.in/. Accessed December 2012.
Source: Jayashree Industries, retrieved from: http://newinventions.in/. Accessed December 2012.
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- Direct labour costs            (126.56) and initial misc. admin. expenses                       127
Monthly Operating Expenses
Expense                                             Cost (US$)
Rent                                 13.55
Electricity                                       9.00
General Administrative Expenses                                        18.08
   Total             40.63
EXHIBIT 4: 
MONTHLY (25 DAYS) 
OPERATING AND INPUT EXPENSES
EXHIBIT 5: 
PRICING MODEL
   
 
Monthly Input Costs
Description               Units                 Total Cost (US$)
Wood Pulp                        362.5 Kg      360.75
Top Layer               5.5 Kg       153.75
Back Layer                              8.75 Kg       29.50
Release Paper              275 Sheets       13.5
Gum               25 Kg       49.75
Packing Covers              4500 Covers       61
           Total costs        668.25
Description      Workers         Direct Labour Cost (US$)
Semi-Skilled Worker       4 people                        126.56
Note: Costs converted into US dollars from Indian rupees at rate 1 INR : 0.0181 US$
Note: Raw Materials: wood fiber for wood pulp, thermo-bonded 
non-woven fabric, film & polyethylene for top & back layer, release paper, glue/ gum,
packing covers.
Source: Jayashree Industries, retrieved from: http://newinventions.in/. Accessed December 2012.
Description                                                US$
Cost Per Napkin Packet                                  8.30
- Raw material costs plus waste
Target Profit                                 5.00
Wholesale Price           13.50
Add Whole Seller’s Profit Margin of 20 Percent         2.50
Estimated retail price per packet                   15.80
  
8 Napkins Per Packet
4,320 packets per month
Note: Costs converted into US dollars from Indian rupees at rate 1 INR : 0.0181 US$
Source: Jayashree Industries, retrieved from: http://newinventions.in/. Accessed December 2012.
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Abstract
This case is the first part of a two-part series on Innova 
Technology, a technology start-up company based in 
Singapore. The two cases focus on:
Case (A) 
– Developing, producing and marketing a product innovation
Case (B) 
– Growth strategies for a young technology company
The case is set in May 2012, and begins with the protagonist, 
Rick Tan, chief executive officer of Innova Technology 
Private Limited, contemplating what his company’s go-to-
market strategy should be.
Tan and his business partner, Jonathan Lim, who is 
also the chief technology officer for Innova Technology, 
developed PROTAG, a new anti-loss device, using Bluetooth 
technology. The device, which is about the size of two credit 
cards stacked together, is synched to a mobile phone and 
can be attached to valuable personal belongings such as 
keys, wallets, handbags, passports and even phones. If the 
valuable item were to be separated from the person by more 
than a certain distance, the device would set off an alarm 
alerting the owner of its potential loss.
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INNOVA TECHNOLOGY (A): 
SEEKING A MARKET FOR ANTI-LOSS DEVICES
Tan and Lim are two young entrepreneurs who set up Innova 
Technology in January 2011 as a technology start-up 
under the auspices of Singapore Management University’s 
Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Tan, the 
partner with the business and finance skills, focused on 
developing a sound business plan and raising funds for 
their product. Lim, the technology guru, channelled his 
efforts to fine-tune the technology and develop a design 
with unique functionality.
After extensive market research and encouraging results 
from beta test sales using the crowdfunding site IndieGoGo, 
Tan had confidence in his product. Yet, he was keenly aware 
that a great product could fall flat in the market if it was 
not backed by a well-designed marketing strategy. The 
partners had invested in manufacturing and 5,000 pieces 
of PROTAG had already been shipped out from the factory. 
The business’s budget was wearing thin and Tan had one 
shot to get his marketing plan right. Tan had to decide on 
the most appropriate go-to-market strategy for PROTAG:
Should he mass market the product or focus on a 
specific consumer segment? 
Which segment(s) should he focus on?
Should he use multiple sales channels or stick to one? 
Which was the most appropriate channel for his product?
What price should he charge? 9
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On the morning of May 2012, Rick Tan, the chief executive 
officer of Innova Technology, nervously paced the floor of his 
small office in Singapore Management University’s (SMU’s) 
Business Innovation Generator. He stopped to glance at 
the small device that lay on the table before him. Slowly, 
his gaze shifted to the giant white board on which he had 
schematically displayed the various options and strategies 
for the launch of his company’s brand new product.
Tan and his business partner, Jonathan Lim, who was 
also the chief technology officer for Innova Technology, 
had developed PROTAG, a new anti-loss device, using 
Bluetooth technology. The device, which was about the 
size of two credit cards stacked together, was synched to a 
mobile phone, and could be attached to valuable personal 
belongings such as keys, wallets, handbags, passports and 
even phones. If the valuable item were to be separated 
from the person by more than a specified distance, the 
device would set off an alarm, alerting the owner of its 
potential loss.
The idea to build and sell an anti-loss device came to the 
two young entrepreneurs in late 2010. Tan recalled the day 
in January 2011, when he had rushed into Lim’s office, 
barely able to keep his voice steady, “Jon, I just received 
a call from SPRING Singapore and they have agreed to 
extend a grant of US$62,000 of seed money for us to start 
manufacturing our first batch of devices.” Shortly after, 
the start-up was established under the auspices of SMU’s 
Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship.
In the 15 months that followed, Tan and Lim worked 
frenetically, frequently pulling all-nighters, to fine-tune the 
technology, develop a design with unique functionality and 
finalise the modular manufacturing process with partners 
in China. The duo also worked tirelessly to raise additional 
funding for their product, which they believed had the 
tremendous potential for global sales in a relatively new 
market.
With the technology, design and manufacturing issues 
resolved, Tan’s focus shifted to the marketing and 
distribution aspects of the business. He recognised that 
Innova Technology was a small start-up trying to create 
awareness amongst its target customers and establishing 
a footprint in a growing market. Tan was confident of 
his product but he also understood that a great product 
could fall flat in the market if it was not backed by a well-
designed marketing strategy. The partners had invested in 
manufacturing and 5,000 pieces of PROTAG had already 
been shipped out from the factory. The business’ budget 
was wearing thin and Tan had only one shot to get his 
marketing plan right.
There were strategic decisions to be made before proposing 
the most appropriate go-to-market strategy for PROTAG. 
Tan had spent the last couple of weeks examining each 
strategy in detail and distilling the options – and now he 
had to make the final decision.
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Market for anti-loss devices
Anti-loss devices were part of the burgeoning consumer 
electronics market. After a slight dip in revenue during 
the global financial crisis, the global market for consumer 
electronics picked up in 2011. Favourable demographics, 
rising consumer incomes, and lifestyle trends helped to 
boost the global consumer electronics industry. Consumer 
electronics sales were estimated to reach US$1,210 billion 
in 2017 with a compound average growth rate of 5.4 
percent over the next five years from 2012 to 2017.1
The market for anti-loss devices grew considerably since the 
early 2000s. Statistics showed that ten mobile phones were 
lost or stolen in the UK every minute; many of which were 
not found and the owner sustained a considerable loss.2 
The Transport for London reported 122,930 lost items in 
2012, including 7,505 sets of keys. New York subway users 
and bus riders, on average, lost 19,000 items each year and 
2,000 items were reported to have been lost at New York’s 
Grand Central Station alone. The ferry service in Sydney 
collected 150 lost items daily.3
It was no wonder that the demand for anti-loss devices was 
growing rapidly. In 2011, the global anti-loss device market 
was valued at US$18 million.4
Small beginnings
Tan first met Lim when he was a second-year undergraduate 
student; both were doing internships at a real estate firm 
in Singapore. The two hit it off very well and decided to go 
into business together. A student at the business school 
at SMU, Tan was the one with the business and finance 
expertise, while Lim, with his engineering background, was 
the design and technology guru.
The two friends began to brainstorm ideas for a viable 
business. The idea for developing an anti-loss device came 
from Lim who once nearly lost US$32,000 in cheques, 
by accidentally leaving them in a bus.5 Realising that 
it was a great stroke of luck that he managed to recover 
the cheques, Lim then thought of developing an anti-loss 
device to prevent people from losing valuable everyday 
objects. Lim recalled,
I accidentally left my folder containing those priceless cheques behind on 
the bus! …. I couldn’t imagine having to face the buyer again to explain 
why I needed new cheques from him.
The idea was to develop a device that would provide a 
safeguard against losing objects which were intrinsically 
worth more than the device itself. The product was initially 
developed with overseas travellers in mind, so as to “…
Minimise the trauma and trouble of losing valuables while 
travelling”.
The product was to be light, portable, easy to operate and 
reasonably priced. The main feature of the device was 
the ability to activate an alarm from the user’s phone if 
the item tagged with the anti-loss device was further than 
a certain distance from the user. Tan’s idea was to be a 
market differentiator. After examining the competition, he 
concluded,
I did a search on the Internet and found that there was really nothing much 
out there. For electronics devices such as notebooks and mobiles, there 
could be security software. What I wanted was a device that could work 
equally well for electronic as well as non-electronic valuables.
In 2011, the two major international players in anti-loss 
devices were Cobra Tag and Blue Watchdog. The Cobra Tag, 
priced at US$59.95, came with a bi-directional connection 
between the device and the phone, so that finding one using 
the other was possible as long as it was within Bluetooth 
range.6 The Blue Watchdog mainly targeted markets in the 
United States and Europe.7 Its most salient feature was 
its 100 decibel alarm that could be triggered at a distance 
of more than 30 metres. Priced at US$77.14, its main 
shortcoming was that it did not offer protection against the 
loss of the mobile phone itself.8
1 Global Consumer Electronics Industry 2012-17: Trend, Profit and Forecast Analysis, Lucintel, July 2012, http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/2312943/global_consumer_electronics_industry_20122017, assessed June, 2013. 
2 TrackingMobile.co.uk, How to Locate Your Phone: Lost Mobile Phone Recovery, http://trackingmobile.co.uk/how-to-locate-your-phone-lost-mobile-phone-recovery/, accessed June 2013.
3 MicroTrax, Alarming Statistics, http://www.micro-trax.com/statistics/, accessed June 2013. 4 Innova Technology Pte Limited, company estimates. 5 US$1 = SGD 1.25, annual average exchange rate for 2012, www.oanda.com, accessed June 2013. 11
Tan concentrated on writing the business proposal and 
raising funds for the start-up while Lim focused his efforts 
on developing the technology behind the product. Lim 
explained,
Rick and I also fitted very well together. I really hate writing proposals – 
I’m an engineer, not a writer. [Rick] is in charge of the accounts, marketing 
and business development.
Innova Technology Private Limited was established as a 
technology start-up in January 2011, three months after 
the duo started brainstorming.
Funding and seed capital
The funding for the start-up came from various sources. 
In collaboration with SMU’s Institute for Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship, Innova Technology’s business plan 
received priority consideration under the SPRING Singapore 
grant scheme. SPRING Singapore was a government body 
that provided financial and advisory services to Singapore’s 
small and medium-sized enterprises to support them at 
the growth and expansion stage. It was also a national 
standards and accreditation body, which also provided 
additional quality endorsement for companies expanding 
overseas. Innova Technology received US$62,500 from 
SPRING capital as seed capital for its venture.
Tan and Lim also contributed to seed capital from personal 
savings, which they had saved up from the time they had 
been working in the real estate business together.
In an innovative move, the partners tapped into the market 
for crowdfunding and obtained pre-orders for PROTAG 
worth US$10,000 from an online site called IndieGoGo. 
The results from the first round of crowdfunding were 
encouraging – by pricing the product at a discounted 
price, Tan was able to gauge market sentiment, drum up 
publicity and solicit feedback to improve the product prior 
to its full launch.
Tan was inclined to raise funds entirely through this 
promising source. However, after further deliberation, it 
was decided that he would also pursue other investors and 
technology incubator firms as they also brought with them 
expertise and management advice. Tan met Leslie Loh of 
Red Dot Ventures, a venture capital company, at a start-up 
pitch organised by TechInAsia, an online technology news 
forum that focussed on Asia. Innova Technology was able to 
raise US$400,000 from Red Dot Ventures and the National 
Research Foundation.
Red Dot Ventures provided Innova Technology with more 
than just funds. They provided support and valuable advice 
to the young entrepreneurs on appropriate packaging, etc. 
and also linked them with their contacts in Europe. 
Tan commented:
[RedDot] had good experience in running big businesses and knew what 
it takes to make it work. I learned much in management processes, 
distribution, etc.
Product design and manufacturing
In January 2011, after receiving the grant from SPRING, 
Innova Technology set up a small office in SMU’s Business 
Innovations Generator, where the duo worked on crafting the 
device specifications and putting together the manufacturing 
process and the go-to-market strategy. Working with SMU’s 
Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship gave them an 
added advantage of having access to subject matter experts 
whom they could turn to for advice.
Product differentiation
The team worked on differentiating itself from existing 
competitors such as Blue Watchdog and Cobra Tag, which 
were listed companies in the United States (refer to Exhibit 
1 for Competitive Analysis). Tan did comprehensive market 
research to understand the products that were currently in 
the market. His aim was to have a competitive advantage 
by combining a number of features into a package that 
the competitors did not offer, such as phone contacts, 
adjustable ring volume and variable alert distances.
6  Antuan Goodwin, Cobra Tag Finds Your Lost Keys, Phone, Other Junk, Cnet, April 25, 2011, http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13746_7-20057309-48.html, accessed July, 2013.
7 Mike Hanlon, Blue Watchdog Turns Your Mobile Phone Into an All-purpose Anti-theft Device, Gizmag, September 26, 2010, http://www.gizmag.com/blue-watchdog-mobile-phone-all-purpose-anti-theft-device/16471/, 
  assessed July, 2013. 8 US$1 = EUR 1.2856, annual average exchange rate for 2012, www.oanda.com, accessed July, 2013. 12
The development of the final product was through an 
iterative process of testing and re-designing. The team also 
relied on feedback from user groups based on beta test sales 
of PROTAG Generation 1. The hardware design was altered 
to ensure manufacturing consistency and, after a couple 
more iterations, PROTAG was ready for manufacturing (refer 
to Exhibit 2 for Development Roadmap). According to Tan, 9
For a hardware firm like ours, we had to ensure that the process was right 
from the start. If not, it gets complicated when you have to talk to the 
manufacturer regarding changes.
The final product was the size of two credit cards stacked 
together – the thinnest of its kind in the market – that could 
be broken into two parts to be attached to objects as small 
as a keychain, wallet, bag or phone (refer to Exhibit 3 for 
PROTAG features).
PROTAG could be used with major phone operating systems 
such as Android and Research In Motion, which developed 
the ubiquitous Blackberry. The Android operating system 
had the advantage of being open source and had a big 
market. The Blackberry was typically used by business 
people who were more willing to spend and could see the 
value of such products. 
PROTAG used Bluetooth 4.0 technology to connect the 
valuable item to a phone and alerted the user when their 
belongings were more than a certain distance (for example, 
10 metres) away from them.
PROTAG was a significant step forward from existing anti-
loss technologies. Prior to PROTAG, anti-loss devices used 
relatively simple technology to connect with the mobile 
phone and alert the user upon loss. PROTAG, on the other 
hand, was a comprehensive, 360-degree system, with an 
additional online component for tracking the phone as well, 
in case of loss:
• Before the loss of an item, the device would alert the user
   with the smart alarm feature that he/she was accidentally
   leaving his/her belongings behind.
• After the loss of an item, PROTAG could be used as a
   tracking tool as the smart locator feature would be able 
   to pinpoint the location of the lost item. Upon reaching
   the location, PROTAG’s smart radar feature would allow
   users to scan the area quickly and retrieve the item.
• In the case of permanent loss (such as an unrecovered
   theft or when the item was irretrievable), the PROTAG
   trace system, which was an online version of PROTAG,
   would allow the user to easily delete sensitive data from 
   the lost item.
9 Bryan Koh, How Not to Lose Your Things Ever, The Business Times, 
February 6, 2012, www.businesstimes.com.sg, accessed July 2013.
Modular manufacturing
Tan was keen to get the product into the market as 
soon as possible, yet the partners took care to develop 
the manufacturing process in a way that protected the 
company’s intellectual property. Innova Technology had 
secured a patent for their product and took steps to ensure 
that manufacturers could not copy their device. Since the 
life cycle of electronic products was short, Tan and Lim 
devised a modular system which consisted of various parts 
or modules – hardware, hardware casing, firmware and 
four versions of software. This was to ensure that no single 
manufacturer could build the entire system. 
According to Tan,
Although it would be hard to prevent copycats, Innova was banking on 
establishing a strong brand that customers could identify with.
To source from reliable manufacturers in China, the team 
selected factories that were rated as reliable from a Chinese 
Internet portal, Alibaba, which provided information on 
local businesses. It took three months to find reliable 
partners that Innova Technology could work with from a cost 
and quality standpoint.
8 US$1 = EUR 1.2856, annual average exchange rate for 2012, www.oanda.com, accessed July, 2013.
9 Bryan Koh, How Not to Lose Your Things Ever, The Business Times, February 6, 2012, www.businesstimes.com.sg, accessed July 2013. 13
Distribution and marketing
Singapore was chosen as a test market to launch PROTAG. 
Besides having the familiarity of being home to both 
entrepreneurs, the country also benefitted from widespread 
access to wireless connectivity in most parts of the island. 
This meant that Innova Technology was able to launch the 
Bluetooth 4.0 version of PROTAG, which had a battery 
life of up to several months as opposed to four to six 
days per charge.
Go-to-market strategies
With the technology, design and manufacturing aspects 
of the business sorted, Tan turned his attention to the 
marketing and distribution of PROTAG. He faced several 
crucial questions:
• Target customer segment: Should he mass market the
   product or focus on a specific customer segment? Which
   segment(s) should he focus on?
• Distribution channel: With multiple sales channels to
   choose from – distributors, retailers, direct (online) sales
   and corporate tie-ups – which distribution channel should
   he use? Should he use multiple sales channels or stick
   to just one?
The answers to these questions would help Tan decide the 
most appropriate go-to-market strategy for PROTAG, one 
that was both cost efficient and effective.
Decision time
As Tan stood looking at the white board, he carefully weighed 
all his options. He was trained to solve such problems, so 
why was he finding this so difficult? Had he overlooked 
something? And then it suddenly came to him. He hastily 
erased the board clean, picked up a marker, and began to 
draw out Innova Technology’s marketing plan. What was his 
go-to-market strategy?
EXHIBIT 1: 
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
                    Pros                                 Cons
Blue Watchdog       •Similar core functions
                to PROTAG            •Break synch−alarm
Cobra             • Records the global 
                positioning system (GPS) 
                location and time
	 										•Two-way 'finder using
                 phone app
	 										•Sends the GPS information
               to a user-defined contact  
               list through email &
               text message
•Loses signal
•Rings unnecessarily
•100 Db sound excessive
•Does not take into 
   account if phone is the
   lost item
Source: Innova Technology Private Limited
EXHIBIT 2: 
DEVELOPMENT ROADMAP
aL Development
Mobile Programmer
• Search for programmer
•Program Flow of 
   bluetooth software
•If six is needed, integration
   of six into existing flow
Types of software for point 
of control
•Identify type of platform
Further develop aL using 
bluetooth
•Identify type of platform 
   for software
Hardware Modification
•Modify existing 
   bluetooth products
Remarks
•Identify if person has the
   require skills
•Employment
•Non-disclosure
•Pay per month
•Registering with the Office 
   of  Career Services for 
   interns from SMU
•Sourcing from 
   nearby friends
•If platform is iOS
•Purchase/loan/search Mac
•Download software 
   development kit
•Program aL software 
   on platform
•Find out how to mod
   existing BT devices
•Purchase of bluetooth 
   devices to mod
•Areas of modification− 
   Distance
•Re-package aL into a 
   different test form
Timeline
17/01/11-
28/01/11
12/01/11-
19/01/11
1 month
1 month
* Anti-loss (aL) 
   Bluetooth (BT)
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Collected data to be used to 
determine following factors
•Identify problems with 
   the software
•Identify if bluetooth is 
   sufficient for operation
•Identify problems 
   with hardware
Hardware development
•Search for 
   hardware manufacturer
•Determine cost per piece
Testing and collection of 
feedback from users on 
aL prototype
•Identify users to be used
   for testing
•Collect feedback
Modification based on 
data collected
•Identify areas 
   of modification
•Modify software/hardware
   to suit market
•Brainstorm on how to 
   overcome each problem
•Solving critical problems
•Make needed changes
•Finding hardware 
   manufacturer
•Providing manufacturer
   with requirements
•Supplier agreement
•Develop hardware 
   prototype
•Creating technical 
   specifications needed
•Measure on user 
   friendliness, ease of use, 
   problems encountered, 
   'does it serve its purpose?'   
   battery on aL, and
   phone re-sync timing, bug
•'Would you purchase it?' 
   identify other problems
•Areas that are done well 
   (software etc)
Modify identified problems
2 days
1 month
1 week
0.5 month 
to 1 month
Integration and testing
•Testing new software 
   with prototype
•User interface determination
•Feedback collection
•Testing of upgraded 
   software & hardware
•Measure on user 
   friendliness, ease of 
   use, problems
•Encountered, does it serve 
   its purpose, battery on aL, 
   battery on phone re sync
   timing, bug
•Would you purchase it, 
   other problems
•Areas that is done well
   (software etc)
1 week
Collected data to be used to 
determine following factors
•Identify new problems 
   with the software
•Identify new problems
   with the hardware
•Brainstorm on how to 
   overcome each problem
•Solving critical problems
   first make needed change
2 days
Modification based on 
data collected
•Identify areas 
   of modification
•Modify software/hardware
   to suit market
Modify identified problems 0.5 month 
to 1 month
Further integration and 
development − identify 
next few OS to develop on – 
finding of programmers for 
individual OS
•Symbian, Andriod, 
   RIM, Windows
•Capabilities of 
   programmers
   for development
1 month
External market testing
•Identify market 
   for testing
•Measure on user 
   friendliness, ease of use, 
   problems encountered, 
   does it serve its purpose, 
   battery on aL, battery on
   phone re sync timing, bug
•Would you purchase it?
•Areas to improve
•Areas done well
•Student group affiliated
   with Intitute of Innovation 
   & Entrepreneurship
1 week
Mass production •Mould pricing and creation
•Mass production price 
   per piece
1 week
Source: Innova Technology Private Limited
EXHIBIT 3: 
PROTAG FEATURES
Source: Innova Technology, company website, www.innovatechnology.com.sg,
accessed July 2013.
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Abstract
This case is the second part of a two-part series on Innova 
Technology, a technology start-up company based in 
Singapore. The two cases focus on:
Case (A) 
– Developing, producing and marketing a product innovation
Case (B) 
– Growth strategies and its related challenges for a young technology
   company
The case is set in November 2012, two months after the 
launch of PROTAG, a new anti-loss device developed by 
Rick Tan and his partner, Jonathan Lim. Tan is the chief 
executive officer of Innova Technology Private Limited, the 
company that manufactures and sells PROTAG. After a 
highly successful product launch, Tan is contemplating his 
company’s growth strategy. 
Tan and his business partner, Jonathan Lim, who is 
also the chief technology officer for Innova Technology, 
developed PROTAG, a new anti-loss device, using Bluetooth 
technology. The device, which is about the size of two credit 
cards stacked together, is synched to a mobile phone and 
can be attached to valuable personal belongings such as 
keys, wallets, handbags, passports and even phones. 
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INNOVA TECHNOLOGY (B): 
Growing the Business for Anti-loss Devices
If the valuable item were to be separated from the person 
by more than a certain distance, the device would set off an 
alarm alerting the owner of its potential loss.
After extensive market research and encouraging results 
from beta test sales using the crowdfunding site Indiegogo, 
Tan was confident of his product. He executed a well-
thought out marketing plan which targeted customers in 
the travel segment. Despite the high commissions charged 
by distributors, Tan decided to use this channel to market 
his product. He negotiated with Sprint-Cass Pte Ltd, a 
specialised supplier to travel retail and duty free channels 
which had presence in Asia and the Middle East. The first 
5,000 devices were sold within two months and Tan had 
to rush new orders for manufacturing to keep up with the 
demand. The team was celebrating – in less than two years; 
Innova Technology had successfully made its foray into 
the market for anti-loss devices and established a niche 
customer base.
Yet Tan could not help but ponder about his company’s 
growth strategy. Once again, he found himself at crossroads. 
What would his company’s next steps be? Should there be 
a PROTAG Gen II? Should he consider expanding globally? 
Did his company have the capacity, capabilities and skill 
set to take their product beyond Singapore and Asia? How 
else could he grow his business? 16
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Sitting in his newly rented office in Fuji Xerox Towers in the 
central business district of Singapore, Tan scanned through 
the company sales statistics. It was November 2012, just 
over two months since the launch of PROTAG, a new anti-
loss device developed by Tan and his partner. The data 
looked very promising – the company had planned to sell 
5,000 devices in Singapore over a period of five months; 
instead they had sold out in just two months.
Tan and his business partner, Jonathan Lim, who was also 
the chief technology officer for Innova Technology, had 
developed PROTAG, a new anti-loss device, which alerted 
the owner of a potential loss via an alarm. The device, which 
was about the size of two credit cards stacked together, 
was synched to a mobile phone, and could be attached 
to valuable personal belongings such as keys, wallets, 
handbags, passports and even children.
The idea to build and sell an anti-loss device came to 
the two young entrepreneurs in late 2010. Under the 
auspices of Singapore Management University's Institute 
of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, the partners set up 
a technology start-up. What followed was 19 long months 
in which Tan and Lim worked frenetically, to fine-tune the 
technology, develop a design with unique functionality, 
finalise the modular manufacturing process with partners 
in China, and plan and implement a go-to-market strategy.
The duo also worked tirelessly to raise additional funding 
for their product, which they believed had tremendous 
potential for global sales in a relatively new market.
Of the first batch of 1,000 devices manufactured, Tan and 
Lim obtained pre-orders for 500 pieces through IndieGoGo, 
a crowd-funding platform. They used the remaining pieces 
as samples for marketing. Consumer response through 
pre-orders provided the necessary validation that Tan was 
looking for – he now felt confident that his product would 
sell – and the revenues from the pre-orders provided a 
source of funds to continue manufacturing.
Yet Tan knew better than to get carried away with the 
initial euphoria. His business acumen recognised that 
the challenge was just starting. Innova Technology was a 
small start-up trying to create awareness amongst its target 
customers and establishing a footprint in a growing market. 
Tan was confident of his product but he also understood 
that a successful market entry had to be followed by 
a sound and effective growth strategy. What were the 
critical factors for growing his business? Was it innovation? 
Constant innovation seemed to be an important factor for 
any technology firm with short product cycles. Or was it 
expansion into new markets and new customer segments? 
Was Innova Technology prepared and equipped to take 
PROTAG beyond the familiar market of Singapore? Tan had 
to figure out the correct growth strategy for his company, 
one that was both successful and sustainable.
Development of PROTAG
Innova Technology was established in January 2011 by 
Rick Tan, an alumnus of the business school at Singapore 
Management University (SMU), and Jonathan Lim, a 
computer engineer from Temasek Polytechnic. The idea of 
an anti-loss device came from Lim, who wanted to develop 
a device that would provide a safeguard against losing 
objects, which were intrinsically worth more than the device 
itself.
Tan did comprehensive market research to understand the 
products that were currently in the market. His aim was to 
have a competitive advantage by combining a number of 
features into a package that the competitors did not offer. 
After several design iterations, the partners honed in on the 
final design that was light, portable, easy to operate and 
reasonably priced. The main feature of the device was its 
ability to activate an alarm from the user’s phone, using 
Bluetooth technology, if the item tagged with the anti-loss 
device was further than a certain distance from the user. 
PROTAG was about the size of two credit cards stacked 
together, and could be tagged onto any valuable item.
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PROTAG could be used with major phone operating systems 
such as Android and Research In Motion, which developed 
the Blackberry. It used Bluetooth technology to connect the 
valuable item to a phone and alerted the user when their 
belongings were more than a certain distance (for example, 
10 metres) away from them.
PROTAG was a significant step forward from existing anti-
loss technologies. Prior to PROTAG, anti-loss devices used 
relatively simple technology to connect with the mobile 
phone and alert the user upon loss. PROTAG, on the other 
hand, was a comprehensive, 360-degree system, with an 
additional online component for tracking the phone as well, 
in case of loss:
• Before the loss of an item, the device would alert the user with the smart
    alarm feature that they were accidentally leaving their belongings behind.
• After the loss of an item, PROTAG could be used as a tracking tool as the
   smart locator feature would be able to pin point the location of the lost
   item. Upon reaching the location, PROTAG’s smart radar feature would
   allow users to scan the area quickly and retrieve the item. 
•  In the case of permanent loss (such as an unrecovered theft or when
    the item was irretrievable), the PROTAG trace system, which was an
    online version of PROTAG, would allow the user to easily delete sensitive
   data from the lost item.
Tan and Lim devised a modular system of manufacturing in 
order to protect the company’s intellectual property, which 
consisted of various parts or modules – hardware, hardware 
casing, firmware and four versions of software. This was 
to ensure that no single manufacturer could build the 
entire system. 
Marketing PROTAG
Singapore was chosen as a test market to launch PROTAG. 
Tan knew that a product like PROTAG would have wide 
marketability. The problem of accidentally losing valuables 
was not restricted to a particular demographic segment or 
a specific consumer profile; it was a general problem. Yet 
mass marketing PROTAG would require significant resources 
in terms of advertising and marketing costs. Tan therefore 
considered the option of a more targeted marketing strategy 
that would focus on a niche segment.
One such consumer segment for which loss of valuables 
was particularly traumatic was that of overseas travellers. 
Passports, wallets, phones and briefcases were just some of 
the items that could cause a lot of anxiety if they were lost 
or left behind in an airport or a foreign country. He felt that 
travellers who lost their valuables would have experienced 
significant pain, and when they were at an airport or travel 
centre after the loss, they would be more willing to buy such 
an anti-loss device. This segment would typically also be 
able to afford a product that cost over US$50 and would 
most likely be users of the Bluetooth technology required to 
make PROTAG work.
For distribution channels, Tan opted for intermediary 
distributors. Although distributors charged a high 
commission, he felt that the distributors would be able to 
help Innova sell their product without the company having 
to create and support its own sales force. In addition, the 
distributor had established contacts with retailers and knew 
how to position PROTAG in the most favourable light vis-à-
vis other products to make a successful sale. 
With the travel segment in mind, he negotiated with 
Sprint-Cass Pte Ltd, a distributor of computer peripherals, 
accessories and consumables in the information technology 
industry. Sprint-Cass was a specialised supplier to travel 
retail and duty-free channels with presence in Asia and the 
Middle East.
Time to celebrate or to 
contemplate?
PROTAG was launched in September 2012. Within two 
months, 5,000 devices were sold and Tan and Lim had to 
place new rush orders for manufacturing. The team was 
celebrating – in less than two years, Innova Technology had 
successfully made its foray into the market for anti-loss 
devices and established a niche customer base.
Yet Tan could not help but ponder about next steps. He 
once again found himself at a crossroads. What would his 
company’s growth strategy be? Given the short product 
cycles in the technology segment – should there be a 
PROTAG Gen II? Should he consider expanding globally? 
Did his company have the capacity, capabilities and skill 
set to take their product beyond Singapore and Asia? How 
else could he grow his business?
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In September 2013, Alex Leong, co-founder of Rainmaker 
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available to his technology start-up company in order to grow 
the business. Earlier that year, Rainmaker Labs launched 
ShopGuru, a mobile shopping application that enables 
users to earn and redeem loyalty points for browsing or 
shopping at select retail outlets. The ShopGuru application 
works hand-in-hand with Rainmaker’s proprietary iSenze 
hardware, which sends signals to the ShopGuru mobile 
application and captures information about each customer 
using the application.
Keenly aware of the valuable customer data the company 
is collecting, Leong wants to further explore how this could 
be converted into a revenue opportunity. However, it has 
been a challenge to find investors, and after two and a half 
years the company is still cash negative and operating on 
slim margins.
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Alex Leong, co-founder of Rainmaker Labs Pte Ltd, was 
tired. It was the third successive late night that he and 
his two co-founders had spent in their office in Midview 
City, Singapore. Their company, which developed mobile 
applications and solutions, was under pressure. They 
needed to brainstorm options on how to make the business 
grow and generate revenues over the next six months. Leong 
felt a sense of déjà vu, as there had been many such all-
nighters since the company was incorporated two and a half 
years ago in March 2011.
In May 2013, Rainmaker Labs had launched ShopGuru, 
a mobile shopping application that enabled users to earn 
loyalty points for browsing or shopping at select retail 
outlets. Those points could then be redeemed for rewards 
at participating vendors. The ShopGuru application worked 
hand-in-hand with the iSenze hardware, also developed by 
Rainmaker Labs.
The ShopGuru application captured the signal from the 
iSenze device installed in a retail outlet every time a signed-
up customer entered the store, and transmitted information 
to the retailer, such as: when the customer walked into the 
store, how much time he or she spent there, how much 
money was spent per visit, and the frequency of visits.
The iSenze device and the ShopGuru application together 
formed the ShopGuru platform. Downloading the ShopGuru 
application was free for customers; the company made 
money by charging retailers a monthly fee for subscribing 
to the service, and earned a commission on the percentage 
of sales by ShopGuru users. Leong was also keenly aware of 
the massive amount of valuable customer data the company 
was collecting, and was working with an outsourcing partner 
to convert it to a source of revenue.
Right from the conception stage, Leong knew that his 
company had a clear early mover advantage – they were in 
possession of cutting-edge technology that had considerable 
untapped potential. They were also the first to introduce 
this technology in the retail space in Singapore. It had been 
an arduous journey for the founders, but they had made 
significant progress in building the ShopGuru ecosystem 
– developing the hardware and software platform, finding 
investors willing to fund their venture, and convincing 
retailers and customers of the value of signing up for their 
service. And it was paying off; as of September 2013, four 
months after its launch, ShopGuru had already signed up 
160 retailers and 70 brands. There had been more than 
10,000 downloads of the ShopGuru mobile application. 
However, the company was still cash negative.
Leong’s challenge now was to decide where to go from here, 
given the company’s limited resources. One option was to 
expand to other verticals beyond the retail sector, which 
would require growing and developing his sales team. The 
other alternative was to invest in building the company’s 
back-end systems (that were currently outsourced), which 
would provide more control and greater flexibility in day-to-
day operations.
Both strategies required time and money to pursue. 
Expanding into new verticals would surely help the company 
grow fast, but would the current systems be able to cope 
with more business? On the other hand, investing in the 
system’s architecture would mean growth targets would 
have to take a back seat. Where should Rainmaker Labs 
focus and invest its resources in order to make its business 
sustainable and scalable? The three partners were involved 
in a heavy debate over these choices.
Twelve months into our start-up, we realised 
that we had bitten off more than we could 
chew. We had our hands full with hardware 
and software development, business develop-
ment, building a client and customer base and 
looking for funding.
- Alex Leong, Co-founder, Rainmaker Labs Pte Ltd1
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Bare beginnings
On March 6, 2011, three friends looking to develop a 
gainful business idea founded Rainmaker Labs. The trio, 
gifted with diverse yet complementary skills, began by 
brainstorming various business options and experimenting 
with various technologies. They stumbled upon an article 
on the use of ultrasonic sound waves with mobile devices. 
They came up with the idea of using this technology in the 
retail space, and soon began working on the technology to 
support the business proposition. Leong was working at 
Barclays Capital at the time, but invested his evenings and 
weekends into the start-up.
Developing a complex technology into a commercially 
viable product was not an easy project, and involved many 
moving parts. The team spent long, tiresome days building 
and fine-tuning the hardware device and the software 
algorithms. By November 2011, Rainmaker Labs was ready 
with a workable hardware and software prototype (refer to 
Exhibit 1 for an extract of Rainmaker Labs’ business plan). 
Leong left his banking job to join Rainmaker Labs full-time. 
He recalled,
Most people thought we were crazy to leave our high-paying jobs to join the 
start-up. What motivated us was the fact that we were young. If we didn’t 
do it now, we would never do it.
Just as the technology and the go-to-market strategy were 
being finalised, one of the founders left the company and a 
new partner joined to take over the technology development 
of ShopGuru. Leong observed,
The new team was much better aligned in terms of common 
vision and goals. A good business is not just about the 
technology or the business model. It is about the founders 
and the core team of employees. The 'holy trinity' of a tech 
start-up consists of a technical expert, a designer who 
knows how to make the product user-friendly, and a hustler 
with the business acumen.
Leong approached his alma mater, Singapore Management 
University (SMU), for assistance with the business. SMU’s 
Institute of Innovation and Entrepreneurship provided the 
team with workspaces on the campus and linked them 
up with seasoned entrepreneurs who were able to provide 
advice and guidance for the start-up.
Finding fundingIn December 2011, Rainmaker Labs received seed capital 
of US$77,000 from an angel investor who was impressed 
with the prototype.2 This gave the company the much 
needed funds to hire a small team to further refine the 
technology and develop a business plan. Leong brought 
in two consultants for intellectual property and hardware 
development. One of these experienced advisors was the 
former chief executive officer of the Intellectual Property 
Office of Singapore, a statutory board under Singapore’s 
Ministry of Law.3 Leong believed that there should be 
segregation between advisors and investors, so that 
ShopGuru could be developed with advice from subject 
experts rather than investors whose advice “often came with 
an agenda” and may not always work in the best interests
2 US$1 = SG$1.30, monthly average for December 2011, www.oanda.com, accessed February 2014.
of the company. Leong and his partners also began 
contacting retail clients to talk to them about ShopGuru.
Between December 2011 and March 2012, Leong applied 
for many government grants but did not manage to secure 
any funding. He was getting increasingly frustrated as he 
felt that he had wasted four months without making any 
progress in the business. In April 2012, Rainmaker Labs 
decided to focus on private sources of funding, and in 
November 2012, the company received US$483,800 from 
Incuvest Asia, an early stage venture capital firm, which 
invested in technology companies.4
Building the ecosystem
The technology: iSenze and ShopGuru
iSenze was the hardware device embedded with proprietary 
technology that was developed by Rainmaker Labs. In 
Leong’s words, it was the “backbone of the business”. The 
device was based on ultrasonic sound wave technology 
that enabled it to transmit unique signals to pre-specified 
smartphone applications. Once a retailer signed onto the 
service, the iSenze device was installed in the shop. Upon 
activation, the location of the smartphone users could be 
accurately pinpointed within a three- to five-metre radius, 
and was not permeable through walls and windows, making 
this technology perfect for use inside a retail store.5
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Leong was proud that his company stood at the forefront 
of a new technology, but he also recognised that he had to 
leverage this early mover advantage. The use of sensors with 
mobile applications was just gaining traction, and the Asia-
Pacific region had yet to tap into the huge potential offered 
by this technology. Leong stated,
The possibilities are tremendous. We were at the beginning of a revolutionary 
technology, and we had not even begun to scratch the surface.
To complement the iSenze hardware, the ShopGuru 
application was created to enable Apple’s iOS and Android 
smartphones to receive the signals transmitted by the iSenze 
device. The purpose of the ShopGuru application was to 
enhance the shopping experience and reward customers for 
visiting a store and buying from participating retailers.
Value proposition for customers
Once the user had downloaded the application and created 
a ShopGuru account, he/she would be credited with points 
whenever he/she walked into, or made a purchase, at a 
retailer where an iSenze device was located. Customers 
would be rewarded for just entering a store and browsing. 
Each customer had a unique ShopGuru account, which 
was credited with reward points at the checkout when a 
purchase was made. Users could also send a link to the 
ShopGuru application to friends to earn referral points. 
Points in the account could be accumulated and redeemed 
for rewards such as free coffee and movie tickets, or even 
be used to make donations to charity.
3 Intellectual Property Office of Singapore, “What Do We Do?”, http://www.ipos.gov.sg/AboutUs/WhatDoWeDo.aspx, accessed February 2014.
4 US$1 = SG$1.22, monthly average for November 2012, www.oanda.com, accessed February 2013.  5 Rainmaker Labs Singapore, “Presence: Indoor Positioning”, http://www.rainmaker-labs.com/technology/, accessed February 2014.
The company took care to address all privacy issues, as the 
ShopGuru application enabled the company to collect data 
on user activity, such as timing, frequency of store visits and 
value of spend. The iSenze would transmit signals whenever 
it detected a ShopGuru application within its radius, but 
only if users had purposefully turned on the application 
on their smartphones. Therefore, consumer tracking was 
possible only when the user made a conscious decision to 
use the service.
Value proposition for retailers
Retailers could gain from greater customer footfall and 
potentially greater sales, as customers knew they would be 
rewarded for visiting, and buying at, a participating store. 
In a sense, retailers could reap the benefits of a loyalty 
programme without undertaking the administrative costs 
and efforts of running it.
The data that was collected from customer interactions 
was also of great value to retailers who subscribed to the 
ShopGuru platform. Based on information that the system 
was able to capture, Rainmaker Labs could report on items 
such as when customers walked into the store, how much 
time they spent there, how much money they spent per 
visit, and the frequency of visits. Such customised market 
intelligence would be highly attractive for retailers looking 
to better connect with their customers.
Leong knew that his company was sitting on a mass of 
valuable raw data, which could become a key revenue pillar 
if Rainmaker Labs could process the data using customer 
relationship management (CRM) market analytics and sell 
it back to the merchants. Consequently, in March 2012, 
the company partnered with a CRM service provider based 
in Singapore to develop the back-end systems architecture 
that would support the ShopGuru platform (refer to Exhibit 
1 for an abstract of the company’s business plan).
The revenue model
The iSenze device costs about US$79 a piece to 
manufacture, and was initially given to the retail merchants 
free of charge.6 Rainmaker Labs planned to start charging 
for the hardware device after a promotional period of one 
year. The company earned revenue from two sources: 
retailers were charged a monthly fee for subscribing to 
the service, and Rainmaker Labs earned a commission on 
sales, which was negotiated with merchants individually. A 
part of this commission was given back to customers as 
rewards, constituting about five to ten percent of the total 
commission. On the user side, the ShopGuru application 
could be downloaded for free, and did not earn any revenue 
for the company.
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Coalition loyalty
Leong and his partners spent endless hours with retailers 
and mall operators, convincing them of the value of signing 
up for the ShopGuru service. Initially, the ShopGuru 
platform was targeted at retail merchants, or a group of 
retailers in a particular mall, who were not affiliated with 
each other. This approach was taken in order to build a 
'coalition loyalty' amongst retailers in a specific location. 
Once the mall has agreed, every store in the mall was 
covered by the service. As more malls subscribed to the 
ShopGuru service, it became more attractive for users to 
shop in those premises.
In the long run, the plan was to eventually create a 
'universal coalition loyalty' scheme, which would go beyond 
retail shops, to include food and beverage outlets and even 
services. For example, the Nectar card (www.nectar.com) 
offered by Sainsbury’s, the grocery chain in the UK, allowed 
cardholders to earn rewards not just on goods bought at the 
grocery store, but also on services (such as insurance, travel 
and telecommunications), online purchases, and even from 
simply watching advertisements on television or doing 
an Internet search. The Passion card in Singapore was a 
similar concept, and users could have multiple uses for the 
card in addition to obtaining reward points and discounts 
from merchants, such as paying for public transport and 
borrowing books from the national library. The ShopGuru 
platform had gone a step further – it did away with a loyalty 
card altogether and took the concept of customer loyalty 
schemes into the digital age.
ShopGuru goes live
The iSenze and ShopGuru systems went through several 
iterations before the hardware and software were ready to 
market. By May 2013 – over two years after Rainmaker Labs 
was set up and 18 months since they developed the first 
prototype – the company was ready to take their product to 
the market. On May 15, ShopGuru was officially launched 
at Bread and Butter, an upmarket fashion boutique in 
Mandarin Gallery at Orchard Road, the premier shopping 
district in Singapore.
The combination of the iSenze hardware and the ShopGuru 
software was sold to retail merchants as an innovative way 
for them to capture more foot traffic coming into their 
stores. To attract end users to download the application, 
an online video featuring local celebrities was posted on 
the company’s website to show how easy it was to use 
the application, and to highlight the benefits that were 
associated with using it.7 By September 2013, four 
months after the launch, ShopGuru’s reach had increased 
to 70 retail brands, covering more than 160 stores. More 
than 10,000 customers had downloaded the ShopGuru 
application.
The road ahead
Despite successes in spreading the reach of the application, 
two and a half years after being founded, Rainmaker Labs 
was still running cash negative. Leong observed,
At least 20 to 30 percent of our budget was spent on mistakes. It is an 
iterative process, and we need to learn quickly, else the learning comes 
at a huge cost.
Notwithstanding the heavy costs, long lead time and the 
steep learning curve, the team at Rainmaker Labs trudged 
on because they were convinced of the tremendous potential 
offered by their business proposition. At that time, such 
a service was not being offered by any other company in 
Singapore or elsewhere in the region.
Leong also realised that Singapore was a difficult market 
to break into with a new technology and a difficult place to 
expand a business. First, it was a relatively small market. 
Second, being a country with high Internet penetration, 
Singaporeans were already inundated with many technology-
based promotions, and were not easily persuaded to adopt 
yet another application which might seem to offer more of 
the same. Last, physical retailers were hesitant to invest in 
new technology and preferred to 'stick with what they know', 
unless they saw real value in doing so. It would take time to 
engender a change in mind-set. Leong felt that his company 
needed to do more to engage and educate the end users, as 
well as the retail and other clients.
Although most start-ups took anywhere from three to five 
years to become profitable, the company was at a crossroad. 
It was running thin on resources, and any future investment 
would need to be thoroughly evaluated before committing 
funds to it. Leong and his partners considered various 
options to make the business scalable and sustainable.
6 US$1 = SG$1.26, monthly average for September 2013, www.oanda.com, accessed February 2013. 
7 Click on the following links to view the advertising video and the launch video for ShopGuru: Advertisement video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XBnG1IIHsIE
  Launch video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INX8IrbvWGA 23
Expanding to other verticals
One option was to scale up the business to verticals other 
than retail. In addition to the retail space that Rainmaker 
Labs was already targeting, there were endless possibilities 
to the scope of the ShopGuru platform. To build a more 
powerful and comprehensive proposition to merchants and 
end users, the ShopGuru platform could extend to myriad 
products and services in a similar vein as the Nectar or 
Passion card; for example, areas such as food and beverage, 
travel, telecommunications, and even financial services. 
Through vertical expansion, Rainmaker Labs could increase 
the uptake of its service and expand its client base to offset 
the invested research and development costs of developing 
the hardware and software.
However, Leong was aware that breaking in and building 
relationships in each vertical or industry would require 
time, effort and money. All company resources would have 
to be focused on business development, and on expanding 
and training the sales team across different verticals. He 
was also concerned about whether the existing back-end 
systems had the capacity and the flexibility to support such 
a scale up.
Building the back-end systems
An alternate option was to first focus on, and invest in, the 
back-end systems before expanding the business. Although 
the system’s architecture developed by the CRM partner 
was robust, it had not been used to its potential. Bringing 
it in-house could give Rainmaker Labs greater control over 
these assets, and in turn enhance flexibility and speed in 
adapting to market changes. Leong explained,
So far we have been driving with a Toyota engine, which offers standard 
service. It may serve our purpose currently, but for future growth, and to 
differentiate ourselves from the competition, we need to switch to a BMW 
engine. And we will need to build the BMW engine ourselves in a way that it 
is customised to our requirements and offers the flexibility to quickly adapt 
to our dynamic needs.
Also, as the business grew, Leong was worried that the 
back-end systems may not be able to handle the new flow 
of business. Building a 'BMW style' back-end systems 
would cost Rainmaker Labs between US$79,400 and 
US$158,700.8 It was a huge cost, and one that the 
company could not afford without a second round of 
funding. However, doing so would improve the technology 
platform, which would help the company with its growth 
plans.
What next?
“Our resources were few, and the options for growth were 
many”, stated Leong. His partners and him knew they had 
a workable technology and a viable business model, but 
the great idea combined with the founders’ sweat equity 
had not yet translated into profits. ShopGuru was still cash 
negative, and the business was working on slim margins.
Leong and his partners had to decide what to focus on 
next. Should Rainmaker take a step back, build its own 
CRM system and focus on fixing the internal plumbing? 
Or, should it invest more time and money in expanding its 
network to other verticals in Singapore?
8 US$1 = SG$1.26, monthly average for September 2013, www.oanda.com, accessed February 2013.
EXHIBIT 1: 
BUSINESS PLAN FOR RAINMAKER 
LABS (JANUARY 2012)
Products and services
Shopguru was a technology platform that aimed to 
revolutionise customers’ shopping experience. ShopGuru’s 
core business for the first 18 months since inception was 
to launch ShopGuru – a shopping application available 
on iPhone and Android. The ShopGuru business revolved 
around our Security Signal Emitting Device (SSED) 
technology, which allowed ShopGuru to reward smartphone 
users for simply walking into a retailer’s store. It wanted to 
provide a service to retailers that could:
• Increase foot traffic by rewarding consumers for walking in.
• Increase conversions by enabling focused and targeted marketing 
   to influence the consumers' purchasing decisions while they are very 
   near or in the store.
• Incentivise conversions by rewarding consumers for purchasing
   promotional items and/or for larger purchases.
• Provide ShopGuru Analytics. Provide retailers with in depth analytics 
   incorporating buying patterns, demographics and statistics to aid
   business decisions.
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Existing market problem
Physical retailers faced a constant challenge to drive 
foot traffic into their stores. Sales conversion rates were 
generally high for physical stores ranging from 20 to 90 
percent, depending on the type of retailer. However, getting 
customers into the store was the primary issue. Even when 
retailers visually saw a customer entering the store, they 
were unaware of the customer’s demographics, preferences 
or shopping history, and thus were unable to up- or cross-
sell their products, or even push the most relevant products 
to him/her. Google made US$29.32 billion of revenues in 
2010, of which 97 percent was attributed to Google Adwords 
–essentially ‘Pay per Click’ advertisements to entice online 
users to click onto the websites of online businesses that 
sell products and services of their interest. Businesses 
were willing to pay up to US$27.80 to US$54.91 for the 
top 20 most expensive keywords online to simply redirect 
web traffic into their site. Unlike the online world where 
behavioural e-commerce targeting engines had reduced 
the wastage of marketing dollar and enhanced marketing 
efficiency through utilising consumers’ web history 
heuristics, the physical retail world had not been able to 
close this sales loop of targeted marketing. This was due to 
the fact that no existing technology had been able to bridge 
online technologies into the physical world.
Proposed solution
Location-based technology available to the masses were 
currently only able to provide the geo-positioning with 
an accuracy of up to a range of 50 to 100 metres. A 
smartphone was able to determine its location by utilising 
one or more systems including global positioning system, 
WiFi, and Bluetooth, etc. The flaws of these technologies 
were that they are accurate up to a range of 50 to100 
metres; were not sufficiently timely; and were represented 
by longitude and latitude in the systems but not height. The 
company's technical solution to these restrictions was the 
SSED prototype that it had built. The SSED was installed 
into retail store entrances and cost less than US$77 
(SG$100) when manufactured in bulk.9 Its primary purpose 
was to emit a security signal that can be associated with a 
location, which the company calls a Unique Store Identifier 
(USI). The smartphone upon receiving the Security Signal 
was able to identify its location accurately up to a range 
of three to five metres. This was a substantial increase in 
accuracy of 95 percent compared to current technologies.
9 US$1 = SG$1.30, monthly average for December 2011, www.oanda.com, accessed February 2014.
Business application
With the SSED subsequently being able to accurately 
pinpoint a smartphone’s location, the implications for 
both consumer and retailer were significant and potentially 
market altering. The company had built ShopGuru, a 
technological platform that aimed to revolutionise the 
personal shopping experience. The ShopGuru system 
consisted of an application across iOS, Android, Blackberry 
and other external device that acted as a receiver for 
Security Signals at partner retail stores. ShopGuru was 
able to deliver exceptional value to both retailers and 
consumers alike that was not possible with previous 
technologies. One of ShopGuru’s critical functions was to 
provide a mass scalable service to consumers to deliver 
adaptive targeted personalised offers based on their 
demographics, preferences and history, as well as on the 
accurate identification of each consumer’s location and 
identity. ShopGuru also rewarded consumers in the form of 
loyalty points for all steps along the sales loop. These loyalty 
points were cumulative and could be redeemed in the form 
of cash vouchers. The cost incurred by the retailer’s use of 
ShopGuru was entirely derived from the added value the 
consumer brings.
Source: Rainmaker Labs, Extract of company business plan, January 2012.
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Abstract
The case is set in January 2012, and begins with Kenneth 
Yap, the founder of Quantine Pte Ltd, strategising on an 
effective growth plan for his company. Quantine was a job 
candidate pre-screening service provider, which specialised 
in asynchronous video interviews. In the three years since 
its inception, market forces and internal factors had 
necessitated a change in its original corporate strategy. The 
business had started out in 2009, focusing on competency 
assessments for testing technical skills for the information 
technology industry. It also provided aptitude tests for 
companies to assess candidate qualities such as numerical 
skills and the ability to pay attention to detail. Due to strong 
competition in the market, likely demise of the technology 
for its platform, and lack of funds, Quantine had been forced 
to re-evaluate its business proposition. It decided to focus 
on a different business idea – a new method of candidate 
pre-screening: on-demand video. The Next-5 platform, as 
it was called, was created as an ecosystem for recruitment 
agencies, companies and prospective employees. 
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QUANTINE: 
VIRTUALISING THE INTERVIEW PROCESS
From 2009 to late 2011, Quantine had gone through four 
rounds of fund raising. With the latest grant of US$392,000 
from the National Research Fund, Yap wondered how he 
could best use this money to market his company’s suite of 
pre-screening services, and implement an effective growth 
plan for the company.
This case can be used to teach concepts related to new 
product development strategy. Students will have an 
opportunity to understand the challenges faced by a start-
up, and the reasons for these challenges. They will learn 
that the maturity of the market is a key determining factor 
in product development strategy. Students will also get an 
overview of the stage-gate process to product development, 
and discuss its strengths and weaknesses. They would 
understand the criteria for choosing an investor, and the 
contribution investors should make to a start-up.
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People were alread
y familiar with Sky
pe 
and YouTube – why
 not make interview
s 
asynchronous?
- Kenneth Yap, Co-Foun
der and COO, Quantine 
Pte Ltd
1 US$1 =SG$ 0.783 Oanda.com, http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/, assessed August 30, 2013.
Kenneth Yap, co-founder and chief operating officer of 
Quantine Pte Ltd (Quantine), looked at the map which 
showed the location of the global users of the Singapore-
based company’s virtual platform. These were located 
throughout Asia, Latin America, Europe and the Middle 
East. It was January 2012, and in the three years since the 
company was founded, market forces and internal factors 
had necessitated a change in its original corporate strategy.
Quantine was a candidate pre-screening service provider 
which specialised in asynchronous video interviews for 
jobs. When the company was first conceived, Quantine’s 
founders decided that it would go into the business of 
candidate pre-screening. The business initially focused 
on competency assessments to test technical skills for the 
information technology industry. It also provided aptitude 
tests for companies to assess a candidate’s qualities – 
such as numerical skills and the ability to pay attention to 
detail. However, in 2009, competency assessment was a 
very competitive market, with many larger, well-established 
players. Moreover, Quantine was planning to run its platform 
using Adobe Flash technology, and there were rumours 
that it would soon be demised. Quantine also recognised 
that it had insufficient funds to develop new competency 
assessments on its own. Thus, it decided to focus on a new 
method of pre-screening candidates: on-demand video.
Subsequently, in 2010, the Next-5 platform for on-
demand video was created, which served as an ecosystem 
for recruitment agencies, companies and prospective 
employees. Recruiters could post available jobs on the 
platform, and organisations could reach out to potential 
candidates or screen available candidates. As for 
candidates, the platform comprised two main parts. First, 
it had a pre-recorded video which served as a video cover 
letter for candidates. Second, it had pre-recorded questions 
from the interviewer, and candidates were given only one 
opportunity to record their answers.
Marketing the platform was initially difficult, as the 
company was considered a start-up and prospective clients 
needed more confidence in its abilities to deliver. Thus, 
from the beginning, Quantine cast a wider net to reach 
out to companies outside Singapore. It also did not follow 
a fixed pricing model, and charged different prices for 
different market segments.
From early 2009 to late 2011, Quantine had gone 
through four rounds of fund raising. With the latest grant 
of US$500,0001 from the National Research Foundation 
(NRF), Yap wondered how he could best utilise the money 
to market his company’s suite of pre-screening services, as 
well as implement an effective growth plan for the company.
27
Founding quantine
Quantine, an acronym for 'quantitative routine', was 
founded by friends, Daryl Low and Kenneth Yap. They 
met when they were students at the School of Information 
Systems at Singapore Management University, and worked 
together on projects since their second year of study. Their 
final year project was on creating a system to manage 
software developers. Subsequently, in their final year of 
university, this concept was extended to set up Quantine, 
focusing on the pre-screening of potential job candidates 
for businesses.
The premise for starting competency assessments was 
simple. Having a background in information technology 
and knowledge of this industry, Low and Yap realised that 
when it came to hiring software developers, there was a 
common phenomenon of ‘paper tigers’: programmers who 
would have several certifications that looked good on their 
resume, but often fail to achieve even a passing score when 
they sat for a simple proficiency test on their actual skills. 
2 The Shi Ning, “Online Recruitment Goes Virtual,” The Business Times, January 2, 2012, on SMU IIE website, http://www2.smu.edu.sg/news_room/smu_in_the_news/2012/sources/BT_20120102_1.pdf, accessed August 2013.
3 SHL Group Ltd, via OneSource Information Services, Inc., accessed August 2013.
As there were hundreds of applications received for each 
job opening for software developers, companies were 
looking for a standardised test that could be used to identify 
candidates who could perform promptly on the job .
It was with the intent to separate the ‘paper tigers’ from 
those who were able to quickly deliver work that Low began 
to create in-house technical competency tests for software 
developers. At the same time, Quantine also tied up with 
partners, such as Walden Testing in Canada, to provide 
aptitude tests for candidates and round out the list of 
competency assessments offered on the platform.2 This 
went on for the best part of 2009, but there were factors 
that eventually made Quantine shift its business focus.
Changing strategy
Early in 2010, Quantine decided to create a new platform 
to pursue a fresh business strategy for the candidate pre-
screening market: on-demand videos. The idea for virtual 
video interviews had already been discussed by the team 
during the initial brainstorming sessions. Low explained, 
We had actually talked about virtual interviews before in 
2009, but did not start with the idea because we had no 
idea how to put it into motion, and the market was not ready 
for it. If we had, we would have been the first in the world.
But in early 2012, the founders decided to take up this idea 
and run with it for three key reasons: strong competitors 
in the existing business, developments in technology and 
financial limitations.
Intense competition
The market for competency assessments was fierce and 
established, with large players such as the UK-based SHL 
Group providing a suite of talent measurement solutions, as 
well as resources for employee development and succession 
planning.3 Hence, Quantine would either have to do better 
than the existing competitors, some of whom, such as 
Accenture in the UK, also offered other complementary 
services, or differentiated itself with its offering. At the 
time when they were considering a strategy change, the 
only competitor for on-demand videos was Hirelabs, a 
United States company based out of the country. Hirelabs 
not only provided a list of aptitude assessment tests, but 
also provided a tool called Occupational DNA to determine 
the traits required for different job profiles, that employers 
could test for using their competency assessments.4
Technology developments
 
There was also a major shift in the technology requirements 
for Quantine’s online platform, which ran on Adobe Flash 
technology. In October 2009, when Adobe announced the 
launch of its upgraded suite of services for smartphones, 
Apple decided not to support this upgrade.5 At that time, 
Apple’s smartphone, iPhone, had 10.8 percent share 
of the smartphone market and was growing quickly.6 
Apple’s decision with regard to Adobe Flash disrupted the 
reachability of Quantine’s platform. Quantine found itself 
investing capacity for a customer base that had shrunk 
overnight. There were also worrying rumours that Flash 
When we started, 
we decided that th
e 
company would foc
us on the pre-scree
n-
ing phase of candid
ate recruitment.
- Daryl Low, Co-Founde
r and CEO, Quantine Pt
e Ltd
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would eventually be demised. Hence, Quantine decided to 
take the precautionary step to move to a new platform. It 
started hiring permanent staff and interns to work on the 
new in-house platform. Previously with the Adobe Flash 
platform, Quantine had tried outsourcing the programming 
to third parties. However, they soon discovered that there 
were only a handful of programmers who were well-versed 
in Flash programming in the market. Moreover, those who 
charged less and met the company’s budget were likely to 
deliver lower quality work. Also, it was believed that as third 
parties, they may not be committed to doing a stellar job. 
With their new in-house approach, Quantine built a new 
platform from scratch in six months.
Funding
In the first quarter of 2009, Quantine managed to 
secure US$39,200 of funding from SPRING Singapore, 
a government-funded scheme that supported budding 
Singaporean entrepreneurs. The grant was provided under 
the Young Entrepreneur’s Scheme, and Quantine managed 
to apply for and obtain the grant just shy of Low’s 25th 
birthday, after which they would not have met the age criteria 
for application. But by the end of 2009, Quantine’s existing 
funds were running low, and it did not have the budget for 
sufficient research and development to extend their line of 
competency assessment tests. It became clear that in order 
to continue running the business, it would have to either 
obtain more funding soon, or come up with a new business 
idea that leveraged on the existing technology, and was a 
viable alternative. This new business idea was Next-5.
Next-5
Yap explained the reason for naming the new platform 
Next-5,
When you think about interviewing or shortlisting people, you think in 
series of fives – top five candidates, next five candidates… or you don’t 
take more than five minutes to know if you want to hire this person or not.
The Next-5 product was a platform for on-demand 
videos, and Quantine’s aim was to create an ecosystem 
for recruitment agencies, companies and job candidates 
to interact. Recruiters could post available jobs on the 
platform, organisations could reach out to potential 
candidates or screen available candidates, and candidates 
could apply for jobs through the platform.
Videos
Two types of videos could be recorded by candidates and 
stored on the Next-5 portal for prospective employers to 
view. The first was the video 'cover letter', where candidates 
would prepare a short video of a few minutes that answered 
basic questions such as their educational background, skill 
sets and work experience. Similar to a cover letter, this 
video could be re-recorded and revised to the satisfaction 
of the candidate, and different versions could be stored 
for job applications to different organisations or job roles. 
The second type of interview was conducted ‘live’ with the 
candidate answering pre-set questions provided by the 
organisation. When the candidate started the process, he or
she would be presented with a question, with 30 seconds to
4 Hirelabs, “Occupation DNA,” Videos & Demos, http://www.hirelabs.sg/videos/, assessed August 2013.
5 Patrick Seitz, Adobe Brings Full Flash To Smart Phones But iPhone The Big Exception, Investor's Business Daily (Los Angeles, CA), October 6, 2009, via NewsBank, EBSCOhost, accessed August 2013.
6 Jim Dalrymple, “Apple Doubles its iPhone Market Share,” May 20, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-10245339-37.html, accessed January 2014.
read and reflect – this is in line with a live interview. Then 
he or she would have to respond, and this response could 
not be re-recorded.
Benchmarking
A key feature of the portal that enabled companies to do a 
pre-screening of the relative suitability of the candidates 
was Next-5’s benchmarking tool. As the portal also offered 
competency assessments to verify the skill sets that 
candidates had on paper, candidates who performed the 
assessment could be benchmarked, either against their 
peers applying for the same job, or even against the portal’s 
entire universe of candidates who had previously completed 
the same assessment. This would allow the company to 
assess the calibre of the candidate before choosing to view 
their video cover letter.
Another metric that could be customised for the organisation 
was a weighted score of the candidates’ experience and 
competency assessment scores. Companies could specify 
the relative importance of different criteria, such as years 
of work experience, and this would be combined into a 
weighted average as an indicator of the candidates’ fit for 
the job. In this way, companies could tailor their knowledge 
of what qualities were required to be successful in the job, 
and compare these with the experience and background of 
the candidates.
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How to get candidates on the portal
The recruiting firms could upload their LinkedIn company 
profiles on the portal, and specify areas of specialisation 
and geographies that they cover. While these recruiter 
profiles were public and searchable, candidates’ profiles 
and videos were confidential. These would only be available 
to companies and recruiting agencies if the candidate 
applied for specific jobs on the portal. In the case of 
companies that had posted jobs and received applications 
on job boards that were external to the Next-5 portal, they 
could, if they had a ready pool of candidates to interview 
and assess, extract the email addresses of their candidates 
onto a spreadsheet. The emails would then be uploaded 
onto Next-5 after which email invites would be sent out 
to candidates who could apply for a specific job that was 
posted by the company. This was by invitation only.
Although the portal was aimed at performing candidate 
screening for companies which had numerous applicants 
applying for a particular job, it also had an additional 
feature that helped the companies advertise job vacancies 
on social media sites such as LinkedIn, Facebook and 
Twitter to widen their candidate pool. The portal would then 
aggregate all the responses from the various social media in 
one place for the hiring organisation.
Selling the idea
Marketing
A primary advantage for companies that used on-demand 
videos for recruiting mostly junior and mid-level staff 
was that it could speed up the recruiting process by up 
to 70 percent and save up to 80 to 90 percent of the 
costs associated with first round screening interviews – 
which was the cost and time used to coordinate schedules 
and to fly to another country for face-to-face meetings.7 
The on-demand interviews, with the pre-set questions 
decided by the company, could be passed on within the 
organisation to interviewers based in different time zones. 
Furthermore, the same questions asked repeatedly to the 
same candidate across interviewers would not be an issue. 
For the final round of interviews, which required a more 
interactive dialogue, the company could choose to adopt 
the face-to-face approach. This method of asynchronous 
video interviews also trumped YouTube in terms of privacy 
and Skype for coordination requirements. Interestingly, 
candidates who took the competency assessments could 
also voluntarily withdraw their application after their scores 
on the tests were revealed.
To market Next-5, Quantine focused on selling the benefits 
of the platform to recruitment firms and organisations, 
particularly Human Resource (HR) departments. They 
adopted the strategy of selling their product even as 
improvements were being made, instead of waiting for the 
‘perfect’ product. Over time, they refined their target market 
to large multinational corporations, and small and medium-
sized enterprises of more than 200 employees. In addition, 
the platform was also promoted to universities where first-
time job seekers could record mock interviews to work 
with their career coach, as well as to expand their online 
professional presence for internships or their first jobs.8
To reach their target audience, Quantine would cold call or 
send personalised direct mailers to the HR contact person 
in the organisation. In an age where the use of email and 
social media was widespread, Quantine chose to take the 
old fashioned route of paper mail to add that personal 
touch. To get the most out of each advertising dollar, they 
also placed advertisements in human resources magazines.
One of the key problems Quantine faced was the fact that 
they were a young company. They would always be asked 
“How old is your company?”, and the magic number that 
the prospective client was looking for was three years. Any 
less than that, and the prospect would most likely listen 
politely to the presentation and decline to sign up for the 
platform.
Another challenge for Quantine was changing the mind-set 
of the people in human resources, who were accustomed 
to the traditional method of in-person interviews. This was 
particularly challenging in Singapore, where it was possible 
to travel from one end of the island to another easily within 
a day for an in-person meeting.
7 Ibid.
8 Next-5.com, “About Us,” http://next-5.com/AboutUs, accessed August 2013.
9 Online Recruitment Goes Virtual, Business Times, January 2, 2012, on SMU IIE website, http://www2.smu.edu.sg/news_room/smu_in_the_news/2012/sources/BT_20120102_1.pdf, accessed August 2013. 30
Thus Quantine was open to promoting the platform to 
companies in any country, and even managed to sign up 
a client in Cyprus.9 By January 2012, the company had 
ten clients throughout Asia, Latin America, Europe and the 
Middle East. These comprised three educational institutions, 
four small-to-medium enterprises, and three multi-national 
corporations (one of which covered recruitment for several 
countries: Singapore, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, India 
and Indonesia).
Pricing
Setting the right price point for the platform was a bit 
of a trial and error process for Quantine. The customer’s 
willingness to pay varied according to factors like the size of 
the company, as well as the country where the company was 
based (refer to Exhibit 1 for the Next-5 employer price plan). 
The main charge was for the videos, where the companies 
were only charged for each video selectively unlocked, and 
not per video received. The competency assessments were 
part of an ‘a la carte’ menu which was charged separately.
Funding and investors
Funding
Quantine’s first client, Agricultural and Veterinary Authority 
of Singapore, signed up in part because of the confidence 
given by the SPRING Singapore funding, which the client 
saw on Quantine’s website. By late 2010, surviving only 
on this initial funding, Quantine had already managed 
to bring in revenue that equalled the funding amount of 
US$39,200. Subsequently, the company received funding 
from angel investors and private investors. Late in 2011, 
a grant of US$500,000 was received by the National 
Research Foundation’s Technology Incubation Scheme 
(TIS-NRF). The National Research Foundation of Singapore 
was a government body that was founded for the purpose 
of fostering innovation and promoting research and 
development for early-stage technology-based enterprises 
in Singapore.10 Much of the NRF funding was devoted to 
improving the Next-5 platform.
Investors
When it came to investors who provided funds to Quantine, 
Low’s experience was that,
If you ask advice from ten people, you will get 11 comments. They will 
never get what you are trying to do.
Quantine’s founders recognised that there were many 
people along the way who had helped them during the early 
days. The Singapore Management University Institute of 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship (IIE) provided Quantine 
a space in their incubator to work out during the initial 
phase. As part of an "extrapreneurship"11 programme under 
the IIE, where experienced entrepreneurs set up businesses 
together with students just starting out, Eddie Chau, SMU’s 
entrepreneur-in-residence and an entrepreneur in his own 
right in the information technology space, jointly set up 
Quantine with Low and Yap. Both Low and Yap agreed that 
having Chau on board helped them to avoid elementary 
mistakes that most start-ups would have made. They also 
acknowledged that having Chau’s stake in the business 
helped them raise their credibility when it came to 
raising funds.
To keep the company nimble and have ‘no dead weight’ 
in the team, Quantine managed an ongoing ‘shareholders 
clean-up policy’ where the decision-makers in the company 
were kept on an active list and updated regularly depending 
on how active and effective they were. The company 
started with four shareholders, and over the three years 
since its inception, it had undergone various additions 
and departures to the shareholding team, with the number 
decreasing to three and finally to two shareholders.
Low recognised that, finally, the founders of the company 
were the ones who needed to make key decisions on their 
own. He accepted that there would be investors who just 
wanted to provide funds in exchange for an equity stake, 
but would not be involved in how the company was run. Or 
there would be investors who would want to have a say, but 
not put their reputations on the line by connecting Quantine 
to their contacts – which was the most effective and key way 
in which they could contribute to the company’s success. 
At the end of the day, being the niche player that it was, 
what Quantine really needed was concrete connections 
from people who were well-versed in the area of human 
resources, and many investors did not have that kind of 
in-depth knowledge.
10 National Research Foundation, “About Us,” http://www.nrf.gov.sg/nrf/uploadedFiles/20120309%20TIS%20Press%20Release%20(FINAL).pdf, assessed August 2013.
11 Extrapreneurship happens when a problem and opportunity is identified by business practitioners through first-hand experience, who bring the idea to potential collaborators (typically students at a university, when SMU first came up with this concept) who can help solve the problem. 31
Virtually growing
Three years after Quantine had been founded, the company 
had undergone a change in strategy as it moved from 
competency assessments to on-demand video interviews. 
Although the company had managed to cover its original 
costs within nine months after their first round of funding 
of US$39,200 in 2009, it still had to think about how to 
scale up business in a more directed and effective manner.
Yap thought hard about the next step for Quantine. It 
had a good product, and had enough funds to sustain the 
company  for the next few months. Also, through their hard-
earned experience, the founders had learned to trust their 
own judgement when making key decisions. The question 
was now – how could Yap best use the US$500,000 that 
they had received from their latest round of funding to 
market his company’s suite of pre-screening services, and 
implement an effective growth plan for the company?
(US$)
Watch videos of candidates
Active job posts
Job re-posts per job post
Social media broadcasts
Collaboration tools
Multiple accounts
Personalised career page
Integration services
Basic
$100
8
3
3
                     
Business
$1,322
135
unlimited
unlimited 
Free Plan
free
2
1
1
Start-up
$382
35
5
5
Source: Next-5 (August 2013), Plans & Pricing, htt http://next-5.com/EmployerAccount/Plans (accessed 30 August 2013).
EXHIBIT 1: 
NEXT-5 PRICING PLAN FOR EMPLOYERS
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Abstract
This case follows Aditya Challa, a craft beer aficionado, 
whose passion for good beer led him on an international 
quest to study the art of brewing in Scotland and eventually 
to Singapore, where he started a microbrewery business 
with his friends in 2011. By October 2012, sales of his 
craft beer had been increasing 20 percent per month, 
bringing up his production to about one-third operating 
capacity. However, future growth remained uncertain – with 
specific challenges pertaining to distribution and branding. 
Craft beer was still a relatively unknown concept in the city-
state, and consumers remained sceptical of premium priced 
local beer. Moreover, big breweries in the Singapore market 
had already locked down most retailers with exclusive draft 
contracts. Challa reviewed his business model and growth 
strategy in terms of how and where he could sell his beer 
while continuing to build the Jungle Beer brand.
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It was November 2012 and Aditya Challa, entrepreneur 
and self-proclaimed beer aficionado, felt a mixture of pride 
and anxiety. He and his partners had started their own craft 
beer microbrewery: Barefoot Brewing Company Pte. Ltd. 
Their brand, Jungle Beer, was launched on the Singapore 
market 15 months earlier. The company had since then 
experienced strong growth and healthy operating margins. 
Challa had proven that he could brew a premium quality 
beer. However, as the end of the year was approaching, he 
and his partners began to question the sustainability of the 
company’s growth – particularly since the business climate 
of 2012 was one of recession and concern.
The issue was not in the product itself, but rather in its 
distribution. Many of the retail outlets he could sell to 
were locked-down by exclusive draft contracts held by 
large brewers like Asia Pacific Breweries (APB). Convincing 
other retailers to carry the new Jungle Beer brand was 
also difficult. Jungle Beer had yet to build a well-known 
reputation. In addition, Barefoot Brewing Company did not 
have the resources to provide cash incentives for retailers to 
“Jungle Beer is ab
out making beer y
ou 
love, not merely to
lerate”
- The Barefoot Brewing
 Company
sell the product. Without the assurances of reputation and 
incentives, the retailers felt more at risk to poor inventory 
turnover. Furthermore, selling a unique premium product 
like craft beer to one retailer sometimes precluded being 
able to sell to another because of the innate competitiveness 
of the food and beverage industry.
Above all, there was the more daunting challenge of 
branding. Jungle Beer was a new brand and had the usual 
challenges of raising brand awareness. In Singapore, the 
difficulty of this task was compounded in two ways. One 
was the immature nature of the craft beer market and the 
other was the popular notion that imported products were 
of better quality than local products. Imported foreign 
beer was marketed at a premium price and enjoyed the 
reputation associated with bearing a foreign label. Retailers 
and customers who were not accustomed to craft brewing 
and the various styles of beer, simply did not understand 
why a locally brewed beer should be in the same premium 
price category as a foreign import.
All of these challenges were interrelated. Challa and his 
partners needed a realistic growth strategy that addressed 
the distribution needs of the Barefoot Brewing Company. 
This strategy had to simultaneously promote the new Jungle 
Beer brand and nurture the fledgling craft beer scene in 
Singapore. Customer demand for Jungle Beer, and craft 
beer in general, was key to selling Challa’s beer to retailers. 
Paradoxically, generating customer interest in Jungle Beer 
required retail outlets for the beer to be available. What 
could he do?
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Starting up
Challa returned home to India after graduating in November 
2007 with an MBA from the University of Hawaii. He knew 
he wanted to start a business and was mulling over several 
ideas before deciding to get into the business of craft beer 
(refer to Exhibit 1 for classifications of beer). He recalled,
The biggest thing that struck me was that I wasn’t able to drink Indian 
beer anymore. After having lived in the UK and the US for a few years, I got 
back, and I just couldn’t drink the beer. It was the same beer that I had 
been drinking all along, and I couldn’t drink it anymore. I thought this was 
a huge market opportunity in India.
He had fallen in love with the complex tastes and qualities 
of craft beer, and India’s lack of a craft beer scene presented 
an irresistible opportunity for his business venture. 
However, he did not want to hire a brewer and simply run 
the business end. Challa planned to be in the beer business 
for the long term, and this was a product he was passionate 
about – he wanted to be more involved.
Challa left India to study brewing in Scotland where he 
earned a post-graduate diploma in brewing and distilling 
in August 2008. After his studies, he also gained hands-
on experience working in a Scottish microbrewery for five 
months. Following his graduation and the brief stint at 
the microbrewery, he returned to India as a full-fledged 
brewer. Thereafter he considered six states to start his own 
brewing business in, but after eight months he had not 
made much progress. 
The difficulties were largely due to regulatory hurdles 
and ambiguities concerning expectations in relationships 
between government officials and business people. He 
found building a business case difficult because of the 
unknown costs in face of such ambiguity.
I was getting frustrated and getting nowhere. You know, I can’t get my 
friends to invest in a business which I’m not sure about running; because 
of all these unknown costs.
In October 2009, Challa met a few of his old classmates 
for a business school reunion in Bali. Upon hearing his 
business woes in India, his friends suggested checking the 
Singapore market as a possible option. One of his friends 
had been living in Singapore for a year but was not sure 
if there was a market for craft beer; and despite being a 
consumer of craft beer, he was not very familiar with that 
business. They decided to research the Singapore market.
Challa made his first trip to Singapore one month later. 
He and his friend spent their first week meeting brewers 
and visiting microbreweries. They found that most of the 
breweries in Singapore were brewpubs and that there was 
a lot of camaraderie between the craft beer makers (refer 
to Exhibit 2 for definitions and classification of commercial 
breweries). Convinced that there was a market for craft beer, 
that weekend they contacted the government officials about 
setting up a business. Within hours of sending emails, they 
received responses stating that officials would be available 
to meet with them later that day or the next. 
Shortly thereafter the Barefoot Brewing Company was 
founded – it was still November. Challa knew Singapore 
was pro-business, but the speed and efficiency of the 
government bureaucracy amazed him. He said,
This was quite a relief and a big change. So by the end of those two weeks 
we had already started the company, though we hadn’t decided on what 
form the business would take.
Challa and his friends from the business school reunion 
decided to be partners in the brewing business. His friends 
would act as involved investors while Challa handled the 
brewing and business operations. The team, however, still 
needed to decide on the type of craft beer business to be in. 
Starting a brewpub seemed to be the best idea – almost all 
microbreweries in Singapore were brewpubs. However, they 
ultimately decided against it. Challa reported,
We thought about it quite a while, but neither me nor any of the other 
partners were keen on running the retail part of the business because, 
although they are vertically aligned – we sell to bars that then sell our 
beer… but they are still different businesses. Brewing beer is a different 
business than running a bar. None of us knew anything about running a 
bar, and we still don’t know enough about the retail business.
The team next considered opening a nano-brewery that 
used an u-brew business model. This would be the simplest 
and easiest brewing business to start. An u-brew business 
sells the experience of personal brewing. In Singapore, 
individuals are permitted to brew up to 30 litres of beer per 
month as long as it is for free consumption. 
1 Average exchange rate in 2011 between SG$ and US$ at 1.28:1.  
2  Ibid.   3 Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. December 2011. p.10
4 Average exchange rate in 2011 between SG$ and US$ at 1.28:1. 35
Under the u-brew model, customers could come to the nano-
brewery to brew their own batches under Challa’s guidance. 
In this manner, the business would avoid the requirements 
of obtaining any alcoholic beverage related licensing. It was 
also an inexpensive small-scale operation that would not 
need much space. 
The only thing they had to do was provide their customers 
with the raw materials, equipment, and related services. It 
was a fun idea, but did not leave much room for growth.
Serious consideration was given to each idea in turn, and 
it took a couple of months for the partners to finally decide 
as to which type of brewing business they would start. 
In the end, they chose to open a microbrewery focussing 
only on the production, not the retail of beer. They wanted 
something that provided room for growth, and would be 
worthwhile, given the time and money that was going into 
the venture. Next, they had to decide on a suitable location 
in Singapore, and determine if it was better to rent or own 
a space.
We were thinking of renting, but the more we found out how the rental 
markets were – the more we found out how rental works, we found that 
landlords usually… well they’ll usually sign a two year lease at a fixed 
rent, but they could up it to anything after that. In the brewing business, 
a lot of the costs are the setup costs; it’s not just the equipment costs. We 
knew we’d be stuck if somebody wanted us to move, or threatened us with 
a 30 percent extra rent or whatever. So we decided to buy the factory, we 
own this place.
Two of Challa’s partners were experienced in real estate 
and had a sound understanding of property markets. This 
enabled them to determine the best option for the young 
enterprise. However, the decision to buy their own space 
would mean delaying the launch of the business till they 
raised the extra capital needed for a down payment. 
Fortunately, the partners were successful in financing the 
venture internally. In January 2011 they purchased the 
property for nearly S$1,000,000 (US$782,000) and were 
ready to start with the equipment purchases and setup.1
Their equipment purchase was a paragon of the contemporary 
global supply chain. The company they purchased from was 
based out of San Diego, California in the United States, 
and was responsible for designing the equipment and fitting 
out the complex controls, valves, and piping. Whereas the 
components, such as the stainless steel brewing vats, were 
produced in China. Engineers from the company in San 
Diego then assembled the complete setup on site at the 
brewery with local Singaporean technicians.
This setup strategy was done at a lower cost than equipment 
setups used by brewpubs. This was primarily because 
brewpubs had to consider aesthetics, and preferred to 
order more expensive artisan looking copper tanks made in 
Europe. As a production microbrewery, Challa considered 
function over form, and was therefore able to experience 
lower setup costs than a typical brewpub. Nonetheless, 
it was a significant investment that cost S$350,000 
(US$274,000) for the equipment and S$150,000 (US$ 
117,000) for the setup.2
The brewery was fully equipped by April 2011, but 
considerable paperwork and inspections were still needed 
before the necessary licenses and certifications could be 
granted. Several months passed, and on July 1, 2011, the 
Barefoot Brewing Company was ready to start brewing and 
selling beer (refer to Exhibit 3 for Jungle Beer logo and 
Exhibit 4 for types of Jungle Beer). In August the business 
sold its first beer, and for the first 15 months of operations, 
had experienced a 20 percent growth in sales volume per 
month. Regardless, Challa cautioned,
It’s [sale growth] from a really low base… we still do a lower volume than 
most of the other brewpubs, who have their own outlets and dedicated space.
The brew-scape
Alcohol regulation in Singapore
Alcoholic beverages were heavily regulated in many 
countries. An especially noticeable aspect of Singapore’s 
regulation was the high taxes placed on alcoholic beverages 
(refer to Exhibit 5 for taxation and duty levies on alcoholic 
drinks). Domestically produced beer faced a S$48 
(US$37.50) per litre of pure alcohol excise duty, meaning 
that a 5.0 percent alcohol by volume (ABV) beer would have 
a S$2.40 (US$1.88) per litre excise duty. Imported beer 
had the same pure alcohol excise duty and an additional 
S$16 (US$12.50) per litre of pure alcohol customs duty.3, 4
5 MarketLine, Company Profile: Asia Pacific Breweries Limited. 31 May 2012. p. 18.
6 Asia Pacific Brewery, Company Website, http://www.apb.com.sg/corporate-profile.html, accessed November 2012. 
7 Carlsberg Group, Company Website,. http://www.carlsberggroup.com/Pages/default.aspx, accessed November 2012.    8 Datamonitor. Industry Profile: Beer in Singapore. Dec. 2011. p. 18 & 19.  9 Ibid.  10 Ibid. 36
The government of Singapore also maintained strict controls 
on advertising alcoholic beverages. The Asia Pacific Brewery 
(APB), maker of Tiger Beer, had found such stringent rules 
a limitation to their branding and promotional strategy.5 
Instead they had to rely on the bottom-up process of 
organically building brand recognition, which took time. 
APB, which had been in the brewing business since 1931, 
had plenty of time to establish its reputation.6 APB’s main 
competitor, Carlsberg, began sending samples to Singapore 
in 1869 and overtime had become highly recognised as one 
of the few options for beer that was available.7 The historic 
presence of these companies had no doubt affected local 
tastes and preferences and helped form local perceptions 
of what a beer was supposed to taste like.
Bargaining power
Established brewers like APB faced narrow operating margins 
and relied on economies of scale to remain profitable (refer 
to Exhibit 6 for selling margin of a typical beer brand).8 
The brewing business was capital intensive and dependent 
on vast distribution networks where large wholesalers and 
retailers with significant buying power negotiated for even 
lower prices.9 To remain cost competitive, the brewers had 
to source for raw ingredients at low prices, which involved 
setting up long-term contracts with suppliers; this had a 
knock on effect of limiting their flexibility.10 These high 
barriers to entry meant that large brewers typically did not 
worry about the threat of newcomers, but instead competed 
fiercely with each other in capturing market share – this 
often involved setting up exclusive draft contracts or other 
agreements with small retailers like bars, clubs, and 
restaurants to exclusively carry their products or incentivise 
the sales of their products.
As a microbrewer, Challa was able to extract much higher 
operating margins than mass-market beer by selling 
premium craft beer that appealed to more sophisticated 
consumers (refer to Exhibit 7 for Singapore beer market 
segmentation by value). According to Challa,
Our goal is to be the premier craft beer from Asia… period. We’re 
consciously not making any of the widely available styles, for instance, a 
regular wheat beer or lager… It’s pointless to try and differentiate enough 
in those segments to be able to sell at a premium.
Entry barriers into the craft beer market were seemingly 
low. Initial capital investment for a microbrewery was 
manageable and the premium margins of craft beer were 
attractive. However, the small size of the Barefoot Brewing 
Company and low product recognition associated with its 
newcomer status meant that Challa did not have much 
bargaining power over buyers, as opposed to brewpubs, 
which benefited from captive consumers. This was further 
complicated by having to survive in the fledgling craft beer 
market. The challenge for Challa was not making the beer; 
it was finding where to sell it, and how.
The competition
In 2012 there were 10 breweries in Singapore, including 
The Barefoot Brewing Company, which was one of two 
microbreweries that was not a brewpub (refer to Exhibit 8 
for number of breweries in Singapore). Jungle Beer, 
however, was special because it was the only true craft beer 
not produced in a brewpub. This gave it a couple of distinct 
advantages. For example, brewpubs competed for many of 
the same customers – discerning craft beer aficionados, 
sophisticated drinkers and trendsetters. Brewpubs were 
some of the best channels for selling craft beer to such 
target customers. At the same time, brewpubs also had 
fewer channels than a production microbrewery for selling 
craft beer. To elaborate, a brewpub or bar would not want 
to risk selling another brewpub beer in their establishment 
because it would introduce an unnecessary risk of losing 
customers. Suppose a customer was introduced to a beer 
from The Pump Room while they were at Brewerkz.11 If they 
enjoyed that beer they might start frequenting The Pump 
Room, which was just across the river, instead of Brewerkz.
The fact that Barefoot Brewery was not a brewpub meant 
that Jungle Beer could be proposed as an alternative without 
the risk of customer attrition. This potentially made Jungle 
Beer attractive to brewpubs and bars looking to expand 
their brand portfolio. This was beneficial because craft 
beer drinkers typically enjoyed a wide and diverse selection 
of beers. In this sense, brewpubs were ostensibly both 
competitors and a point of sales. In addition, unlike many 
of its competitors, Jungle Beer did not require exclusive 
draft contracts from its retailers. Challa expressed another 
advantage of Jungle Beer not being a brewpub was,
Typically, a brewpub’s capacity is mostly tied up in making more ordinary 
beers to keep the volumes of the pub going, whereas we’re not constrained 
by that, we can make the more special beers without having to worry about 
making a lager or whatever else.
11 The Pump Room and Brewerkz were two brewpubs in Singapore located at Clarke Quay in 2012. 37
12 Brewers Association, Craft Brewer Defined,Retrieved from: http://www.brewersassociation.org/pages/business-tools/craft-brewing-statistics/craft-brewer-defined, accessed November 2012.
To this end, Barefoot Brewing Company could offer 
customised boutique beers catered to specific restaurants 
interested in carrying Jungle Beer. Challa had already 
made two unique customised beers for two restaurants in 
Singapore, and was hoping to make more unique style beers 
in future. 
Before the end of 2012, he planned to launch another 
interesting niche product: a low-alcohol craft beer brewed 
with acai berries. The idea was that this would appeal 
to certain tastes and preferences that were not already 
provided for by the market. 
Archipelago was the other non-brewpub microbrewery in 
Singapore. By definition, it was not a true craft beer maker 
because it was owned by a large brewing company, APB.12 
Nonetheless, Archipelago was a good craft beer in all other 
respects. As a subsidiary of a large brewer, it had the clout 
required to demand exclusive draft contracts with retailers.
Exclusive draft contracts with bars allowed a brewer to 
avoid bottling costs. However, relying on exclusive draft 
contracts may also limit opportunities for growth – that is, a 
commitment to contracts may reduce flexibility. Challa said,
I think this is where we’ve got to play to our strengths, which has a lot to 
do with flexibility and being able to change brands quickly – I could make 
a new beer tomorrow… or today…
As a startup, flexibility was an important aspect of Barefoot 
Brewing. It enabled rapid growth by being able to move 
quickly and change directions as need be. In fact, Jungle 
Beer had already exported beer to two other countries in its 
first year, Malaysia and New Zealand. There were also plans 
for Jungle Beer to eventually be sold in China and Thailand. 
Still, the challenge continued to be a matter of distribution. 
Challa needed to convince retailers that Jungle Beer was a 
product that would sell.
Bottles and kegs
Channeling the brew
For the first six months of operations, Jungle Beer 
was distributed in kegs only, meaning that it was only 
available on draft. It was not until early 2012 that bottled 
distribution began, but still most volume was sold in kegs. 
However, distribution in bottles had increased in terms of 
the number of bars willing to sell Jungle Beer. This was 
because exclusive draft contracts were prevalent throughout 
Singapore. These contracts would incentivise bars to meet 
target volumes of a big brewing company’s beer. By offering 
Jungle Beer in bottles, Challa was able to get around the 
draft contracts in bars. Even when bars did agree to carry 
Jungle Beer, some were less concerned with Jungle Beer 
sales as it might compete with the attractively incentivised 
draft beer contract volumes. For instance, Challa said,
If they’re making 50 to 80 percent margin on the big brewing companies’ 
beers, they would want a 200 percent on ours because… they want to have 
it on the menu to be cool, but they don’t really want to promote it.
Nonetheless, the large number of on-trade retailers, like 
bars, clubs, and restaurants, gave ample opportunities for 
growth. In Singapore, these channels numbered over 
a thousand (refer to Exhibit 9 for the number of trade 
establishments in Singapore serving alcoholic drinks by 
type). There were even craft beer bars operating in Singapore 
that offered as many as 50 to 70 beers. These bars would 
be receptive to a locally produced craft beer, but it would 
also be difficult to achieve high sales volumes from these 
establishments because of the large variety of beer on offer.
Another aspect of bottled distribution was branding. 
Draft beers were poured into glass mugs that might not 
have a label on the glass to signal which type of beer was 
being consumed. Worse still, labeled glass mugs did not 
necessarily match up with the type of beer it contained. 
Bottles had the advantage of having clear and accurate 
labels that signaled the types of beer consumed. This was 
very important for building brand recognition.
Distribution in bottles also opened the door for export and 
boutique bottle shops specialising in premium beers, some 
of which offered home delivery service (refer to Exhibit 
10 for off-trade percent sales of beer in Singapore by 
distribution format). Although grocery stores were still the 
largest off-trade retailer of beer, Challa had decided against 
distributing through this channel (refer to Exhibit 11 & 12 
for sales of alcoholic drinks by category by on-trade versus 
off-trade split and off-trade mark-ups for beer, wine, and 
spirits in Singapore):
Grocery stores are really tough. We do sell at a few bottle shops, we sell 
at three of them, but the minute we’re in a super-market then a lot of our 
core customer base, which is a craft beer bar, are not interested to have 
our beer anymore, because a super-market can do a 20 percent markup, 
but these guys need to do a 100 to 150 percent markup to survive and pay 
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their rent. The minute we’re in a supermarket, we’re going to lose the bulk 
of our core customers – our existing customers.
By October 2012, The Barefoot Brewing Company was 
utilising 4,000 to 5,000 of its 15,000 litres per month 
capacity to produce Jungle Beer, leaving plenty of room for 
growth without having to invest in additional production 
capacity. Jungle Beer focused more on value utilisation as 
opposed to volume utilisation. This value utilisation strategy 
meant that Jungle Beer had to be sold at a premium due 
to the higher marginal costs of ingredients and labour 
experienced by small-scale brewers.
Selling ‘Singapore’ to Singapore
Points of sale
Imported draft and bottled beer in Singapore was sold at 
a premium, typically 30 to 40 percent above the retail 
price for local beers. This was partially because imported 
beer had to pay excise and customs duties, as well as 
transportation costs, and also because of perception. 
Singaporean consumers readily identified foreign imports 
as being synonymous with premium quality (refer to Exhibit 
13 for market shares of beer sales by companies selling in 
Singapore).
Many countries throughout Asia, with perhaps the exception 
of Japan, perceived imported products, particularly from 
the west, as being of higher quality. It was a problem of 
perception, in which Challa believed,
Everyone in Asia is dealing with this. Anyone making a quality product 
needing to charge a premium is surely dealing with it. It’s not even unique 
to beer.
As a case in point, Challa described a sales meeting with 
a buyer, 
[The buyer asked], ‘why does the bottle say it’s made in Singapore?’ I 
mean, we’re made in Singapore! It’s just bizarre. Most people don’t know 
that anything good is made here. It’s just going to take time.
Another challenge was convincing retailers to sell Jungle 
Beer in their bars at a premium price. The perception was 
that because Jungle Beer was local, bar owners questioned 
why customers would be willing to pay a premium price for 
it. As Challa put it,
If your beer is local, why is it more expensive than the most popular local 
beer?
Premium imported beer sold at a 30 to 40 percent more 
expensive than what Singaporeans usually paid for local 
beer. Convincing bars to sell anything else was a challenge. 
However, making cold-calls to bars to persuade them to sell 
Jungle Beer was not very viable. It was time consuming, but 
more importantly, these retailers simply did not understand 
what craft beer was all about. This was a challenge to all 
players in the craft beer market. To this point, even when 
a customer bought a craft beer from a competitor, such as 
one of the other local craft breweries, it was still beneficial 
to Jungle Beer because it would raise awareness of craft 
beer in general.
Tastes and preferences
Craft beer was making headlines in lifestyle trends in 
Singapore. In October 2012, The Straits Times featured the 
first ever craft beer festival in the weekend Life! section 
of the newspaper, and Jungle Beer was promoted as a 
local brand of craft beer.13 It seemed Barefoot Brewing 
Company had become part of a craft beer zeitgeist among 
trend-setting Singaporeans. Steadily increasing incomes 
also meant that Singaporeans were more receptive to social 
drinking in more expensive on-trade establishments.14 
Strong tourism in Singapore meant that many on and off-
trade establishments were catering to foreign tastes as 
well.15 Challa was convinced these trendsetters would be 
the market drivers,
It’s more the young, trendy, well-networked people who are reading about 
craft beer, and then trying it out…
Herein lay the paradox; a lot of the buzz surrounding craft 
beer occurred at the point of sale. It was at the bars, 
pubs, and restaurants that enthusiasm for the product was 
generated. These places were critical to building Jungle 
Beer’s brand reputation, but Jungle Beer needed to have a 
brand reputation to get into these channels.
The next batch
Jungle Beer seemed well poised to be at the forefront of 
an emerging trend, but was this trend sustainable? On 
the topic of craft beer becoming a fad in Singapore, 
Challa grinned: 
I’ve never met one person who used to drink craft beer and now only drinks lager.
13 Lydia Vasko,”Be Hip to the Hops,” The Straits Times, October 19, 2012, Sec. C6.
14 Ibid.   15 Ibid. 39
16 Brewers Association. Craft Brewer Defined. Retrieved from: http://www.brewersassociation.org/pages/business-tools/craft-brewing-statistics/craft-brewer-defined
17  Ibid.   18 The Beer Store. Beer Types and Sub-Types. Beer 101. Retrieved from: http://www.thebeerstore.ca/beer-101/beer-types    19 Ibid.   20 Ibid.   21 Ibid. 
Craft beer was in fact gaining traction in Singapore, 
which boasted more microbreweries than any other city in 
Asia. However, relative to Singapore’s size, this was less 
impressive – smaller cities elsewhere, such as San Diego 
in the United States, had three to four times as many 
microbreweries as Singapore did. In this sense, the craft 
beer market in Singapore was still in its infancy, but this 
also presented opportunities for growth (refer to Exhibit 14 
& 15 for Sales of alcoholic drinks and beer sales forecasts 
in Singapore).
Challa knew that word-of-mouth and reputation were key 
to branding in this environment. He entered Jungle Beer in 
competition and won awards against local and international 
breweries. He had consistently organised events that 
featured Jungle Beer, maintained a regularly updated 
website, and pursued an active social media presence. 
Jungle Beer had also been mentioned numerous times in 
several different news publications since its inception. He 
had even met with the tourism board to discuss what work 
could be done to make people more aware of the growing 
craft beer scene in Singapore.
Challa had already taken Jungle Beer a long way – from a 
desire to drink craft beer in India to a fast growing business 
in Singapore in the span of three years. He could make good 
beer – that much was certain, but with the Barefoot Brewing 
Company at one-third capacity he needed a strategy that 
would keep him on the path towards continued growth. 
He needed to increase the demand for Jungle Beer by 
crafting a strategy that reconciled branding and distribution 
through hesitant channels.
EXHIBIT 1: 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF BEER
The difference between craft beer and normal beer (beer 
produced by large or big breweries) Craft beer was produced 
by small independent breweries, which had to be less than 
25 percent owned by a big or large brewing company.16 
They also tended to develop new styles of beer that may 
be innovative and create unique tastes while using natural 
ingredients.17
Types of beer: Beer can be classified into three basic 
categories: Ales, Lagers, and Stouts. There are many sub-
types of beer within these categories.18
Ale: Ales use top fermenting yeast that had a warmer 
fermenting process than the bottom fermenting yeast. 
This difference resulted in a beer that had a distinct taste 
that combined fruitful, floral, aromatic, acidic, and bitter 
characteristics.19
Lager: The colder fermenting process of lagers required a 
longer fermentation time that gave the beer a smooth and 
light taste. It was usually more carbonated than ale, which 
also gave it a crisp refreshing characteristic – this is the 
most widely consumed beer in the world.20
Stout: Stouts also used a top fermenting process, and have a 
rich creamy taste with a distinct black colour.21
EXHIBIT 2: 
COMMERCIAL 
BREWERY CLASSIFICATION
Classification                       Capacity
Large or Big Brewery
Regional Brewery
Production 
Micro-Brewery
Brewpub Micro-Brewery
Nano-Brewery
More than 6,000,000 barrels produced annually
Between 15,000 barrels to 6,000,000 barrels 
produced annually
Less than 15,000 barrels produced annually 
with 75 percent sold off site
A restaurant – brewery that sells at least 25 per-
cent of its beer on site
These are very small brewing facilities that 
often rent their capacity for non-commercial 
brewing purposes
Note: 1 Barrel = 1.17 hectolitres or 117 litres
Source: The Brewers Association. Retrieved from: http://www.brewersassociation.org/pages/
business-tools/craft-brewing-statistics/market-segments, accessed November 2012.
Source: Barefoot Brewing Company website: http://www.junglebeer.com, 
accessed November 2012.
EXHIBIT 3: 
JUNGLE BEER LOGO
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Name of Beer
Tropical Wheat – Mango
Tropical Wheat - Mango & Orange
Tropical Wheat – Pink Guava and Soursop
Kiasu Stout
American Pale Ale (IPA)
Porter
Pale Ale (English)
Cerveza Habanero
Lah Belique (Belgian Ale)
EXHIBIT 4: 
TYPES OF JUNGLE BEER
EXHIBIT 5: 
TAXATION AND DUTY LEVIES ON 
ALCOHOLIC DRINKS IN SINGAPORE, 2011
EXHIBIT 6: 
SELLING MARGIN FOR A TYPICAL BEER 
BRAND (TIGER BEER) IN 
SINGAPORE, 2011Source: Barefoot Brewery Company Website. Retrieved from: http://www.junglebeer.com/our-
beers/?&offset=0, accessed November 2012.
Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. 
December 2011.
Note: Based on Tiger, S$3.04, 323ml at supermarkets/hypermarkets and five percent ABV 
Excise includes any other tax as relevant
Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. December 2011.
EXHIBIT 7: 
SINGAPORE BEER MARKET 
SEGMENTATION BY VALUE, 2010
Note: A premium lager is S$9 (US$7.04) or more per litre, with below S$9 consisting of standard 
lagers. Specialty beers, ales, stouts, and bitters are likely to be imported premium beers from 
overseas big or large breweries. Assume an average retail price of S12 (US$9.40) per 500mL 
for Jungle Beer.
Source: Datamonitor. Industry Profile: Beer in Singapore. Dec. 2011.
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EXHIBIT 8: 
NUMBER OF BREWERIES IN SINGAPORE, 2005-2010
EXHIBIT 9: 
THE NUMBER OF TRADE ESTABLISHMENTS IN 
SINGAPORE SERVING ALCOHOLIC DRINKS BY TYPE 
FROM 2006-2010
EXHIBIT 10: 
OFF-TRADE SALES OF BEER IN 
SINGAPORE BY DISTRIBUTION 
FORMAT, 2011
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Distribution Format       % Off-Trade
Brewery
MicroBreweries
Total
Bars/Pubs
Cafes
Full-Service
Restaurants
Fast Food
Store-Based Retailing
Grocery Retailers
Discounters
Food/Drink/Tobacco Specialists
Hypermarkets
Small Grocery Retailers
Convenience Stores
Forecourt Retailers
Independent Small Grocers
Supermarkets
Other Grocery Retailers
Non-Grocery Retailers
Non-Store Retailing
Direct Selling
Home-shopping
Internet Retailing
Vending
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 3 6 6 7 8
3 4 7 7 8 9
115 151 154 166 176
892 901 923 937 963 
1,356 1,410 1,459 1,499 1,584 
1,128 1,151 1,195 1,267 1,371
99.0
99.0
0.0
3.0
11.7
22.2
11.0
2.2
9.0
62.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
Note: By 2012 there would be 10 breweries in Singapore because Barefoot Brewing Company would not have existed in 2010
Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. December 2011.
Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. December 2011.
Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. December 2011.
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EXHIBIT 11: 
SALES OF ALCOHOLIC DRINKS BY 
CATEGORY BY ON-TRADE VERSUS 
OFF-TRADE SPLIT
Note: Alcoholic beverages sold in clubs, bars, pubs, and restaurants are considered 
on-trade. Off-trade is sold without a license for home consumption through outlets 
such as supermarkets and convenience stores.
Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. 
December 2011.
EXHIBIT 12: 
TYPICAL WHOLESALER AND 
RETAILER OFF-TRADE MARK-UPS
FOR BEER, WINE AND SPIRITS IN 
SINGAPORE, 2011
Note: A wholesaler buys large quantities of a good, warehouses these goods, then resells 
them to a retailer at a higher price
Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International.
December 2011.
EXHIBIT 13: 
COMPANY SHARES OF BEER SALES BY 
VOLUME IN SINGAPORE, 2011
Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. 
December 2011.
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EXHIBIT 14: 
SALES OF ALCOHOLIC DRINKS 
IN SINGAPORE, 2006-2011
EXHIBIT 15: 
BEER SALES FORECAST IN 
SINGAPORE, 2006-2011
Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. December 2011. Source: Passport. Alcoholic Drinks in Singapore. Euromonitor International. December 2011.
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Abstract
Case A begins in April 2010, where Sharat Verma, the 
Brand Manager for Gillette India, reflects on the solutions 
that were developed to overcome stagnant growth in their 
men’s grooming segment – specifically Mach3 razors. The 
product was unsuitably priced to the market and suffered 
from poor availability. Faced with this problem, he worked 
with Harish Narayanan, the assistant brand manager in 
the Singapore Regional Business Unit, and together they 
influenced a research and development effort that focused 
on frugal innovation, wherein they succeeded in removing 
non-essential features of the Gillette razor design in order 
to reduce costs, thereby aligning the value proposition 
and price-point to the target segment. In addition, Verma 
and Narayanan helped work to develop an unconventional 
marketing campaign, called the “Shave India Movement”, 
which catalysed the previously unresponsive yet more 
affluent urban market, which resulted in record breaking 
sales for the Mach3 razor in 2010.
Verma and Narayanan are then left to analyse the mechanics 
underlying the success of this campaign, and determine if 
the Movement can be further expanded. They must also 
determine if lessons from the campaign can be applied 
elsewhere, and if so, how?
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GILLETTE’S “SHAVE INDIA MOVEMENT”: 
RAZOR SHARP AGAINST THE STUBBLE (A)
to shave or not 
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The situation was t
hat Indian men we
re 
shaving just once a
 week. The percepti
on 
was that the stu
bble looks cool a
nd 
desirable to wome
n! Just doing an 
ad 
was not the solutio
n. The brand neede
d 
to ensure a nationw
ide public sentimen
t 
and response to cha
nge this situation.
- Pritha Mitra Dasgupta
, journalist1
It was April 2010 and Sharat Verma, the brand manager for 
Gillette India, was reviewing the latest report for the third 
year of the “Shave India Movement”. The movement was a 
remarkable marketing campaign that boosted the company’s 
Mach3 razor sales by 500 percent. It was a particularly 
impressive accomplishment given that the men’s shaving 
category in India had been stubbornly unresponsive.
The movement began in 2008, prior to which, Verma had 
been concerned over Mach3’s poor customer adoption rates 
in India. This was quite uncharacteristic in comparison 
to other markets, and all the more frustrating given the 
immense potential for growth that India represented. 
Nevertheless, sales languished for Gillette’s flagship 
product but many still doubted if the company would ever 
grow their razor category beyond 20 percent market share.
The Mach3 had a reputation for quickly capturing market 
share in almost all geographies. Verma said,
Gillette has market leadership in almost all markets in the world except 
Japan. We have 70 percent or more market share in Australia, the United 
States and Western Europe. That is unheard of in any other category.
In late 2007, Verma wondered what it would take for 
a significant impact to be made on the Indian market. 
Traditional marketing methods had so far yielded less than 
average results. Conversations with colleagues around the 
globe further confirmed his thoughts: Gillette India would 
have to develop innovative tactics to raise awareness and 
increase adoption. He recollected,
We have a great product that we want more people to experience. We 
want to make it more available and better known – and to give them a 
reason to buy it.
1 Pritha Mitra Dasgupta, “Razor Sharp,” The Financial Express, June 29, 2010, http://www.financialexpress.com/news/razor-sharp/639541, accessed April 2013.
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What emerged was the “Shave India Movement”: a ground 
breaking viral campaign that went mainstream in 2009. 
It targeted upper-middle class urban men who had the 
discretionary spending necessary for using the relatively 
expensive Mach3 blade. By all accounts it was a great 
success, but even after the movement’s third year, Verma 
knew that much more had to be done. He flipped through 
the report. He would start by analysing the campaign, learn 
from it and apply those lessons to the next step… but what 
was that step, and how would it further grow Gillette’s 
presence in India?
46
2 P&G Corporate Newsroom, “About P&G,” http://news.pg.com/about, accessed April 2013.
3 Chris Isidore. P&G to buy Gillette for $57B. CNN Money. 28 January 2005. Retrieved from: http://money.cnn.com/2005/01/28/news/fortune500/pg_gillette/, accessed April 2013.
4 Proctor & Gamble Company Annual Report, June 30, 2012, SEC Filing, Form 10-K, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/80424/000008042412000063/fy2012financialstatementsf.htm, accessed April 2013.
5 P&G, 2010 Annual Report, http://www.pg.com/annualreport2010/index.shtml , accessed April 2013.
Procter & Gamble
Procter & Gamble (P&G) was founded in 1837 and was 
headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio. In 2010, P&G was a 
publicly traded Fortune 500 company and was the largest 
global consumer packaged goods company operating in the 
world. P&G’s mission was to provide branded products and 
services of superior quality and value that would improve 
the lives of the world’s consumers now and for generations 
to come. The group’s business was segmented into two 
key Global Business Units: Beauty and Grooming, and 
Household Care.
P&G’s top 50 brands were amongst the world's best-known 
household names and accounted for 90 percent of P&G 
sales and more than 90 percent of its profits. Twenty-four 
of their top Leadership Brands generated more than US$1 
billion in annual sales. Four billion times a day, P&G brands 
touched the lives of people around the world. Consistently 
ranked as one of the world’s top advertisers, the group 
invested over US$8 billion in marketing and advertising 
in 2010. Some of P&G’s largest and most trusted brands 
included Pampers, Tide, Ariel, Always, Pantene, Bounty, 
Pringles, Charmin, Downy, Iams, Crest and Olay.2
The Gillette brand
The Gillette Company was acquired in 2005 by P&G for 
US$57 billion.3 The markets viewed the merger favourably 
as both companies shared a dedicated focus on product 
innovation and an ability to build strong brands. Following 
the merger, Gillette continued to be headquartered out 
of Boston, Massachusetts and employed 129,000 people 
worldwide working under the brand.4 The brand had 
a history of personal care and grooming products that 
spanned over a century, with a name that was synonymous 
with innovative products and quality. This was especially 
true of Gillette razors.
Gillette razor brand products, which consisted of male 
personal care products, male blades and razors like the 
Mach3, were housed within the Beauty and Grooming 
business unit at P&G. Grooming, which housed billion 
dollar brands like the Mach3, accounted for 13 percent of 
net earnings for the entire P&G group in 2010.5
Gillette’s history
As the story goes, one summer morning in 1895, a travelling 
salesman by the name of King Gillette was practicing his 
daily grooming ritual. He became irritated when he found 
that the edge of his straight razor had become dull and 
unusable. He later claimed that this was the moment he 
had an inspirational vision of creating a new kind of razor. 
He imagined an inexpensive, double-edged blade that could 
be clamped over a handle and used until it was dull. It could 
then be discarded and replaced by a new disposable blade.
Another safety razor, the Star, already existed on the market, 
however its blade needed sharpening following each use 
and eventually required professional honing. Gillette was 
determined to find a better, more profitable product with 
enhanced usability. He spent the next six years perfecting 
his idea and consulted numerous scientists and toolmakers. 
Most of them tried to discourage him by telling him that his 
product idea was impractical and impossible to produce. 
However, the 40-year old Gillette was a proven salesman, 
inventor and writer, and had a tenacious will to keep 
pursuing his vision.
In 1901, he partnered with William Nickerson, a 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology-educated machinist. 
Nickerson developed the production processes and 
Gillette formed the American Safety Razor Company after 
raising US$5,000 to be used for manufacturing the razor. 
Production, advertising and sales of the razor began in 
1903. In its first year, the company sold 51 razor sets and 
168 blades. In 1904, Gillette received a patent on the safety 
razor and sales rose to 90,884 razors and 123,648 blades. 
By 1906, the company had paid its first cash dividend. 
In the years before World War I, Gillette steadily increased 
earnings through print advertisements, emphasising that 
with his razor, men could shave themselves under any 
condition with fewer cuts or irritation.6 During World War 
I, millions of blades and razors were sent to American 
soldiers. To reach even more consumers, Gillette developed 
a lower priced razor and developed a razor designed for 
women. After the war, Gillette advertised to millions more 
with its Blue Blades Campaigns, sponsorship of the World 
Series, and the Gillette Cavalcade of Sports. By the 1950s, 
people were asking for a more comfortable close shave, 
and Gillette responded by creating more products. Verma 
acknowledged, “When it comes to marketing campaigns, 
well… Gillette pretty much wrote the book on it.”
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Research and innovation
Developing a razor was not a simple task and required years 
of dedicated research and development. New razor systems 
were typically launched at five-year intervals.7 Highly skilled 
engineers and product teams worked continuously on 
design, feature and material improvements – going through 
numerous iterations before a product was launched. By 
2010, over US$750 million on research and development 
was dedicated to producing the Gillette Mach3 razor alone.8 
The complexity of the product was such that the amount 
of welding required by the Mach3 rivalled that of products 
from the automotive industry. Verma added:
We have fantastic technology. People think we just keep adding blades. In 
reality, we have a simple rule of thumb: if a product doesn’t do much better 
than the previous one, we don’t launch it. There is a lot of science behind 
it. For example, the reason for three blades was that, instead of individual 
blades contacting the skin, it spreads the skin by becoming a surface that 
shaves; hence giving you more comfort. The Mach3 product had 30 plus 
patents. Imagine that in a small razor. I call it the best piece of technology 
you can have in your hand for under US$10.
The Mach3 was considered a premium product. It combined 
Gillette’s Three Blade Shaving Technology with anti-friction 
blades on a pivoting razor head that used a lubricating strip 
and 10 micro-fins that gently guided hair to the blade for 
a smooth shave. It was, as the company deemed, a high 
performance, close, yet comfortable shave.
Gillette India Limited
Gillette India Limited was initially incorporated as Indian 
Shaving Products Limited in 1985. Although it retained its 
separate legal status, it became part of P&G when P&G 
acquired Gillette in 2005. By 2008, Gillette India was 
maintaining a stagnant 32 percent market share in the 
men’s grooming category, with only 20 percent in the razor 
sub-category. This was a pretty lacklustre state of affairs 
considering Gillette’s past successes in other markets. 
Nonetheless, the company was focused on serving the 
emerging consumer market with historically innovative 
product offerings.
In 2010, Gillette India’s revenue from grooming products 
rose to US$132 million from US$100 million in 2007. This 
was a significant increase in growth relative to the overall 
growth in India’s shaving market – a change attributable 
to the company’s ability to innovate and run an effective 
marketing campaign, that is the “Shave India Movement”. 
However, these numbers were still small in respect to 
the entire size and potential of the India market (refer to 
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 for retail sales in India, company 
market and brand shares for the men’s grooming category, 
and Gillette’s razor sales in India).
India
In 1991, the Indian government added 846 million 
consumers to the global economy by opening its markets 
to the world.9 Since then, foreign businesses had long been 
enticed by the country’s enormous market potential. 
However, most companies that entered India failed to 
break even. This illustrious list included: Coke, Kellogg’s, 
Seagram, Reebok, Mercedes Benz, Booze Allen Hamilton, 
and many more from all sectors of industry.10 India, though, 
remained un-phased in spite of the rocky experiences of 
such suitor companies.
By 2006, India was the world’s fourth largest economy 
(in terms of purchasing power parity) and continued to 
undergo impressive growth.11 Its population, already at over 
a billion, was also young; 40 percent were under the age 
of 21.12 India was also very poor – its per capita income 
ranked 166 out of the 193 countries recognised by the 
UN.13 However, the country’s development was promising 
and quite lucrative from a marketing perspective.
India’s continued population growth was projected to 
increase at an annual rate of 1.6 percent, an amount 
equivalent to the size of Australia’s population each year.14 
Moreover, India was not as poor as it used to be, the 
population’s conditions were improving steadily. A national 
survey found that from 1991 to 2004, the percentage of 
people below the poverty line decreased from 36 to 22 
percent.15 Per capita income increased from US$120 
to US$700 during that same time and there were no 
indications that this upward trajectory would abate.16 
Projections up to 2015 put India at the same per capita 
income level that China had in 2005.17
6 Funding Universe, The Gillette Company History, downloaded from: http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/The-Gillette-Company-Company-History.html, accessed April 2013.
7 P&G, Gillette Newsroom, http://news.gillette.com/about/timeline, accessed Dec. 2012.
8 Naomi Aoki, “The War of the Razors: Gillette-Schick fight over patent shows the cutthroat world of consumer products,” The Boston Globe, August 31, 2003, http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2003/08/31/the_war_of_the_razors/, accessed April 2013. 48
Market complexities
Gillette had fared better than most other global companies 
that entered India, but was by no means an exemplar when 
compared to its own standards in other markets. There was 
a common thread running through the strategic difficulties 
that just about all foreign companies discovered when they 
entered India: complexity.
India was not a single market, but rather a patchwork 
of many markets consisting of a plethora of affluence 
levels, geographies, and identities all subtly connected 
yet separated through numerous languages, cultures 
and traditions that spanned centuries. The consumption 
ideologies were a sophisticated blend of these factors. This 
presented itself as a confusing mix of contradictions that 
made it extremely difficult for global companies to plan a 
coherent strategy. Only one thing was certain - the growing 
aspirations of the Indian consumer.
Most Indians were constrained by tight, limited budgets but 
simultaneously empowered by greater consumer confidence. 
In the decade leading up to 2008, consumers benefitted 
from spectacular economic growth, access to cheap credit 
and the availability of more and more affordable products, 
all of which outpaced growth in their income.18 Consumers 
were eager to spend, but were extremely discerning on what 
they would spend their money on.19
It became common practice for a person to purchase a 
consumer durable on debt, and then pay off that debt over 
time by the savings gained from switching to a lower end 
fast-moving-consumer-good from what they normally 
used.20 The choice essentially became, ‘should I buy a 
washing machine and downgrade to cheaper shampoo, or 
use an expensive shampoo and forgo the washing machine’. 
This increased comfort for borrowing was fuelled by a 
feeling that tomorrow would be better than today.
According to Rama Bijapurkar, an expert on market strategy 
and consumer behaviour in India, the principal reason 
why most global companies failed to penetrate the Indian 
market was because they did not understand the market. 
These companies often held on to an axiom that their best 
practices and strategies that worked elsewhere, even in other 
developing markets, would also apply to India. This was not 
the case. Success, she argued, would require an innovative 
strategy tailored for the Indian market... or rather… markets 
(refer to Exhibits 6, 7 & 8 for India’s income demographics, 
GDP distribution and affluence layers).
The Indian shaving market
Gillette saw extraordinary opportunity for growth. Most 
Indian men had an abundant, full set of facial hair that 
needed to be shaved daily to keep it clear of stubble. There 
were also a lot of them - 400 million men of shaving age. 
What excited and frustrated the company even more was 
that most of these men were still using double edge blades. 
Verma exclaimed,
In India, if you take out the men in the population who are too old or too young to shave 
you still have a consumer group of 400 million. Eighty percent of them are using this 
double edge blade. This is what King Gillette invented a hundred years ago!
Using antiquated double edge blade technology routinely 
caused cuts, nicks and rashes too. The Mach3 should not 
have had any difficulty competing against such epidermal 
abuse. As it turned out that, this was not the case.
In 2008, nearly ten years after Gillette sold its first Mach3, 
nearly half of all shaving men regularly visited a barber, 
and half of those men exclusively visited a barber for all 
their shaving needs. Barbers were also affordable, costing 
just US$0.15 to US$0.30 for a shave. The rest of the male 
shaving-population, roughly 300 million men, practiced self-
shaving. Eighty percent of these men used double edge blades.
Double edge blades were the accepted norm as they were 
readily available and cheap, costing only US$0.05 per 
blade. They had been in use for generations, which brought 
up an important point. India existed in multiple centuries at 
once through a compromise, or perhaps, a synthesis of the 
traditional and the contemporary.21 On average, consumers 
in India were risk averse and did not make purchasing 
decisions lightly.22 New ways and new things were not 
adopted wholesale.23
However, upper-middle class urban males, the target 
segment, were not nearly as sensitive to the premium priced 
Mach3 when compared to the low-earning masses. For 
them, how they chose to shave was much more a matter of 
entrenched behaviour. Shaving was a simple, routine habit 
that could even be considered traditional. Verma said,
It’s a habit. The Indian consumer has been doing it for so long. He’s seen his 
father, his grandfather, his great grandfather do it.
 9  Rama Bijapurkar, We are like that only: understanding the logic of Consumer India (India: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 16.
10 Ibid. P. 16    11 The World Bank, “Data – GDP per capita, PPP”, downloaded from The World Bank website, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?page=1, accessed April 2013.
12 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2011 Census of India: Age Structure and Marital Status, http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/age_structure_and_marital_status.aspx, accessed April 2013. 49
Cuts, nicks and rashes were just seen as an inevitable 
part of shaving. Consumers did not perceive a need to try 
anything new or different, and adoption rates into other 
shaving systems were historically low. Other systems, like 
disposable razors were used by a minority of the male-
shaving population and cost about US$0.20 on average. 
The Mach3, which cost US$7.00 for the razor and US$2.00 
for the blade, was used by only a small fraction of India’s 
male shaving population. Verma explained the predicament 
of the Mach3,
It’s a very interesting situation we’re in. The awareness of what we’re 
offering is low, and the high quality of our product costs us much more to 
produce than our competitor’s cheaper products. Add to that, the fact that 
our product has a very low involvement category.
Gillette’s offerings in India
Adoption of razors typically followed a rungs-on-a-ladder 
pattern in Western countries. Male consumers started 
shaving with a simple model and progressed along a ladder 
towards increasingly sophisticated models. In the US, 
Gillette observed that each move up a rung in the shaver-
ladder represented a 20 percent increase in price, and 
consumers moved rapidly towards the top of the market. 
For example, consumers would first adopt the Mach3 before 
moving up to the top-of-the-line 5-blade Gillette Fusion. It 
was assumed that consumers wanted the best shave they 
could get.
The original assumption at Gillette was that the Indian 
market would follow this Western pattern: consumers would 
start at the lower end of the market with double edge 
blades, and progress to Mach3. But the Indian market was 
proving the model wrong. When most men shaved, they 
used a technology that was originally designed in 1895 - 
the double edge blade. And they never went beyond; the 
segment was unresponsive.
The question was then, why did Indian men not move up 
the ladder? A partial reason was that they associated nicks 
and cuts as an inevitable aspect of shaving. They believed 
it was more a matter of skill rather than a property of the 
blade; it was a habitual way of thinking about shaving (refer 
to Exhibit 9 for a diagram of shaving methods used by 
Indian males).
Habit was not the only adoption barrier for the middle-class 
urban male. The segment did not appreciate the value that 
the Mach3 had. Verma noted,
Then there is the fact that the Mach3 is considered to be a premium 
product for the Indian consumer. Think of something that you buy or use 
everyday – if there was a product that costs ten times of what you usually 
buy that also had the same function, would you even think of buying it? 
Would you even look at it in the same category? After you look at the price, 
would you even want to know more about it? And yet this is the product 
that I want to sell.
The consumer did not believe a different blade would make 
a difference in their shaving experience. In addition, the 
jump in price between this 100-year-old technology and the 
next technology was too big. If the price difference was only 
20 percent or so – as it was in the US – then some men 
might be tempted to try the Mach3. In India, however, the 
jump to a Mach3 blade was 40 to 50 times the price of a 
double edge blade.
Gillette eventually came to realise that the ladder model 
worked in the US as sequential innovations provided smaller 
steps to get to the next level. But this was not working for 
the Indian consumer. The gap between one category and 
the next was simply too wide – there were no incremental 
steps that would have helped the Indian consumer adopt. 
India required its own product and marketing strategy.
Price point alignment
Gillette India’s research had shown that three main 
drivers influenced a consumer’s buying decision for a 
Mach3: price, availability and perception. The Mach3, it 
was decided, would have to be modified in order to bring 
down its production costs so that the price point could be 
properly aligned.
Verma remembered wrestling with the price point issue 
back in the early days before the “Shave India Movement”. 
He had contacted Harish Narayanan, the Assistant Brand 
Manager at the Singapore Regional Business Unit. He was 
responsible for working on more upstream projects and was 
Verma’s connection to the global team based in Boston. 
Verma said to Narayanan
13 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: India, downloaded from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html, accessed April 2013.
14 Rama Bijapurkar, We are like that only: understanding the logic of Consumer India (India: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 16.
15 Ibid. P. 34    16 Ibid. P. 34    17 Ibid. P. 39    18 Rama Bijapurkar, We are like that only: understanding the logic of Consumer India, (India: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 47. 50
These modifications need to preserve our brand’s promise of great 
performance, along with great value. And we need to create consumer 
excitement to drive adoption. Let’s see what tools and ideas we can create 
to make this happen.
Immediately Narayanan understood what needed to be 
done. He said,
Let us work with the Global and Engineering teams about stripping out 
everything non-essential to the consumer experience from Mach3, while 
still providing a superior shave.
The result was a downward innovation that pared down 
almost every feature except for the blades – the most 
important component for a good shave. The following 
deconstructions were therefore made:
1) The razor was made lighter and less expensive by
    introducing plastic in the metal handle.
2) The plastic storage tray was discarded, since it was not
    important to the consumer for his shaving experience.
3) The packaging was streamlined down to the bare
     minimum, while still retaining and improving its presence 
    on shelf.
Other changes to production were also made and assembly 
was brought to India to further ease costs. This in itself was 
an innovation, enabled by bold decisions in the Product 
Supply team – a first for a company that had 
always produced its razors outside of India.The team had 
succeeded in realigning the price point dilemma. They 
were able to reduce the razor’s retail price from US$7.00 
to US$2.30, while maintaining a fixed US$2.00 price for 
the blades. Only two challenges remained: distribution and 
perception.
Project Hercules
Verma and his fellow colleagues knew that getting the 
Mach3 accepted by male consumers would require a 
focused initiative. Project Hercules was thus conceived as 
a means to drive this effort. Scheduled to run for one year, 
the mission of the project sought to educate and change 
the mindset of Indian men: to convince them to at least try 
the Mach3.
Distribution
There were serious distribution challenges that needed to 
be addressed as well. Thankfully the Mach3’s new lower 
price helped attract more retailers interested in carrying 
the product. Still, without further improved distribution 
the product would remain unavailable to many consumers - 
even if they wanted it and could afford it.
India’s retail sector was massive. In 2010 the market was 
valued at an estimated US$450 billion and expected to 
grow to US$900 billion by 2015.24 Small independent 
retailers, called kiranas, dominated the market. There were 
approximately 12 million of them, accounting for 95.5 
percent of retail enterprises. The remaining 4.5 percent of 
stores, classified as organised retailers, were larger stores 
like supermarkets, hypermarkets, and convenience stores 
(refer to Exhibit 10 for a picture of a typical Kirana stall).
The Mach3 was already carried at most organised retailers. 
The issue was getting into the smaller kiranas. Their small 
size, extremely widespread distribution and unregistered 
status made it impractical for Gillette to move the product 
into these stores. In response to this challenge, Verma said,
We worked with wholesalers to get our product into the smaller outlets. We 
engaged in a lot of logistical planning, how to move it, how to package 
it and determined the optimal SKU count and so forth. We also had to 
rapidly distribute this and make the product stand out. We needed to be 
accessible and there were over 1.5 million – 2 million stores we wanted to 
be in. So we went through multiple rounds of testing to see what worked 
best to make the product stand out. Eventually we got there.
Making the product available to more retailers was only part 
of the challenge. The other side of it was making it both 
feasible and attractive for the retailers to carry. This was an 
important consideration since kirana stores were very small 
and had limited inventory space, this characteristic put 
significant pressure on shop owners to have a fast turnover. 
Verma explained,
Packaging had to be made so that it could easily and readily be displayed 
in stores. It had to work for the retailer. We determined how we could 
ensure the profitability for the retailer – especially since the adoption was 
slow. So we really needed to create awareness too. 
19 Ibid. P.47   20 Ibid. P.47
21 Rama Bijapurkar, We are like that only: understanding the logic of Consumer India, (India: Penguin Books, 2007), include p no.
22 Ibid.   23 Ibid. 51
Perception
In terms of perception, there were two main impediments 
to adoption. The first was the value proposition. Realigning 
price point helped, but consumers still needed to be made 
aware of the product’s benefits. Verma explained:
The question was one of value. You have to understand that the cost of 
the razor is not just the value part. First, if you buy a double edge blade, 
it will last just one shave - maybe two shaves. Whereas this new product 
could give you 20 shaves, depending on the kind of hair you have. It’s 
also more hygienic, you don’t cut yourself. The value that the consumer 
perceives is much better when you use a Mach3. So once you make that 
initial investment you’ll learn that it’s not 40 times, but maybe two or three 
times the cost, because the value that you get out of it is actually much 
more. The benefit is better.
The fact was, most Indian men still believed that Mach3 
would still cut his skin in the same way that cheap blades 
did.
The second, and more difficult, impediment to overcome 
was one of taste. In India, facial hair was traditionally seen 
as a sign of virility. It was even a job requirement for some 
professions. Throughout the 2000s, the two-day stubble 
look, sported by popular Bollywood actors, was thought to 
be hip and attractive. Facial hair was in fashion.
A marketing campaign to 
talk about
Gillette needed to educate consumers and convince 
them to use Mach3 blades. However, the segment proved 
unresponsive to traditional mass marketing campaigns. 
Narayanan discussed the matter with Verma,
We have tried all sorts of ads around all sorts of features: Smooth shave, 
fast shave, comfort, no cuts, long-lasting blades, etc. etc. etc. We sold 
it all. Sold it for a hundred years. We were the first ones to do sports 
marketing. When it comes to brand building, we’ve done it all. What 
more can we do? What is the next innovation that is relevant to the India 
consumer, and at the same time builds on the fantastic characteristics 
that this brand has?
Gillette India returned to its founder’s roots and launched 
a door-to-door educational campaign. The company’s 
marketing and sales people were sent out to individual 
homes and demonstrated the product. The team found that 
consumers were eager to adopt the Mach3 after trying the 
blade. These hands on tactics were quite successful, but 
clearly unsustainable and insufficient given India’s size. 
Narayanan pondered at the scope of this task…
And then comes this whole, mammoth, confusing, chaotic, but fantastic 
place that is India. It’s mind-boggling to try and understand. The way I 
explain India to my friends who have moved to Singapore or moved to India 
for the first time, is to think of India as a continent. Think of it as Europe. 
Don’t think of it as a country. If you go to India and ask them if they speak 
Indian they laugh at you, because it’s like Europe.
It’s like a continent, it has so many different cultures, so many different 
languages and so many different types of facial hairs; you name it. It’s so 
different, and it’s so difficult to talk one language with them.
The team also knew that reaching their target customer would 
require something different from previous and traditional 
P&G/Gillette advertising campaigns - culturally, Indian men 
did not talk about their grooming habits. Conversations like, 
“Wow! You look like you got a really close shave. What kind 
of razor do you use?” were not happening. Verma lamented,
We have to get the costs down on every element, including marketing 
spend. And word of mouth is really powerful - it creates a multiplier effect.
Gillette needed to create a buzz and put the clean shave 
back in fashion – people had to start talking about shaving.
The Shave India Movement
In late 2008, Gillette commissioned an AC Nielson study 
on shaving that targeted 18-25 year olds across India’s 
eight largest metropolitan areas (refer to Exhibit 11 for 
India’s top metropolitan areas by population). The findings 
were striking and contrary to current facial hair fashion: 77 
percent of women preferred a clean-shaven man with 72 
percent agreeing that the act of shaving was sexy. It was just 
the opportunity needed to get India talking about shaving. 
Narayanan agreed with Verma,
24 Taylor Salisbury, “The Future on Sale: The Indian Retail Market,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, South Asia Monitor, Number 137, January 06, 2010, http://csis.org/files/publication/sam_137.pdf, accessed April 2013. 52
At P&G we talk about moments of truth. When you interact with a consumer 
you have certain moments of truth - the test of your product. The first 
moment of truth is when the consumer enters the store. He hasn’t seen 
your product, or he is just seeing it for the first time. You want him to pick 
it up and look at the packaging. The second moment of truth is when he 
uses it. You have to bear in mind both moments of truth. There is also a 
zero moment of truth, which is communication – he has not even seen your 
product but he has a perception of it. So, in India we win in pretty much 
all moments of truth. The product is fantastic, but the category is non-
responsive! That was our biggest challenge.
How do you motivate men to talk about a category like shaving? 
Get women involved.
India Votes: To shave or not, 2009
The Shave India Movement began just as Gillette announced 
the results of the survey and the launch of the newly 
modified Mach3 in 2009. The results created a sensation 
by pitting what the women found attractive against what 
men found cool. This kind of contradiction was exactly what 
Gillette India needed.
India was a country that loved to debate. Amartya Sen’s 
seminal book, The Argumentative Indian, highlighted the 
importance that public discourse and intellectual pluralism 
were to the national identity. The strategic relevance of this 
characteristic cannot be understated. The media quickly 
latched on to the survey results and a national debate about 
shaving ensued.
Gillette further stoked the debate through their campaign, 
‘India Votes: To shave or not’, in which they invited everyone 
to vote in an online live polling. In all, 12.2 million Indians 
voted for a clean shave, where it was found that 83 percent 
of women polled felt that a clean-shaven man was more 
attractive. This was accompanied by a highly covered PR 
event in which Gillette sponsored Bollywood stars to shave 
on live television. Media across the country picked it up 
and created a huge buzz in the urban markets. In eight 
weeks the campaign doubled awareness of the Mach3, 
product trials increased four times, sales went up by 35 
percent and market share increased by 25 percent (refer to 
Exhibit 12 for a link to an online video about the “Shave 
India Movement”).
Women Against Lazy Stubble, 2010
The next phase of the Shave India Movement took place 
in early 2010. Women Against Lazy Stubble, or W.A.L.S., 
called on women to protest against the stubble look. The 
debate was reignited. For two months television stations, 
radio and newspapers held interviews in which popular 
actresses spoke out on the stubble. The media also carried 
opinion polls and covered stories on W.A.L.S.
In Mumbai 2,000 men shaved off their stubble in front 
of crowds of cheering women, in what was deemed, the 
world’s largest Shave-a-thon.
The Shave India Movement Facebook page became a forum 
for mass debate and discussion – it seemed everyone had 
something to say on the matter. The effect was huge: 
Mach3 sales increased by 500 percent and market share 
increased by 400 percent. Gillette’s value share crossed 
40 percent and their volume share hit 58.1 percent, the 
highest ever for Gillette India. All of which occurred, again, 
in eight weeks.
Breaking internal records
The Shave India Movement was a resounding success. 
Mach3 awareness and usage had increased, mostly among 
urban males. But Verma believed more was possible; could 
this Movement be used to drive even more sales? And if 
so, how? They also understood that other segments were 
still untouched by Gillette’s razors. Many men continued 
to exclusively visit barbers and many millions more used 
double edge blades. They needed to address the needs of 
these segments and craft a strategy appropriate for reaching 
them. What lessons could they use from the successes of 
the “Shave India Movement” and could those lessons be 
applied elsewhere?
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EXHIBIT 1: 
RETAIL SALES IN INDIA, 2004-2011E
EXHIBIT 2: 
MARKET SHARES BY PERCENT RETAIL VALUE 
FOR MEN’S GROOMING IN INDIA, 2007-2010
EXHIBIT 3: 
RAZORS AND BLADES BRAND SHARES IN INDIA IN 
TERMS OF PERCENT RETAIL VALUE, 2008-2010
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008e 2009e  2010e 2011e
              2007             2008            2009             2010 Brand                  Company              2008            2009  2010
Retail sales (US$ bn)
Retail sales, volume 
growth (percent)
Retail sales, US$ value 
growth (percent)
Non-food retail sales 
(US$ bn)
Gillette India Ltd
Hindustan Unilever Ltd
Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd
Vidyut Metallics Ltd
Malhotra Shaving Products Ltd
All Other
Super-Max
Gillette Mach3
Gillette Vector Plus
Topaz
Wilkinson Sword
Laser
Others
Vidyut Metallics Ltd
Gillette India Ltd
Gillette India Ltd
Malhotra Shaving Products Ltd
Gillette India Ltd
Malhotra Shaving Products Ltd
293 332.4 360.6 438.5 454.5 422.5 468.6 529.3
3.9 5.9 5 4.3 0.7 2.9 4.3 4.5
10.8 13.5 8.5 21.6 3.7 -7 10.9 13
90.3 104.7 116.1 144.1 145.4 132.4 145.9 162.7
33.2 31.7 30.9 31.5 
5.4 7.0 8.3 9.5 
1.4 2.7 4.7 6.2
10.0 9.4 8.5 7.5
10.8 10.0 8.8 7.3
39.2 39.2 38.8 38
15.2 15.0 14.5
7.5 9.5 12.5 
12.8 13.0 12.7
10.0 9.5 8.2
7.8 7.8 7.0
6.2 6.0 5.8
40.7 39.2 39.3
Source: “Industry Reports: Consumer Goods and Retail in India,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2009.
Source: Men’s Grooming in India, Passport, Euromonitor International, September 2012.
Source: Men’s Grooming in India, Passport, Euromonitor International, September 2012.
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EXHIBIT 4: 
GILLETTE INDIA’S SALES IN RAZOR SYSTEMS AND 
BLADE CARTRIDGES BY VALUE AND QUANTITY, 
2006-2011
EXHIBIT 5: 
GILLETTE INDIA’S SALES IN SAFETY RAZOR 
BLADES (DOUBLE EDGE) BY VALUE AND 
QUANTITY, 2006-2011
Source: Proctor & Gamble Annual Reports: Gillette India Limited, 2007-2011
Source: Proctor & Gamble Annual Reports: Gillette India Limited, 2007-2011
EXHIBIT 6: 
ESTIMATES ON INCOME DEMOGRAPHICS OF INDIA, 2004-2010
   2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Nominal GDP (US$ bn)
Total number of households (m)
Households with annual earnings 
above US$5,000 ('000)
Households with annual earnings 
above US$10,000 ('000)
697.8 810 923.5 1,133.50 1,164.10 1,121.40 1,264.80 
202.6 206.3 209.9 213.4 216.8 220 223.3 
16,594 21,890 26,895 37,040 39,522 34,625 40,939 
3,538 4,824 6,070 8,722 9,379 8,036 9,723 
Source: “Industry Reports: Consumer Goods and Retail in India,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2009.
The middle class in India, defined as households with annual incomes of approximately US$4,500 to US$23,000, consisted of five percent of the total population, or 50 million people in 
2005.25 Median age for men equals 25.9 years and per capita GDP equals approximately US$3,700 (2011).26
25 KS Oils, The Indian Consumer Market: a change from pyramid to sparkling diamond, KS Oils Limited, 2008.
26 Index Mundi, Median Age of Indian Men, http://www.indexmundi.com/india/median_age.html, accessed April 2013 55
EXHIBIT 7: 
GDP DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME PERCENTILES IN 
INDIA, 2004
EXHIBIT 8: 
AFFLUENCE LAYERS IN INDIA BASED ON CONSUMPTION INTENSITY, 2006
Percentile of Income 
Top 10 percent
The next 30 percent
The Bottom-of-the-Pyramid, 
last 60 percent
Affluence layer
Prosperous I
Prosperous II
Well off
Entering upper class
Aspiring
Average
Strivers
The poor
Population
(millions)
109326653
% of 
population
0.5
0.523
9
1035
40
Washing 
machine
81
7653
30
8---
2-wheel 
vehicle65
72
6962
50
306-
Shampoo
93
91
89
85
79
70
69
38
% of income
34.1
36.1
29.7
TVs
100
100
98
94
92
79516
GDP per capita 
(US$)
1,878662265
Cars
714424
102---
Total GDP
 (US$ billion)
204.6
216.6
178.2
AC
48265-----
Source: Rama Bijapurkar, We are like that only: understanding the logic of Consumer India (India: Penguin Books, 2007), p.102
Source: Rama Bijapurkar, We are like that only: understanding the logic of Consumer India (India: Penguin Books, 2007), p. 96-97
% of households in each layer consuming/ having
EXHIBIT 9: 
SHAVING METHODS USED BY 
INDIAN MALES
Men’s Shaving 
Market in India
45 percent of men 
visit a barber
40 percent 
exclusively visit 
barbers for 
shaving needs
80 percent of 
men use double 
edge razors
US$0.04-US$0.05 
per blade
US$0.15-US$0.20 
per razor
US$7 per razor and 
US$2 per blade
7 percent 
of men use 
disposable 
razors
1.5 percent 
of men use 
the Mach3
Others
60 percent 
occasionally visit 
barbers for
 shaving needs
55 to 82 percent of 
all shaves are from 
self-shaving men
55 percent of 
men practice
self-shaving
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EXHIBIT 10: 
PHOTOGRAPH OF A KIRANA STORE
EXHIBIT 11: 
INDIA’S 10 LARGEST CITIES BY POPULATION 
(EXTENDED URBAN AREA), 2011
EXHIBIT 12: 
VIDEO ON THE “SHAVE INDIA MOVEMENT”: 
INDIA VOTES TO SHAVE OR NOT
Note: The kirana store is a small independent retail store that is common throughout India. The 
shopkeeper is usually the only person inside the store since space is extremely limited.
Source: Nita Jatar Kulkarni, photographer and blogger. Stock Pictures – Free Photographs: Small 
retailers in India. 28 Nov. 2011. Photo retrieved from: http://www.stockpicturesforeveryone.
com/2011/11/small-retailers-in-india.html, accessed April 2013.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
City
Delhi
Mumbai
Kolkata
Chennai
Bangalore
Hyderabad
Ahmedabad
Pune
Surat
Jaipur
Population
21,753,486
21,753,486
14,617,882
8,917,749
8,728,906
7,749,3346,352,254
5,049,968
4,585,367
3,073,350
Source: Press Information Bureau, Government of India, India Stats: Million plus cities in India as per Census 2011. 
Retrieved from: http://pibmumbai.gov.in/scripts/detail.asp?releaseId=E2011IS3, accessed April 201l.
For video on YouTube about The Shave India Movement: India Votes to Shave or Not and 
Women Against Lazy Stubble, go to: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JNqdTmkTBOQ
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Case B begins in May 2010 with Sharat Verma wondering how he could extend 
the “Shave India Movement” from the urban elite down to consumers at the 
bottom of the affluence pyramid through a new product, the Gillette Guard – set 
to launch five months later in October. This new product was designed specifically 
for low-income consumers in India. With the price-point and distribution dilemma 
already solved vis-à-vis the successes of the Mach3 campaign, he now needs to 
craft an activation strategy that would extend the Shave India Movement to all 
rungs of society.
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In India, nearly
 half a billion 
men still 
shave with a ce
ntury-old techn
ology—the 
double-edge razo
r—because there
’s no safe 
alternative they
 can afford. To a
dd to the 
inevitable risk o
f nicks and cuts,
 many men 
shave sittin
g on the floo
r in low ligh
t, while 
balancing a mirr
or against a wall
. It’s an in-
tense, tedious an
d time-consumin
g process.
- Gillette 2011 Annu
al Report
It was May 2010 and Sharat Verma was riding high on the 
success of the “Women Against Lazy Stubble” (W.A.L.S.) 
campaign, the latest iteration of Gillette India’s “Shave 
India Movement”. The campaign had further increased 
sales of the Mach3 by 500 percent in India and he was 
hoping to replicate that success with their new product, the 
Gillette Guard, set to launch five months later, in October.
While the Mach3 was targeted at consumers towards the 
top of India’s income distribution, the Guard was designed 
for the masses at the bottom-of-the-pyramid, which 
represented over 70 percent of the country’s population. It 
was a radically different shaving system from the hundred-
year-old double edge razor technology that was still used 
by some 80 percent of India’s men. Breaking into this 
consumer segment posed an ostensibly similar challenge to 
what Verma initially faced when marketing the Mach3 back 
in 2008. He explained, 
For quite some time now we knew there was need to have a product that 
could help accelerate the conversion from double edge to our systems. This 
was a challenge since the product we wanted to convert people from was 
part of an engrained shaving habit and it was very low-cost… Going from 
a double edge to something like the Guard is a big habit change, especially 
for someone in rural India. People are really risk averse. They are not open 
to experimenting with new products because they have limited means. 
They don’t want to waste any money.
Verma realised that it was important for Gillette to replicate 
the Mach3’s recent success for the Guard. The new product 
was meant to make inroads into the urban-poor and rural 
markets, which were increasingly aware of the Mach3, but 
lacked the purchasing power to buy it. The Gillette Guard 
was therefore developed specifically for the safety and 
affordability needs of this segment of the Indian market.
This case was written by Professor Srinivas Reddy, Christopher Dula and 
Adina Wong at the Singapore Management University. The case was pre-
pared solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not 
intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial 
situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identify-
ing information to protect confidentiality.
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Gillette had already made significant progress concerning 
the challenges posed by India’s vast, complex channels and 
distribution system. Verma now had to tackle the challenge 
of convincing people to transition from the double edge to 
the Guard. He was hopeful his experiences with Gillette’s 
“Shave India Movement” and the Mach3 would help. 
However, the segments served by the Mach3 and Guard 
were so different in terms of socio-economic status, living 
conditions, shopping patterns, and shaving habits that he 
was uncertain how lessons from the Movement could be 
applied to marketing the Guard. Verma knew one thing 
was certain:
To win in India, we need to be able to win in all segments – double edge, 
disposable, entry-level and high-end systems. 
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The rural market for 
razors in India
As early as 2007, P&G dispatched a multifunctional 
team into India’s rural areas to get a first-hand look at 
how men there lived… and shaved.1 They learned that 
rural men shaved under very different conditions than 
their counterparts in developed markets. These men 
usually shaved while sitting on the floor, often in low-light 
conditions, with a cup of water and handheld mirror.2 This, 
in conjunction with a cheap blade, easily led to nicks and 
cuts. For men using double edge blades this was a daily 
occurrence and most of them accepted it as part of the 
shaving ritual. These men were usually unaware of safer, 
more comfortable options – and if they did know of other 
options, such as the Mach3, they dismissed them as being 
too expensive.
Besides being uncomfortable, nicks and cuts increased the 
likelihood of infections. Since it was common in rural in 
India to be paid on a daily basis, it was especially important 
not to fall ill since it could drastically affect a family’s 
livelihood. Intermittent access to water also meant that 
men did not shave everyday. They needed a blade that could 
easily shave longer hair and be used with a minimal amount 
of water.3 P&G saw an opportunity for Gillette to provide 
the segment with a safer more comfortable razor (refer to 
Exhibit 1 for an example of a man shaving with a double 
edge blade.
The rural market for razors in India held huge potential 
for Gillette, as it comprised about 400 million men, and 
almost all of them used double edge blades.4 In 2010, the 
most popular double edge blade in India was the Super-Max 
brand, which cost at most US$0.03 per blade. Given their 
price-sensitivity, bottom-of-the-pyramid consumers in India 
were less willing to buy a blade that was above this price-
point. It was very difficult to convince consumers in the 
lower affluence layers to transition away from products that 
they habitually used in the day-to-day. These were sceptical 
and discerning consumers who would only transition if they 
clearly understood the value-proposition and believed it 
(refer to Exhibit 2 for affluence layers in India).  
We learned that [
men in rural Indi
a] 
valued safety, ease
 of use and affordab
il-
ity above all else. 
- P&G, Gillette Guard m
arketing material
The One-Rupee-Shave
Gillette Guard is a breakthrough new shaving system designed to 
provide a safe, high-quality shave at an affordable price for more than 
one billion men in emerging markets who today shave with double edge 
razors. As the first Gillette product designed specifically for men in these 
markets, Gillette Guard is one of the most significant product launches 
in Gillette history.5
Price–based-costing
The Guard was developed based on the insights gathered 
by the P&G team on their numerous visits to rural India. 
It was the first product that the company had created 
entirely in developing markets, for developing markets.6 
The company set out with the objective of creating a one-
rupee-shave (roughly US$0.02), an affordable price for the 
bottom-of-the-pyramid segment. From there, the Guard 
was designed as a safe and hygienic shaving system that 
could be manufactured cost effectively and sold at the 
targeted price.7 It was a simple design that only contained 
three parts – the blade, the blade housing and the support 
handle, all of which was manufactured entirely in India 
(refer to Exhibit 3 for features on the Guard).8
The Guard’s blade cartridge was good for five shaves 
with each replacement blade costing about US$0.08 – a 
price equivalent to a sachet of shampoo or a small tube 
of toothpaste. The lower price would also encourage small 
shops, called kiranas, to carry this item in stock since it 
fit the budget of most customers (refer to Exhibit 4 for an 
affordability analysis of consumer items in India)
1 The Wall Street Journal. Gillette’s Latest Innovation in Razors: The 11-cent Blade. 1 October 2010.
2 P&G. Gillette Guard − Improving Life for Men Around the World 1 October 2010. Company website, retrieved from: http://news.pg.com/blog/product-innovation/gillette-guard-improving-life-men-around-world, accessed August 2013
3 Household and Personal Products Industry, “. New Gillette Guard Razor Debuts in India,” 1 November 1, 2010.   4 “Gillette’s Latest Innovation in Razors: The 11-cent Blade,” The Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2010.
5 P&G. Gillette Guard Fact Sheet, retrieved from: http://www.pg.com/en_US/downloads/innovation/factsheet_final_Gillette_Guard.pdf, accessed August 2013. 60
6 P&G, “. Gillette Guard − Improving Life for Men Around the World,” 1 October 1, 2010. Company website, retrieved from: http://news.pg.com/blog/product-innovation/gillette-guard-improving-life-men-around-world, accessed August 7, 2013. 
7 The price-based-costing is a term coined by the eminent academic, Professor Raj Srivastava and can be considered the route for a number of reverse innovations occurring in the emerging markets
8 Household and Personal Products Industry, “New Gillette Guard Razor Debuts in India”, 1 November 1, 2010.
Reaching the rural population
You need to rely on the wholesalers to get your product into the 
smaller outlets to adopt the system. So we had to engage in a lot 
planning, determining the optimal case count. Packaging had to be 
made so that it could easily and readily be removed from the carton 
and displayed in stores [usually kiranas]… We also had to consider 
the trade margin structure - we had to determine how we could 
ensure the profitability for the retailer per blade – especially since 
the adoption of the [Guard] razor system would be slow versus double 
edge. We next had to create awareness.
Gillette wanted to achieve a multiplier effect per dollar of 
marketing spend on the Guard. This multiplier effect would 
rely on word-of-mouth, so getting the rural consumer on 
a talking point would be important. Verma believed the 
large number of kiranas dispersed throughout India would 
play an important role. The small shops were the dominant 
retail outlet in rural areas and often played a large role in 
influencing purchasing decisions.
The Gillette Guard was about to enter the market as an 
affordable alternative to the double edge blade. It offered 
a clean-shaven look that promised a healthier more 
comfortable shave than double edge blades. With the value-
proposition, price-point and distribution channels finalised, 
Verma needed to develop a brand activation strategy that 
would build awareness and drive segment response.
The details
Through a deep understanding of the rural segment, Gillette 
designed, developed, manufactured and priced the Gillette 
Guard at US$0.33 per razor system and US$0.08 per blade 
cartridge. Verma considered which touchpoints would best 
fit the Guard’s marketing campaign in rural India. Success 
could even pave the way for additional Gillette products for 
the segment. The Guard would therefore serve as an entry-
level product that could attract new customers and serve 
as a mechanism for some of those customers to eventually 
trade-up to higher margin products, like the Mach3, or 
purchase complementary products like shaving cream. It 
was believed this strategy would double Gillette India’s 
sales revenue in three years.
Still, pressing questions remained on Verma’s mind. Would 
the rural Indian shaver embrace the Gillette Guard? With a 
tradition of using double edge blades for generations, could 
these men be convinced to switch? Would the affordability 
and safety arguments be sufficient to convince the rural 
shaver? The W.A.L.S. campaign worked well in marketing 
the Mach3. Could a similar campaign work for Guard? If 
not, what other creative ways could Verma use to influence 
the rural consumer?
EXHIBIT 1: 
A MAN SHAVING WITH A DOUBLE 
EDGE BLADE
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EXHIBIT 2: 
AFFLUENCE LAYERS IN INDIA BASED ON AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION 
AND DISPOSABLE INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS BRACKETS
Source: McKinsey & Company. The ‘Bird of Gold’: The Rise of 
India’s Consumer Market. McKinsey Global Institute. May 2007.
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EXHIBIT 4:
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS FOR CONSUMER ITEMS IN 
INDIA, 2009
Item
Soap, 100 g (supermarket)
Light bulbs, two, 60 watts (supermarket)
Electric toaster (supermarket)
Shampoo & conditioner in one, 400 ml
Lipstick, deluxe type (chain store)
Business suit, two piece, medium weight (chain store)
Dress, ready to wear, daytime (chain store)
Child's shoes, sportswear (chain store)
Compact disc album
Television, colour, 66 cm
Price (US$)
0.35
0.54
24.62
3.45
9.87
296
49.35
43.18
11.1
826
% of monthly personal 
disposable income
0.49 
0.78
35.27
4.95
14.14
424.1
70.68
61.84
15.9
1,184
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Industry Reports: Consumer Goods and Retail in India, May 2009.
EXHIBIT 3: 
FEATURES OF THE 
GILLETTE GUARD
Focus on Safety:
• Single-blade system lined with a safety comb
   designed to prevent nicks and cuts
• Flexible pivoting razor head helps better
   manoeuvre the curves of the face and neck and
   tackle the hair under the chin – difficult areas 
   for double-edge razor users to shave safely
• Easy-to-manoeuvre handle with a light weight,
   ribbed design offers excellent one-handed 
   control to help prevent nicks and cuts
Added Convenience:
• Easy-rinse cartridges to prevent clogging
• Hang-hole at the end of the razor handle provides
   a convenient means of storage
• Easy-click docking makes it faster and easier 
   to connect the blade to the razor versus the
   complexity of assembling a double edge razor
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Abstract
Headquartered in the United States, Encompass Digital 
Media provides digital media services through its 
broadcasting facilities in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Asia. Encompass delivers tailor-made 
solutions for the management and distribution of content, 
including a diversified range of TV content, as well as live 
sports events for companies such as ESPN, IMG, Star 
Sports and Sony Entertainment.
Encompass Digital Media (Asia) began its operations in 
Singapore in 2009. By 2012, the company had captured 
over 50 percent of the market for outsourced Digital Playout 
services in Asia. While manpower costs were significantly 
higher than in China, India and neighbouring South East 
Asian countries, the stability of the Singapore government, 
an established infrastructure and a friendly business 
environment made up for the higher costs. At the same 
time, the group was facing increasing competition.
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The sheer speed of growth that Encompass Singapore was 
experiencing called for an innovative, solutions-driven 
approach to almost all aspects of the business. Growth in 
the media industry was costly and capital intensive. Process 
innovation had been critical in supporting the growth of the 
company since 2009, when the volume of business had 
increased dramatically. But could process innovation alone 
continue to fuel double-digit growth?
Through this case, students will understand the concept of 
process innovation, and how it differs from business model 
or product innovation. They will learn to appreciate the 
factors that are required to develop a culture of constant 
innovation, and analyse the drivers of innovation.
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Encompass: 
Creating innovation in 
broadcast, everyday
In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy devastated portions 
of the Caribbean, the United States and Canada. The storm 
destroyed homes, businesses and the basic infrastructure 
of cities along its path. The destruction it left in its wake 
produced an outpouring of sympathy from across the globe 
for its victims. On December 12, 2012, the Robin Hood 
Fund organised a concert to help Hurrricane Sandy’s 
victims. Leading artistes including Bon Jovi, Eric Clapton, 
Billy Joel, Alicia Keys, Chris Martin, Bruce Springsteen 
& the E Street Band, Eddie Vedder, Roger Waters, Kanye 
West, The Who and Paul McCartney lent their talent to the 
event. In order to maximise the benefit of this concert for 
those afffected by the hurricane, the organisers decided to 
showcase the event ‘live’ globally.  
This presented an unprecedented challenge for broadcasters. 
The concert had to be beamed live from Madison Square 
Garden in New York to over 800,000 viewers across Asia, 
and subsequently, it had to be broadcast over a large 
number of channels across the region within three days. 
Compounding this challenge were regulatory requirements 
for all content to be vetted and edited in real-time for 
cultural and religious sensitivity before it was made available 
to Asian audiences – a feat that, if performed successfully, 
would be an industry first. 
The challenge for Encompass Digital Media was twofold: 
to mobilise viewers in Asia to donate to the ‘Sandy 
Relief Fund’, and to ensure that viewers enjoyed flawless 
streaming of the live broadcast. The latter represented a 
particular challenge in that content had to be streamed 
almost simultaneously to being received. But the editing of 
content was a time-consuming process. Typically, material 
was downloaded in high resolution format, converted 
into low resolution files that could be edited, and sent to 
the Censorship Standards and Practices (S&P) team for 
editing, after which the files were converted back into high 
resolution content, for editing according to the guidelines 
from the S&P team, and finally aired  to the viewers. The 
entire process of translating the files into different formats 
would typically take over three hours. But the team did not 
have that amount of time available to them. 
To meet this challenge head-on, Encompass Singapore put 
together an innovative and cost-effective solution in less 
than 48 hours. An essential element of this solution was 
the way that Encompass had mustered different specialist 
teams to work on the project concurrently. By doing so, 
Encompass was able to simultaneously transcode, trans-
format, edit, and store content digitally. Storage was 
important, as it would enable the company to continue to 
use the content in future broadcasts at no additional cost. 
Fiftteen thousand kilometres from New York, Encompass 
teams in Singapore were keeping watch at their stations, 
anticipating the commencement of the concert. As images 
started streaming in from Madison Square Garden, the 
teams got to work. While the Censorship and the S&P 
Edit teams were viewing and editing content in real time, 
the Network team ensured that the studio’s multi-tasking 
equipment was working like clockwork to feed content 
out, and the operations team, which was monitoring the 
outgoing feed, made sure that the feed being transmitted to 
viewers was flawless.
As the excitement of the concert reached a feverish 
pitch, so did the concentration of online activities at the 
event site, choking what was an already limited Internet 
bandwidth. To keep the event organisers updated regularly, 
the Encompass team had to work around the unavailability 
of digital communications. What they thought of using was 
a system that was a tad archaic but no less innovative – 
short messaging service. By reporting back to the organisers 
in 15-minute cycles, the Encompass team was able to 
provide them the needed assurance that everything was 
working according to plan.
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1 The deal was worth approximately US$120M, split between US$113M in cash plus assumption of debt obligations worth approximately US$7M. “Encompass digital media buys Ascent Media’s content distribution business”, December 3, 2010,
  http://www.socaltech.com/encompass_digital_media_buys_ascent_media_s_content_distribution_business/s-0032581.html, accessed December 2012.
At the forefront of the 
new media industry: 
Encompass Digital Media
Headquartered in the United States, Encompass Digital 
Media provided digital media services through its 
broadcasting facilities in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Asia. By 2012, the company’s clients 
included television stations, sports broadcasters, cable and 
satellite networks and governments. Encompass delivered 
tailor-made solutions for the management and distribution 
of content, including a diversified range of TV content, as 
well as live sports events for companies such as ESPN, 
IMG, Star Sports and Sony Entertainment.
Globally, Encompass benefited from the increasing speed at 
which digital media needed to be produced and distributed. 
There were several reasons for the shift in the speed and 
format in which content needed to be delivered. First, 
consumers wanted the freedom to access content anywhere 
at any time, on their phones, tablets, laptops or TVs. As 
a result, a single sporting event had to be broadcasted in 
20 different locations at the same time – and in different 
formats – before being broken down into smaller sections 
for use on phones, tablets and the like. Content providers 
could no longer enjoy the liberty of imposing a place and 
time for the viewing of content. Second, content had a 
much shorter shelf life: when a movie was released in one 
part of the world, consumers would expect its release in 
their market almost simultaneously. Finally, the growth in 
online piracy meant that if content was not delivered across 
the world rapidly, it made its way into pirated forums online. 
Broadcasters needed to release content swiftly and globally 
if they wished to maximise their revenues. These trends 
meant that broadcasters turned to companies such as 
Encompass to help them digitise and distribute content 
rapidly, sometimes in different languages, and with different 
advertisement inserts across various geographic locations.
Encompass in Singapore
Encompass Digital Media (Asia) began its operations in 
Singapore in 2009, with the acquisition of the Networks 
division of Ascent Media Corp.1 Deepakjit Singh, the 
company’s managing director, joined Encompass through 
the Ascent Media acquisition. The acquisition gave 
Encompass an 88,000-square-foot media centre, complete 
with state-of-the-art technology, a climate-controlled tape 
vault, and 15 satellite dishes. Between 2010 and 2012, 
the group introduced innovative ways to increase the 
capacity of the facility, making it the largest digital media 
services hub in Asia, with over 50 percent of the market.
Continuous electrical power was the most critical element 
of such an operation. In 2009, there had been a break in 
power to the equipment lasting approximately five minutes, 
leading to a large number of TV channels going ‘black’ for 
between 25 and 90 minutes. As a result, the team had 
completely redesigned Encompass’ facilities, ensuring that 
‘no single power point should ever be dependent on a single
power supply’. 
In addition, the team needed to ensure that this design was 
realised without any interruption to its on-going broadcast 
services and implemented within a reasonable budget. 
Singh shared his confidence in how the Encompass facility 
had been innovatively redesigned to draw on power from 
different sub-stations, thus harnessing its own back-up 
power generators and uninterrupted power supply (UPS) 
systems:
With the current level of power redundancy in place, Singapore could go 
black and we could still keep transmitting TV channels to all the viewers 
in Asia for a week without any external source of power.
Early days at Encompass Singapore
Despite the strength of its local facilities, it was not easy 
for Encompass Singapore to establish a presence in Asia. 
Singh recalled:
When Encompass Digital Media started operations in 
Singapore three years ago, I had to persuade potential 
customers to visit our facility. Many were unsure that 
such a new company could provide end-to-end services to 
established content owners… We struggled to encourage 
new channels from other parts of the world to trust us to 
broadcast their channels in Asia.
However, we persisted and effectively turned the situation around in our 
favour. Today, we are partners to some of the biggest media names – MTV 
Viacom, BBC, Discovery and IMG.2
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Singapore’s strong regulatory environment made it an 
ideal base for companies for which intellectual property 
protection was critical. While manpower costs were 
significantly higher than in China, India and neighbouring 
South East Asian countries, the stability of the government, 
an established infrastructure and a friendly business 
environment made up for the higher costs. Ritu Sharma, 
head of digital content, explained:
Other markets are far more complex in terms of cost and infrastructure. For 
example, it takes a very long time to get an uplink and downlink license in 
India, which is typically a “bread and butter” service. China on the other 
hand is a completely different environment in terms of market penetration. 
Singapore is clean and transparent. The labour costs are high but it’s 
much easier to do business and drive the desired quality of service.
By September 2012, the Singapore facility transmitted over 
100 channels, adding an average of one new channel every 
third week. Revenues for 2011 stood at US$26.2 million 
(SGD$32.5 million3). Ninety percent of the company’s 
revenues came from outside Singapore, from high content 
consumption markets like Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, New 
Zealand, and Australia.
The growth in demand translated into greater volume, 
and volume was critical to offset the cost of investment in 
hardware and software. As a result of its growth, Encompass 
could offer its customers more competitive prices, which in 
turn encouraged a greater number of customers to outsource 
their backend operations to the company. 
Singh highlighted the importance of size and volume:
It’s a volume game. For us to add a channel to my transmission today 
is much cheaper because we have reached a critical mass. But it’s not 
viable for mid-sized broadcasters to invest so much money and try to 
recover it in such a short period. It’s exactly the way the call centres or the 
manufacturing centres are growing.4
Volume also allowed Encompass’ customers to reach more 
locations in a more cost effective manner than what they 
could have done, helping them lower the cost of distribution 
and processing. Singh explained:
The cost of launching a new channel — that was one of the major pain 
points for customers. How to address more countries in more formats at an 
affordable cost? Revenue from new media or revenue from a new country 
in the beginning is not high enough; therefore, our customers want to keep 
the entry cost low. Then again, what the customers said was, ‘I want to 
enter new countries quicker.’ The team in Singapore adopted innovative 
implementation methods to shorten the time between the decision and 
the launch to less than two weeks. This method of quick implementation 
was developed by the staff at the shop floor. They were able to cut small 
inefficiencies out of the system and gain over a month out of the traditional 
implementation time.
At the same time, the group was facing increasing 
competition. While existing players such as Technicolor 
and Redbee had left the market, new players were 
emerging, taking reference from the success of Encompass 
in the region.
2 Business Times Singapore, Overcoming that fear of making mistakes, June 9, 2012
3 US$1= SG$1.24 as at February 12, 2013.
Going beyond process innovation: 
what next?
The sheer speed of growth that Encompass Singapore was 
experiencing called for an innovative, solutions-driven 
approach to almost all aspects of the business. Sharma 
noted:
It’s about keeping up with the speed of growth. Three years ago, we were 
transmitting 27 channels and had three to four large customers, and the 
question was “How do we grow to 100 channels?” No one thinks of growing 
to 100 channels in two years. That was unheard of. And the question then 
becomes one of supporting growth. You can’t keep growing people. You 
can’t have 150 people in your facility and then say let’s get 50 more 
because we are at 100 channels. We want to get better and better and 
more efficient so that the same team can do more. We don’t think about 
how the work has been done traditionally, but how do we do so innovatively. 
We need to drive efficiency through innovation.
Process innovation had been critical in supporting the 
growth of the company since 2009, when the volume of 
business had increased dramatically. But could process 
innovation alone continue to fuel double-digit growth? And 
how might a top-tier team continue to create a sustainable 
competitive advantage for Encompass? Lin Lin Ng, chief 
financial officer, commented:
It is exactly because our labour costs are high that we need to look at 
those costs very carefully and think about automation and other solutions. 
We have to make it efficient through automation and innovation, so that 
we can bring down costs. Labour cost is three times more expensive in 
Singapore than in India but Singapore is very effective and efficient. It’s 
more cost efficient to work here than in India.
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5 Business Times Singapore, Overcoming that fear of making mistakes, 9 June 2012.
A culture of innovation
Singh was very clear about what it took to win in his industry:
My philosophy is simple: first, allow people to make mistakes. Second, allow 
people to implement their ideas. Both of these create a sense of belonging 
that you can’t get any other way. And when you go to our people and say, 
“We seem to have a challenge (problem)” or “Can’t we do this any other 
way?” it awakens the child in them, and they start thinking creatively. 
Innovation is common sense – if I take away the barriers to change, and I 
encourage people to own their work, it’s really not that difficult.
Let me give you an example. We had a new customer; they wanted their 
channel to have a unique feature that was slightly different. When you 
watch TV today, every channel has something slightly different. Adding 
this point of difference to the programs involves developing or acquiring 
a very expensive piece of software that runs into thousands of dollars. 
Our client wanted this option but did not want to spend that much money. 
We spoke to our engineers, and one immediately said, “Oh, we have done 
a similar feature for another customer and if we spend some time, we 
can develop a plug-in”. He and the team worked for 15 days and nights 
in a row and developed the plug-in. As a management team, we heard 
the suggestion, added to it, devoted the resources and got an innovative 
solution. That level of motivation only comes if you empower people and 
support them. It comes with a sense of ownership. I have always said, 
“Children are freer in the playground than in the classroom!”
Aaron Shaw, chief technology officer, called these "small 
science projects", which gave the company an edge in the 
market: "As a company we do not invent big things; our 
people increase the value of technology by small practical 
innovations." Singh believed that it was the small innovations 
in all aspects of the business that ended up building 
a strong innovation culture. As a result, no processes or 
working methods were ever considered untouchable, and 
everyone was encouraged to suggest changes to the way 
tasks were carried out.
Enhancing productivity through process redesign
Growth in the media industry was costly and capital 
intensive. Rather than working only to reduce costs, Singh 
believed in increasing productivity, which meant increasing 
efficiency and thus reducing cost per unit. Improvement 
through innovation was a continuous process and only 
happened if every department took baby steps, every single 
day. All aspects of work processes and methods were 
looked at. The period between 2009 and 2012 had been 
a period of continuous change in terms of both hardware 
and software. This shift was particularly challenging for 
feed playout, channel monitoring, programme scheduling, 
and content management. In addition, employees all came 
with their preferred individual processes. With a top team 
overseeing each function, Encompass was able to ensure 
that each and every module was looked at and redesigned 
to match the needs of the individual teams. This process 
of redesign created efficiencies and a feeling of ownership 
around these solutions.
Other innovations came from simple things like changing 
the physical layout of the offices, as was the case with 
the space dedicated to monitoring channels. An operator 
monitored six channels, checking image and sound quality 
as the content was streamed. Initially, work areas (called 
pods) were divided by high partition walls that isolated 
each individual from the sound in the next pod. But these 
operators demonstrated that sound monitoring could be 
done through the process of automation, and any sound 
from a neighbouring pod was only a minor disturbance. 
An insight that Singh had gleaned from his first-hand 
interaction with staff was that greater gains could be 
achieved by tearing the partitions down between the pods 
and providing the operators with the technological and 
automation tools necessary to monitor an increased number 
of channels (raising the number of channels from six to ten 
per operator) thus making the job more interesting, while 
reducing cost per channel. Singh explained:
The cost for monitoring 10 channels is a fixed one, but you could choose 
between having two people monitoring five channels each, or you could 
tear down the walls and give people the tools to monitor all 10 channels 
at once. So we sat down with the operations staff, discussed its feasibility 
and asked for their suggestions on how to do it.In a similar case, Encompass’ Singapore facility had to go 
through a power upgrade. But it was impossible to simply 
turn off the power of the entire building and connect a new 
power system. Singh and his team had consulted all the 
best power engineers to find a solution, but unfortunately, 
without success. Instead, Encompass’ in-house team 
devised a practical solution. It proposed that the upgrade 
be done in three phases, by dividing the entire facility into 
three zones. It meant that the process would take longer, 
but it saved the company thousands of dollars. Each rack 
was migrated one by one, ensuring that each piece of 
equipment was always supported by two sources of 
power, thus eliminating the risk of any downtime due to 
power failure.
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Promoting a culture of collaboration
Other signs of innovation at Encompass were linked to how 
different departments worked together. In the beginning, 
employees were organised in a matrix, focusing only on their
specific jobs, and often reporting to different heads. Singh 
changed this, ensuring that all employees knew what 
others were doing and were able to replace one another. 
Lin explained:
In big organisations, the information flow is very slow. For example, finance 
only finds out about a sale once it is done. Previously, there were silos and 
people reported to a functional boss. This meant no one worried about 
the impact on another department or thought about the work of another 
department in the company. Now they work across departments. Deepak 
would involve all of us from the start of any project. We are involved in 
the decision making process. For new sales, finance works along with 
engineering and sales from the prospect phase to the conclusion of the 
contract. For any innovative improvement project, the top team gets 
involved from the beginning. So I from finance can understand what is 
coming. We need to sign off together. It is shared responsibility. People 
work very closely across departments. There are no silos. We don’t sit on 
stuff, we are very fast. You can’t afford to be slow in the media industry.
Sharma concurred:
As much as my card says sales and marketing, I am also responsible for 
content management. We sit down with the customer as a team and come 
up with the most cost-effective solution without compromise on the quality 
of the transmission. Our collaborative team work has been a winning 
unique selling point for us. Our overlapping functions help us to think 
innovatively and come up with out of the box solutions and our volumes 
drive the costs effectively thereby benefiting the customer.
Shaw added:
We also push this collaborative approach down into the organisation. For 
example, I get the technical and operations management team together 
every week to review the projects and issues and to make sure that they 
are in sync in terms of what needs to be delivered. I’m mostly a guiding 
hand and rarely have to take control. For the most part they work out a 
solution for what needs to be done and how to best achieve it and in doing 
so take on a sense of shared ownership in a way that they would not for 
“orders from above”. They are more motivated to achieve goals that they 
have helped to set and take on a pride of ownership that extends that 
motivation into the future.
This strong collaborative culture further supported 
innovation. Singh explained:
I can go to any team now and say, “I know this has never been done before, 
it might be tough or even impossible, but the customer needs it and if 
we can find a way to deliver this we will definitely have a winning edge.” 
And immediately, people will start thinking of ways to make it happen. 
This collective attitude of “we will innovate” to make it happen is our 
winning edge in the market. Typically it’s the resistance from the shop floor 
that kills even the best new technology. You need to make sure everyone 
is involved in the innovation. Instead of having management deciding, 
we take it from the ground up... Most people don’t know how innovative 
they can be. But if you ask your employees, they often give you the simple 
innovative solutions. They know what it takes to make their own work more 
effective and all you need to do is to give them the confidence and tools 
to make it happen. 
One such example of innovation was the launch of a 
‘Localised Advertisement Insertion’ feature in programmes 
on TV. Historically, advertisement campaigns were global 
and then gradually went regional. But the real challenge 
was the need to localise them for smaller markets. Typically, 
localised advertisements were carried in print media.
Encompass’ idea was to innovate using current technology 
and to turn paper ads into TV ads, so that local viewers 
would see advertisements that were tailored specifically 
to where they lived. This would create a completely new 
market. Encompass was the first company to propose the 
service, and the solution had been “invented” during an 
informal discussion with the engineering team on the shop 
floor. The team thought it might be a good idea and had 
an innovative solution that was entirely automated, and 
therefore relatively inexpensive. This solution was then 
proposed to a number of prospective customers and became 
an immediate success.
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Invest in technology
Singh believed Encompass needed to stay ahead when it 
came to technical innovation. The company had invested 
over US$10 million in the Singapore facilities over the two 
years leading to 2012, generating a marked increase in the 
productivity of employees, and allowing the company to 
effectively compete in the Asian market. The investments 
had also made Encompass one of the largest digitised 
content storehouses in the region.
At first the workforce, who feared that jobs might be at 
stake, resisted any automation process. But at Encompass 
Singapore, the top team made it clear to employees that 
automation would increase efficiency and fuel growth, 
insisting that this was not a cost reduction exercise but 
a growth strategy made possible through innovation and 
efficiency. Singh noted:
We grew from 27 channels to 100 channels while adding only 10 people 
to our existing 140. The strategy is to give people the tools to manage the 
growth rather than just add headcount. 
With greater efficiency and higher quality output, Encompass had achieved 
dramatic growth. When people are not afraid of suddenly becoming 
redundant, they adopt the change willingly.
Creating a culture that enables innovation
Singh intended to grow staff from 140 to 175 by the end of 
2016. But more importantly, he wanted to ensure that his 
staff were motivated and enjoyed their work. He believed in 
creating a positive workplace:
An employee who loves to come to the office will be more productive than 
someone who says, “I have to go to the office today because I have to pay 
my mortgage”… People should be proud of coming here. And my gauge 
of that is when kids can tell their friends, “That is where my mother or 
father works”. 
Singh felt that it was important to treat employees well 
and provide them with the necessary training and tools 
needed to do their job efficiently and more productively. 
He launched initiatives that included booking a cinema for 
a movie night with staff and family, showing children of 
employees how TV content was produced, and setting up 
a recreation room where staff could play table tennis and 
Futsal, connect, and relax at the cafeteria.
Singh wanted employees to feel they were part of a nurturing 
environment that tolerated mistakes.
An open and conducive culture will propagate creativity, bravery and trust 
among employees. Just like how my bosses in my early years had always 
encouraged and nurtured me to dispel doubts and embrace my fear of 
making mistakes, business leaders should also allow their employees to 
take a wrong turn without the fear of being penalised.
I am open to people making mistakes in the company as long as they 
learn from them. I make it a point to regularly discuss with my employees 
their new ideas and vision for the company. All ideas, small or big, are 
appreciated and looked into.
At Encompass, we do not encourage the "knowledge is power so I retain 
it" syndrome. Employees know that they should share their learning 
and skills across departments. I have found that better communication 
among employees makes them look forward to coming to work and 
contributing, increasing productivity. The outcome? A happy, nurturing 
and conducive workplace.5
His team concurred. Sharma added:
Deepak gets personally involved in creating the environment. Operationally 
he leaves the decisions to the team. But when it becomes critical he steps 
in and adds value keeping the sensitivities in mind. He has a true open 
door policy. And if there is an issue, he will call us in and ask us for an 
opinion. We always come out of his meetings with a clear understanding 
and an agreement on what needs to be done. We really work closely and 
well together.
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The team believed that the way the company thought and 
was organised would enable significant growth over the 
coming years. Shaw added:
We do our cookie cutting very efficiently through innovation. Right now, 
our infrastructure costs are stabilised because we don’t have to invest for 
each new client. Economies of scale come in with growth. Only labour is 
expensive for us now.
But above and beyond economies of scale, and process 
improvements, it was the company’s ability to capitalise on 
opportunities – a sign of its innovative thinking – that would 
prove critical to its growth. One stark example resulted 
from the aftermath of the traumatic events of the Japanese 
tsunami and Thai floods of 2011. Following these disasters, 
the production of tapes in two of the most critical markets 
came to a complete standstill. And it was the employees 
on the shop floor at Encompass that picked up on this 
trend: customers were calling them to ask them whether 
they might have old tapes which they could borrow and 
then return. 
Fortunately, Encompass was already leading the way in 
digitising content, and when their clients were compelled 
to send content across in digital form over the fibre network, 
Encompass was ready.
Conclusion
As Sharma stated:
Our competitors did not see the potential for growth. They did not see the 
potential in the Asian market. They did not think this business had such 
a huge scope. We’ve given them food for thought. So now, we are a role 
model. We are ahead of the curve and that feels good. At every stage we 
did small things differently. So it wasn’t about making huge changes but 
small continuous improvements.
Singh was proud of the culture the team had built, and 
he had big ambitions for the company: "China is the 
manufacturing warehouse of the world because different 
companies can use the same factory to produce goods. 
Similarly, India is the back-end office of the world. My 
ambition is to make Singapore and our Loyang facility 
the centre for digital media."6 While he aimed to grow the 
company’s customer base by 20 percent year on year, he 
was mindful that neighbouring countries would be catching 
up, and that Encompass’ innovation culture was both a 
liability and a threat:
The day you stop innovating and improving, people will surpass you within 
12-18 months because you are not creating any IP. It’s a bit like being on 
a bicycle: if you stop, you fall over. Which means you can never stop – you 
need to develop and maintain an innovation culture.
6 Business Times Singapore, Overcoming that fear of making mistakes, June 9, 2012
This being said, Singh and his team were clear in their 
message to staff: the company was growing and everyone 
needed to work outside their comfort zone. Singh and Shaw 
led an initiative wherein they formally asked each employee 
what job they wanted to do. Some employees had been 
in the same job for a long time, and were asked whether 
they wanted to try something different. Some seized the 
opportunity and took on a new role, while others tried 
different roles and elected to go back to their first job. The 
latter were not penalised. This initiative had encouraged 
the staff to try new roles and grab new opportunities. The 
constant drive to innovate permeated the culture of the 
company. Sharma explained:
There has been a shift in thought process: people even at the lowest 
levels of the organisation think, “We can innovate and we don’t need to do 
everything ourselves. Can we do this through automation or do we have to 
do it manually?” As soon as they think about this first question, everyone 
starts thinking about how to improve things.
If a competitor recruited us, we could take our leadership and process 
oriented qualities there, but if I don’t have a team that is synergised I 
won’t be able to make a difference there. So a synergized team, right from 
the top to the supervisor at the shop floor thinking along the same lines, 
makes the difference.
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Revenue
Staff costs
Depreciation of property, 
plant and equipment
Other operating expenses
Total expenses
Profit/(loss) before tax
Income tax credit/(expense)
Profit/(loss) for the year
Percent to revenue
CY2011
25,776,894
(8,379,173)
(5,273,479)
(9,050,655)
(22,703,307)
3,073,587
(493,232)
2,580,355
10
CY2009
25,973,718
(7,225,768)
(6,649,634)
(7,485,723)
(21,361,125)
4,612,593
(745,130)
3,867,463
15
FY 2012 (15 months)*
33,201,923
(10,603,084)
(6,674,574)
(11,884,663)
(29,162,321)
4,039,603
(599,564)
3,440,039
10
CY2010
25,295,344
(7,834,155)
(6,374,906)
(9,680,867)
(23,889,928)
1,405,415
96,197
1,501,612
6
CY 2008
27,966,169
(6,991,670)
(7,241,002)
(8,467,795)
(22,700,468)
5,265,702
(994,776)
4,270,926
15
Source: Encompass, Company data.
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